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ISSUES OF PROPRIETY IN NEGOTIATED JUSTICE
BY DONALD J. NEWMAN* AND EDGAR C. NEMOYER**
Due in part to both the erWarren Court" and the public's concep-
tion of "law and order," a heightened interest in the field of criminal
justice has recently emerged. One of the chief concerns arising from
this increased interest is the propriety of plea bargaining - a practice
that is probably the dominant form of non-trial adjudication in our
system of criminal justice today. Professors Newman and NeMoyer
discuss this practice of negotiated justice from many different perspec-
tives. The authors accurately pinpoint the many present and potential
abuses of the practice which have been justly condemned by critical
observers of the criminal justice system. The authors do, however, feel
that a compromise can be reached that not only will retain this admit-
tedly efficient practice but also will solve the serious propriety
concerns that now cloud the practice of negotiated justice. If the state
removes the practice from the shadows within which it now operates
and bases its charge and sentence concessions on the proper motivations,
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INTRODUCTION
N EGOTIATED criminal convictions and the processes by which
they are accomplished have recently received increased attention
by courts, researchers, bar associations, and other observers of and
commentators on the criminal justice system.' What has emerged from
the research and from the kinds of cases which have reached appellate
1 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Pleas of Guilty (approved
draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT]; L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 924-1000 (3d ed. 1969); D. NEWMAN,
CONVICTION-THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966)
[hereinafter cited as D. NEWMAN]; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, Disposition
Without Trial (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
VOL, 47
NEGOTIATED JUSTICE
court levels is a picture of American courtroom justice which is sub-
stantially different from that of the adversary process epitomized by
the jury trial. Although the guilty plea process in general, and the
negotiated plea in particular, are highly adversary processes in many
cases, they operate in a manner that is sub rosa, largely invisible, and
without the ground rules that place constraints on the formal battle of
contested cases in the courtroom. The great issues and conflicts in
modern American criminal law, ranging from the Miranda warnings
to disputes over different tests of insanity, are rendered largely irrele-
vant by guilty pleas. Ironically, the significance of the leading criminal
decisions of the Warren court may be primarily the extent to which
their possible application can be threatened by a defendant attempting
to reach a compromise with the State.
Plea negotiation has long been familiar to initiates of the criminal
court: an elite, if you will, made up of offenders (particularly recidi-
vists who have gone the route before), prosecuting attorneys, experi-
enced defense counsel, and trial court judges. And the army of court
attendants -clerks, bailiffs, jailers, police, and probation staff-
also have been cognizant of plea negotiation in practice if not in theory.
Recently, however, the world of the negotiated plea has come to the
awareness of outsiders, including legal scholars, appellate court judges,
sociologists, and various bar commissions and committees. This is not
to say that such practices were unknown to these persons, but rather
that these practices were not attended to directly and frankly or con-
sidered to be of any particular major consequence.
Yet the guilty plea, particularly where it is overtly negotiated,
describes a form of criminal justice that may well be the dominant
form of adjudication in virtually all jurisdictions. 2 Negotiated justice -
suspects and defendants "dealing" with the state - has wide perim-
eters; including such practices as police exercising leniency with
informants, parole board "negotiating" releases with prisoners, and
probation and parole officers bargaining with their charges where
revocation is possible.8 Yet, the focus of negotiated justice and its
major impact on our ideological foundations occurs at stages where
2 ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1, states that -in some localities as many as 95 percent
of the criminal cases are disposed of in this way (pleas of guilty]"; TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 9, indicates a guilty plea percentage of 87 percent in trial courts of
general jurisdiction in states in which such information was available.
3 For a general treatment of negotiation at points other than the plea of guilty see Cressey,
Negotiated Justice, 5 CRIMINOLOGICA 5 (1968), and Scheff, Negotiated Realit0 : Notes
on Power in the Assessment of Responsibility, 16 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 3 (1968). For a
descriptive analysis of factors relevant to the granting or denial of parole see Dawson,
The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law and Practice,
1966 U. WASH. L.Q. 243-85; and for an analysis of revocation discretion, see Hunt,
The Revocation Decision: A Study of Probation and Parole Agents Discretion, 1964
(unpublished MSW thesis, University of Wisconsin), partly reproduced in REMINGTON,




the prosecutor and the court are involved and where the citizen becomes
the convicted offender. The protections of the criminal trial are, after
all, one of our cultural hallmarks, and the propriety of bargaining for
pleas of guilty where the right to trial is given up raises important
questions, questions which go to the very underpinnings of criminal
justice in our society.
I. THE PURPOSES OF NEGOTIATED PLEAS
Since there has been much recently written about this topic, it is
perhaps unnecessary to go into great detail about the relative merits
of guilty plea contracts for both the state and the accused. It is sufficient
to emphasize that from the point of view of the state, the guilty plea
system is by far the most efficient way of achieving and maintaining
a high conviction rate. It is quick, cheap, and relatively effortless.
Furthermore, it is effective in the sense that it assures conviction, a
result that is always uncertain at trial no matter how carefully the
state's case is prepared. Whether it is effective in larger perspective, i.e.,
the successful rehabilitation of offenders who are so convicted, is
another matter, the answer to which is not quite so clear.
For example, it has been claimed that a long range effect of
bargain justice is cynicism, not reform, and that it leads to sentence
disparity, not uniform treatment. 4 But from the point of view of the
state, the guilty plea, whether it is negotiated or not, avoids all the
sticky questions of law that have so recently confronted the Supreme
Court. In most jurisdictions the plea is a waiver of all prior defects:
There is no test of whether a search was legal or illegal; there is no test
of whether the Miranda warning was properly given; and there is no
test of whether the evidence gathered by the state even proves a prima
facie case of guilt against the defendant, unless there is a pre-trial
(pre-plea here) hearing. In most jurisdictions permitting the guilty
plea, the police, the prosecutor, and, at least until the present time,
the trial judge, are generally off the hook.5
It is important to note, however, that the advantages of the guilty
plea to the state are not simply matters of efficiency and avoidance
4 See Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385 (1951).
See also Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect Upon Systems for the
Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 495 (1958); Remington
& Newman, The Highland Park Institute on Sentence Disparity, 26 FED. PoB. 3 (March
1962); Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 222 (1956). See generally Seminar and Institute on Dis-
parity of Sentences, 30 F.R.D. 401 (1962); D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 42-44, 99-104,
210-16, 230.
5he chance of successfully challenging a guilty plea by appeal has traditionally been
extremely remote, but today the number of potential successes of such appeals may be on
the increase. See generally Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Case v.
Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963); L. HALL, supra note 1, at 12; C. WIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE (CIMINAL) §§ 589-91 (1969).
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of any challenge to enforcement methods and the quantum of evidence.
There is potentially in every plea an element of equity that full prose-
cution, maximum charging, and maximum sentencing after a trial may
preclude. By downgrading charges and/or by granting probation, the
conscientious prosecutor and judge may act to individualize justice by
making sensible distinctions between defendants who, although tech-
nically guilty of the same criminal conduct, do not deserve either the
same record or the same mandatory sentence. Furthermore, plea negoti-
ation and sentencing leniency act to support other parts of the criminal
justice system. Leniency in charging or sentencing may be an effective
reward for police informers or for cooperative state's witnesses without
whom more serious cases could not be developed. Charge reduction
and plea negotiation may select for the probation staff those offenders
most likely to respond to treatment in the community, whereas full
enforcement and maximum conviction might put inappropriate offend-
ers in correctional institutions to their long-range detriment and at
great loss to their families and the community at large. In short, the
avoidance of rigidity and slot-machine justice- in addition to matters
of efficiency and the avoidance of challenge to enforcement methods
and quantum of evidence - constitute at least one side of the state's
case in plea negotiation.
The advantages of plea negotiation from the point of view of the
defendant are, of course, reasonably obvious. He receives a sentence
less severe than that allocated by the legislature for his actual criminal
conduct. Or, and this is a factor of independent importance, he may
receive a label that is neither as harsh nor as damaging as that which
would normally attach to his conduct. Having a record of conviction
for a misdemeanor is almost always better than having a felony record;
likewise, conviction for assault has a somewhat less negative connotation
that conviction for forcible rape. Furthermore, the defendant and his
family sometimes benefit or at least suffer minimum reputational harm
from the relative anonymity of the guilty plea process. A defendant
who goes through a trial, even if he is eventually acquitted, often finds
details of his private life and allegations of his criminal proclivities
spread daily throughout his community. The guilty plea, however, is
quick and generally not as newsworthy as the full-scale trial where all
the evidence is laid out, the case of Senator Edward Kennedy notwith-
standing.
Certain defendants, particularly those who have long prior records
or who otherwise are not able or eligible to be placed on bail, have
still another advantage in "copping-out." The long but customary delay
in scheduling trial in most jurisdictions means that these persons will
1970
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spend a relatively long period of time in detention pending trial,6 and
most offenders with any prior experience prefer to do time in a prison
(a facility for convicted persons) rather than in a lock-up or jail (a
facility for persons awaiting trial). Hence, where the possibility of an
eventual prison sentence is fairly likely anyway, a quick arraignment
and a guilty plea will move the defendant rather rapidly from the jail
into the prison environment which, on the average, is more comfortable,
cleaner, safer, and less given to the long weeks of idleness, character-
istic of pre-trial lock-ups.
A point often overlooked is the possible benefit of wide-spread
plea bargaining to those defendants who now elect to stand trial.
Should plea negotiation be somehow curtailed, with a corresponding
increase in the number of trials, it could well have the effect of judges
and juries taking a more cavalier attitude towards the rights of defen-
dants. A flood of trials, particularly with a greater likelihood of guilty
persons demanding them since they gain nothing by a guilty plea, could
well erode the presumption of innocence which is stronger if the event,
namely a demand for trial, is comparatively rare.
II. TYPES OF PLEA NEGOTIATION
There are at least two major forms of plea negotiations whose
propriety is of current concern. One type, the "implicit bargain," is
present in practically all guilty pleas and has to do with differential
sentencing leniency shown to the pleader over the defendant (perhaps
with the same prior record and accused of the same crime) who has
demanded trial. The pervasiveness of this practice is clear' and amounts
to encouraging a steady flow of guilty pleas, reducing the congestion
of trial calendars in metropolitan areas, and in each case, rural or urban,
avoiding the effort and uncertainty of trial.
Trial judges are the chief proponents and often the sole initiates
of such practices.' In the ordinary case the defendant has not overtly
made any bargain with the prosecutor or the court but has entered his
plea in hope of a sentencing break. In effect, he throws himself on the
6 For the impact on defendants and the subsequent outcome of their cases, see Ares & Sturz,
Bail and the Indigent Accused, 8 CRIM. & DEL. 12 (1962); LaFave, Alternatives to the
Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L. FORUM 8; Paulsen, Pre-Trial Release in the United
States, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 109 (1966); Rankin, The Effect of Pre-trial Detention, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 641 (1964); Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York
Cit), 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693 (1958).
7 CROSS, PARADOXES IN PRISON SENTENCES, 22-24 (1965); LUMMUS, THE TRIAL JUDGE
(1937); D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, ch.4; Ohlin & Remington, supra note 4, at 500-07;
Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 285-89 (1959); see Comment, supra note 4.
8 While trial judges in the past have often been the sole initiates of "implicit" plea nego-
tiation, recent legislative developments have added a new and not yet fully understood
dimension to this process. Laws have been passed which provide for differing sentence
alternatives, depending on whether the conviction was obtained by a full scale trial or
a plea of guilty. This "implicit" plea negotiation on the part of the legislature raises
not only propriety questions but also constitutional issues of the highest order. See
§ III (B) infra.
VOL. 47
NEGOTIATED JUSTICE
mercy of the court; and the court, fully attuned to its own workload
and faced with the inevitable uncertainty of any trial, responds by
showing mercy of a greater measurable extent to those who plead than
to those who are convicted following a full-scale trial.
The other major type of bargaining and the one most commonly
alluded to when the negotiated plea is discussed involves the overt
trading of the guilty plea for prior concessions of charge reduction,
dismissals of other charges, or sentence recommendations for leniency
from the state.
Both types of negotiation, implicit and overt, have significant impli-
cations for the daily administration of criminal justice. Moreover, each
raises important questions of propriety.
III. CONCERN FOR THE PROPRIETY OF PLEA NEGOTIATION
The guilty plea process, including both the implicit bargain and
the practice of negotiated convictions, can be evaluated from a number
of different perspectives. Few deny the efficiency of guilty pleas; some
are bothered about their possible inaccuracy. That is, there is some
concern that the administrative merits of pleading guilty are so attrac-
tive to some defendants, particularly to those who have been convicted
previously, that innocent people will admit to crimes they did not in
fact commit. This is one level of concern, and various states (as well as
the U.S. Supreme Court) have revised rules in regard to pleading
procedure.' Some have attempted to build certain safeguards into the
arraignment proceeding, such as requiring the judge, prior to his accep-
tance of the plea, to investigate to the point where he becomes satisfied
in his own mind that the defendant is in fact guilty of the crime charged
or, assuming charge reduction, guilty of no crime less serious than the
one to which he is pleading.1"
Another basic concern with pleas and plea negotiation, however,
does not relate specifically to whether they accurately separate the guilty
from the innocent but to whether attendant practices of differential
sentencing and overt bargaining for charge reduction are proper forms
of justice per se. Even if it were demonstrated that all defendants who
pleaded guilty were in fact guilty of criminal conduct, an independent
question of the propriety of bargaining to elicit pleas remains. The
issue becomes sharply drawn between those who see no distinction
between inducement and coercion in negating the voluntary consent
of the defendant to plead guilty and those who do see a difference.
9 For example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, as amended in 1966 requires the judge to address the
defendant personally to determine if the plea is being made voluntarily and the defendant
understands the consequences of his plea. It also requires the judge to satisfy himself
that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty. See 15 ALA. CODE TIT. § 264 (1958);
VA. CODE ANNOT. §§ 19.1-192, 19.1-193 (1960).
10 See also ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, § 1.6.
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A. The Conflict and Its Advocates
The basis of the conflict extends throughout the entire system of
criminal justice. There are many devices and techniques for obtaining
confessions which are considered improper per se, even if independent
evidence proves the person guilty of the criminal conduct. For example,
coercion or threat of coercion - the third degree - is repugnant in our
ideology not only because it may lead to untrustworthy confessions, but
because such brutality is intrinsically improper in a democratic society.
There are, in short, enforcement procedures and techniques which, as
Justice Frankfurter put it, "shock the conscience;"'" and some, at least,
are excluded on due process as well as other constitutional grounds
from our law enforcement techniques. There is, however, no specific
list of totally improper, as distinguished from wholly proper, enforce-
ment methods or devices. There is a good deal of controversy and
conflict about many techniques. For example, in the encouragement
of crime by police (the behavior precursive to the inducement of entrap-
ment), the majority position of most appellate courts permits such
encouragement unless the police act to induce crime in an otherwise
"innocent" defendant.12 The minority position' s is that police encourage-
ment of crime, even in those who are not "innocent," is in itself
repugnant. Questions of propriety extend to post conviction and post
sentencing treatment of offenders as well and are not limited solely
to eighth amendment matters of cruel or unusual punishment. There
appears to be increasing awareness of prisoners' rights, including require-
ments for at least some degree of procedural regularity and due process
in those decisions made about prisoners while under sentence. 4
The same propriety issue is now clearly drawn in respect to induce-
ment of pleas of guilty, either by means of traditional leniency given
for the plea itself or as a result of a deal after overt bargaining. The
propriety question about plea negotiation, as at many other points in
the process, is whether an inducement-based system is any more proper
than one which rests on coercion, which is clearly contrary to our system
of government. Is a promise by a prosecutor to "recommend" probation
really any different from a threat to "throw the book" at a defendant
11 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
12The majority position is stated in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) and
also incorporated in the ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (proposed official draft.
1962).
13 The minority position was stated by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
1'4 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963);
Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964). See Barkin, The Emergence of
Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REv.
669 (1966); Kimball & Newman, judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat
and Response, 14 CIuM. & DEL. 1 (1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONS, The Legal Status ol Convicted
Persons, 82 (1967); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law,
110 U. PA. L. Rv. 985 (1962).
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if he pleads not guilty? Is the dropping of a charge in an indictment
to a lesser count, particularly to an "illogical" lesser offense,15 in
exchange for a guilty plea a proper practice when the prosecutor, court,
and defendant know that the defendant committed a more serious
crime and that the evidence in fact supports conviction on the higher
offense?
While as yet there are only a few identifiable members and spokes-
men among those who propose and those who oppose plea bargaining,
perhaps this is because it is a new conflict, relatively speaking, litigated
only rarely on the appellate court level, not yet spoken to directly by
the United States Supreme Court, and only recently the focus of schol-
arly attention. The array of opponents versus proponents, the extensive-
ness of case law on both sides of the issue, and well articulated
arguments for or against such practices are by no means as common
nor easily available as similar debates about more familiar criminal
justice concerns, such as wiretapping, the consequences of the exclu-
sionary rule, or the effects of the Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, battle
lines about the propriety of plea negotiation are being drawn, and it
might reasonably be expected to become a more common basis of
dispute as more cases reach higher courts and more data is accumulated.
With the vast majority of criminal cases being terminated today by
guilty pleas, 6 it is an issue, the importance of which, cannot be denied.
Debate over the propriety of plea negotiation rests upon multiple
considerations, but the major conflict is between those who advocate
recognition (and possible control) of plea negotiation on the grounds
of expediency and those who see it as a distortion of our criminal
justice ideology. In the latter viewpoint, plea negotiation is intrinsically
improper and, furthermore, is dangerous and corrupting in its eventual
consequences. The argument that plea bargaining is efficient, even
"necessary," carries no weight against the fundamental impropriety of
the state "dealing" with criminals by inducing pleas.
Those who take the opposite tack, namely that such dealing is not
necessarily improper, rest their case in good part on the administrative
realities of current adjudication practices. In fact, they argue that the
"sociology" of our criminal justice world makes negotiation - expressed
or implicit - normative. There is good evidence that negotiation is
widespread and there are many who claim that without it the criminal
justice system would simply bog down (the assumption being that many
more trials would result -a researchable assumption in itself) Y1
Assuming this bog down and accepting negotiated justice as not simply
16For a discussion of "illogical" charges, see D. NEWMAN, supra note I at 99-104.
'6See note 2 supra.
17 LUMMUS, THE TRIAL JUDGE 46-47 (1937); Steinberg & Paulsen, A Conversation with
Defense Counsel on Problems of a Criminal Defense, 7 PRAC. LAW. 25, 31 (May 1961).
See also United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. II. 1960).
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a minor variation of American justice but a major characteristic of it,
the argument goes that independent considerations of propriety are not
only irrelevant but are really ridiculous. The thing to do is get with it,
to recognize plea bargaining, to legitimatize the norm, to make visible
what is now an invisible process, and, in short, to bring into the open,
with appropriate sanctions and controls, what are presently common
and indeed inevitable practices no matter how much they deviate from
the hypothetical postures of our criminal justice ideals.
From this pragmatic perspective, it can be argued that the only
thing bad about plea bargaining is that it is sub rose and uncontrolled.
It is not really corruptive like bribery, nor should it act to convict the
innocent or even to harm the guilty. In fact, the leniency of plea
bargaining benefits both the state and the accused, and no one is
threatened or hurt. Therefore, as with many conflicts between ideal
and real, one can resolve the dilemma by simply recognizing the way
things are and attempting to exert proper control over it.
Further, it can be argued that there is really nothing wrong in such
an approach. Who is to say that full enforcement, maximum charging,
and the full dress trial system are any better, fairer, more just, or more
accurate than the system of plea negotiation as it operates in most
district attorneys' offices and courtroom hallways? Indeed, perhaps it
can be demonstrated that the negotiation system is in many ways more
equitable and more just than its maximum implementation counterpart.
Legislatures which define crimes and affix penalties to them are
necessarily distant from individual defendants; and, by the nature of
their tasks, they find it necessary to generalize, so that underlying the
sentences in written law is the implicit assumption that all burglars are
pretty much alike. Any distinctions between cases can be accommodated
by whatever sentencing discretion is given the trial judge. Legislatures
deal with offense and offender categories and not individual violators.
They forbid forcible rape and assign a penalty to an anonymous collec-
tion of persons who may in fact be convictable of that crime. Prose-
cuting attorneys and judges, however, deal not in abstractions but with
individual people and with single cases, all with a myriad of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. The flexibility created by charge reduction
and sentencing leniency allows, or can allow, the system to operate more
equitably.
The supporters of plea agreement practices generally argue control
as strongly as recognition. Negotiation must be made visible, be circum-
scribed, and be made to follow certain practices and procedures as well
as to serve the efficiency needs of the court system. There are, of course,
inherent dangers in the exercise of negotiation discretion just as there
are inherent dangers in any type of administrative decisionmaking.
The line between the use of charge reduction to individualize justice
VOL. 47
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and the use of charge reduction to perpetuate racial or economic bias
is a fine one, and one that is not tested or testable as long as the practice
remains relatively invisible to the general public, higher courts, and
the legislature itself. Formal recognition of the propriety of plea negoti-
ation and close adherence to guidelines for its practice will, it is assumed,
provide necessary checks on unbridled, and possibly bad, adjudicatory
discretion. Supporters of recognizing and tolerating (indeed encourag-
ing) plea agreements inevitably see distinctions between proper and
improper plea negotiation practices.
It might be worth noting at this point that the dichotomous cate-
gories for opposition or support of plea negotiation are not as readily
amenable to the standard labels which commonly become attached to
certain other criminal justice issues. In short, it is not necessarily a battle
between "liberals" and "conservatives", nor is it necessarily a dispute
between pragmatists and purists. There are strange bedfellows on each
side of the debate over the propriety of negotiated justice. This is not
to say that the positions cannot be categorized: One is clearly prag-
matically oriented and the other more idealistic. But even here the
distinction is not perfectly clear cut. For example, one who argues that
plea bargaining is normative, functional, efficient, and perhaps impos-
sible to eliminate could easily be labeled pragmatic. At the same time,
he may intersperse within his position the argument that within our
system of justice this is the only way that equity and fairness can be
built into what would otherwise be a sort of strict construction, slot-
machine administration of justice. To this extent, he is idealistic. He
sees plea bargaining as just, even though it deviates from some com-
monly expressed sentiments about conviction based on fully tested
evidence which has resulted from maximum enforcement efforts, full
charging, and strict adherence to the legislative intent that proscribes
certain conduct and affixes certain sentences.
On the other hand, the so-called purist says, in effect, that the only
proper form of justice is compliance with the legislative authority that
defines substantive criminal conduct and appropriate limits of sentence.
Such compliance involves a moral obligation placed on the court to be
simply a fact-finder on charges accurately brought by the prosecutor-
that is, charges consistent with the actual criminal conduct of the
violator and supported by sufficient and appropriately obtained evidence.
Although this form of strict construction appears based on an idealized
image of the relationship of legislature and court, the proponent may
have some pragmatic motivations. He may see the ultimate consequences
of plea negotiation as developing cynicism and disrespect for law not
only among those offenders who are processed by bargain justice but
also among the general public. Furthermore, while disdaining plea
negotiation as intrinsically corruptive, he may at the same time point
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out that one of the negative consequences of differential bargaining
opportunities is sentence disparity which, in turn, has serious implica-
tions for the rehabilitative efforts of correctional facilities. 8 Starting
from a posture expressed in idealistic terms, i.e., plea negotiation is
intrinsically bad, such arguments may rapidly incorporate the negative
pragmatic effects of bargaining on the long-range consequences of our
system of criminal justice, both in terms of those processed through it
and the image it presents to the general public.
The issue of propriety of negotiation practices cannot be resolved
simply by claiming a basis of kindness and the individualization of
justice any more than it can be resolved on the basis of efficiency. In
and of itself, the issue remains tenacious, plaguing and somewhat
unsettling in a broad view of our system of criminal justice. No matter
how efficient and no matter how benevolently intended, there seems
somehow to be something wrong with labeling (and sentencing) a
person as a burglar or petty thief when that person is, in fact, guilty of
armed robbery. Inaccurate labeling and lenient sentencing are the issues,
and the hangups, that are currently confronting courts, scholars, and
other observers of our system of justice.
The American Bar Association, through its Committee on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, has attempted to resolve the dilemma
of plea bargaining. In its model draft of standards relating to Pleas of
Guilty the committee recognized the propriety of the plea agreements:
In cases in which it appears that the interest of the public in the
effective administration of criminal justice (as stated in Section 1.8)
would thereby be served, the prosecuting attorney may engage in plea
discussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement. He should
engage in plea discussions or reach a plea agreement with the defendant
only through defense counsel, except when the defendant is not eligible
for or does not desire appointment of counsel and has not retained
counsel. 19
And the committee attempted to control such bargaining by: (1) pro-
viding that "similarly situated defendants" be given equal plea bargain-
ing opportunities;2" (2) forbidding the trial judge from participating
in initial plea discussions;2' (3) providing bargaining only with and
through defense counsel;" and (4) requiring the trial judge to make
an explanation in the formal record of the arraignment if he departs
Is It is one thing for correction administrators to cope with individuals sentenced by differ-
ent judges to different lengths of time for committing the same crimes; but it becomes
an even more complicated and difficult thing to deal with persons under sentence when
some, actually guilty of armed robbery, are serving a term for burglary whereas others,
guilty of armed robbery, are serving longer terms for convictions as charged. See generally
D. NEWMAN, supra note 1 at 43, 215, 230.
Is ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.1(a).
20 Id. § 3.1 (c).




from previously agreed upon concessions between prosecution and
defense.
28
While the ABA Committee goes a long way toward solving the
propriety issue by at least recognizing and attempting to control the
practice, the issue is by no means completely settled. Because of the
complexity of the process and the concerns that surround it, an exami-
nation of the specific types of plea bargaining and how they relate to
the propriety issue is in order.
B. The Propriety of feImplicit" Plea Negotiation
An issue which has come to the forefront of judicial debate is
whether or not it is proper for a trial court judge to impose a more
lenient sentence on a defendant who pleads guilty than on a counterpart
who is convicted after a full trial. The argument for this practice (and
there is ample evidence to show that it is common 24) is usually stated
in the negative - that is, the confessing and pleading defendant is
given leniency - rather than the reverse - that the defendant who
demanded trial was treated more harshly. There is a sound basis for
stating the issue in this manner. Judges who have threatened defendants
with long prison sentences unless they pleaded guilty have had the
convictions reversed and, in the process, have been chastized by appellate
courts for having "coerced" the guilty plea by threats of severity.
2 5
The more subtle framing of the commonly stated position today is not
that a defendant who demands his full constitutional rights to a trial
is treated severely simply because of the effort and cost of the trial, but
rather that the defendant who has "cooperated" and by his plea of
guilty has shown "repentence" is a more deserving candidate for
leniency.2 6 Since, in any event, the maximum term imposed on the
defendant convicted after trial is within statutory authorization, the
practice of differential leniency falls, with some exceptions, clearly
within established judicial sentencing discretion to distinguish between
defendants in dispersing sentences. There is then supposedly no threat
to or added punishment for the defendant who demands trial; there
is merely a break for the person who has "thrown himself on the mercy
of the court."
However, there seem to be clear exceptions to this rationale when
dealing with "legislative plea bargaining," i.e., when the legislature
231d. § 3.3(b).
2 See note 7 supra.
23Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Tateo, 214
F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), remanded for retrial, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). But see
Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959), where threats of a prosecutor were
considered insufficient to void conviction by plea. See also Comment, The Coerced Con-
fession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313 (1964).
2See, e.g., People v. Darrah, 33 Ill. App. 2d 175, 210 N.E. 2d 478 (1965); Pilot Institute
on Sentencing, supra note 7; King, Criminal Procedure from the Viewpoint of the Trial
Judge, 25 CONN. B. J. 202, 205 (1951); Comment, supra note 4, at 209-10 (1956).
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provides for the possibility of a higher penalty upon conviction after
a full trial than upon conviction by a plea of guilty. This becomes a
very serious and complex matter in cases where conviction after trial
could result in a death sentence but where such penalty is not statu-
torily permitted if the defendant is convicted by a plea of guilty. The
United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Jackson,27 held invalid the
death penalty provision of such a statutory arrangement. In striking
down the provision, Justice Stewart noted that "t]he inevitable effect
of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the
Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the
Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial .... Whatever might be
said of Congress' objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that
needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.' '28 Stewart
went on to say:
It is no answer to urge, as does the Government, that federal trial
judges may be relied upon to reject coerced pleas of guilty and invol-
untary waivers of jury trial. For the evil in the federal statute is not
that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that
it needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be inherently
coercive in order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden
upon the assertion of a constitutional right.29
Subsequently, two cases (each involving defendants who were
convicted before the Jackson decision) reached the Court in which the
appellants claimed that their respective guilty pleas were invalid because
they were coerced by fear of the death penalty which could be imposed
if they chose to plead not guilty and were convicted. However, in both
cases, Parker v. North Carolina"0 and Brady v. United States,3 the Court
held the pleas to be valid. In an opinion that discussed at length the
Jackson decision, the Court distinguished these pleas on the basis of
other evidence that, in the Court's opinion, rendered these pleas volun-
tary despite the legislative punishment scheme. It seems the "impermis-
sible burden" referred to in Jackson was not enough to invalidate the
otherwise voluntary pleas of Parker and Brady. The Court in Brady
commented:
A contrary holding would require the States and Federal Govern-
ment to forbid guilty pleas altogether, to provide a single invariable
penalty for each crime defined by the statutes, or to place the sentencing
function in a separate authority having no knowledge of the manner
in which the conviction in each case was obtained. In any event, it
would be necessary to forbid prosecutors and judges to accept guilty
pleas to selected counts, to lesser included offenses, or to reduced
charges. The Fifth Amendment does not reach so far.
3 2
7 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
25Id. at 581, 582.
2Id. at 583.
- 397 U.S. 790, (1970).




In combined dissenting (to Parker) and concurring (with Brady)
opinions, however, Mr. Justice Brennen, commenting on plea bargain-
ing as it applies to the situation in Jackson, Parker and Brady, wrote:
The Court attempts to submerge the issue of voluntariness of a
plea under an unconstitutional capital punishment scheme in a general
discussion of the pressures upon defendants to plead guilty which are
said to arise from, inter alia, the venerable institution of plea bargain-
ing. The argument appears to reduce to this: because the accused
cannot be insulated from all inducements to plead guilty, it follows that
he should be shielded from none.
The principal flaw in the Court's discourse on plea bargaining,
however, is that it is, at best, only marginally relevant to the precise
issues before us. There are critical distinctions between plea bargaining
as commonly practiced and the situation presently under consideration
- distinctions which, in constitutional terms, make a difference. Thus,
whatever the merit, if any, of the constitutional objections of plea
bargaining generally, those issues are not presently before us.
We are dealing here with the legislative imposition of a markedly
more severe penalty if a defendant asserts his right to jury trial and
a concomitant legislative promise of leniency if he pleads guilty. This
is very different from the give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably
possess relatively equal bargaining power. No such flexibility is built
into the capital penalty scheme where the government's harsh terms
with respect to punishment are stated in unalterable form.83
Apart from death penalty cases, there is some evidence to show
that this practice of differential leniency is supported by many trial
judges. For example, the Yale Law journal sent a questionnaire inquir-
ing about the plea-leniency relationship to all 240 federal judges and
received responses from 140 of them. Sixty-six percent of the respon-
dents considered the defendant's plea "a relevant factor in local
sentencing procedure," and the majority of them rewarded the defendant
pleading guilty with a less severe sentence than his counterpart who
had trial. 4 At a number of judicial sentencing institutes, particularly
among federal judges, the issue of whether the guilty plea, in and of
itself, should have independent significance in sentence determinations
was considered. The majority viewpoint at one such conference was
that the guilty plea should be considered a factor in showing leniency
for a number of different reasons: 35 (1) state costs are saved by the
guilty plea; (2) the chance of jury acquittal is waived by the pleading
defendant, thus assuring conviction of the guilty; (3) it is necessary
to encourage the practice of pleading guilty in order to efficiently
process ever-increasing numbers of criminal cases; (4) "the realization
of wrong-doing," evidenced by the pleading defendant, was seen as a
"step toward rehabilitation" and not as a position exhibited by one
33 397 U.S. 790, 808-09 (1970) (emphasis by the Court).
34 Comment, supra note 4, at 222.
35 Pilot Institute on Sentencing, supra note 7, at 287-89.
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who stood trial and who, in fact, may have perjured himself if he took
the stand in his own defense and was convicted anyway.
This was not the only position taken by sentencing judges. Some
said that it was simply wrong to penalize the defendant who exercised
his constitutional rights to a trial as against one who waived that right.
Their argument was that differential leniency, no matter how rational-
ized, had this effect. There was also a middle of the road position
which based the propriety issue on whether or not the defendant who
demanded trial entered a reasonable or a frivolous defense. If his
defense were frivolous, then it was agreed that differential sentencing
was proper; but if his defense were reasonable, then it was thought
that he should receive a sentence no more severe than his counterpart
who pleaded guilty.86 After the conference a committee of judges
composed what it called a "Decalogue of Sentencing," and one of
the points made therein was the following:
That the court is justified in giving a lesser sentence upon a plea
of guilty than it would give on a plea of not guilty, upon conviction
for the same offense after a trial in which the testimony of the accused
is proved to be false or in which there is some other circumstance
chargeable to the accused evincing a lack of good faith.37
One of the difficulties of getting at the propriety issue which may
be inherent in differential sentencing leniency is that the practice is
virtually invisible. There is no overt negotiation nor claim of it. If the
person who has had trial is sentenced within proper statutory bounds,
there is no cruel or unusual punishment issue involved. Since judges
rarely explain such differences, equal protection arguments are hard to
make.
However, a rather interesting case occurred some years ago in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 8 In this case,
there were four codefendants involved in a crime, three of whom
pleaded guilty; the other, Wiley, demanded trial. The defendant, Wiley,
who was tried and convicted, had on the record at least, a less serious
criminal background than any of his codefendants. Furthermore, his
part in the crime was peripheral (he was the driver of a car) compared
with his partners. However, he not only received a more severe sentence
than any of his three codefendants, but the judge made it clear that the
sentence was longer because he had asked for a trial. Indeed, the
defendant had requested consideration of probation, but the judge stated
that it was his "standing policy" to refuse probation to defendants who
demanded trial.3 9 In fact, he went on to say that had the defendant
demanded a jury trial instead of a bench trial, his sentence probably
36 Id. at 287.
7Id. at 379-80.
38United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
3 United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1959).
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would have been even longer.4" On appeal Wiley contended that it was
error for the judge to preclude probation following trial, and the court
of appeals agreed, remanding the cause for consideration of probation. 4
1
Then the trial judge held a hearing and denied probation; Wiley again
appealed. 42 On this appeal the court of appeals threw out the sentence
because the trial judge had punished the defendant for exercising, in
good faith, his right to a trial. 8
In a recent case reaching the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, the propriety of plea concessions was again
raised in a complicated case in which there was both overt plea negoti-
ation and the separate issue of differential leniency shown to a pleading
defendant where there was no prior agreement in this regard. In this
particular case a defendant named Scott was convicted after trial for
robbery and sentenced to prison for a term of five to fifteen years.
A codefendant changed his plea to guilty at the completion of the
government's case. The appellate court found the conviction of Scott
free from error but took under consideration the events surrounding
his sentencing, eventually affirming the conviction but remanding the
case for resentencing.4" The issues which gave the court pause in
the sentencing procedure involved, among other things, the statement
of the trial judge to Scott: " 'Now the Court didn't believe your story
on the stand, the Court believes you deliberately lied in this case. If you
had pleaded guilty to this offense, I might have been more lenient with
you.' "146 At this point the case looks quite similar to the issue in the
Wiley case. However, the circuit court noted that a new tangent to
the issue was raised when, during the sentencing hearing, the trial
judge read a letter submitted by the appellant. The letter was from the
appellant's attorney to the appellant, and it referred to a discussion
the lawyer had had with the judge's law clerk. In the letter the attorney
reported that in the clerk's opinion "there was only one way to get a
light sentence from Judge and that was to confess that
you did the robbery, to apologize four or five times and to say that you
were willing to turn over a new leaf. -' The clerk was then called to
the witness stand by the trial judge and stated: "It has always been
40ld. at 458.
41 United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).
4 United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
43 Id. at 504. On remand, the trial judge stated that he had information outside the record
which indicated that the criminal background of the defendant in question was actually
more known than the evidence in the official documents showed. At resentencing, he
again imposed a three-year sentence on the defendant but, bowing to the mandate of the
Court of Appeals, suspended execution of the sentence. United States v. Wiley, 184 F.
Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
"Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
45 Id.




my opinion that you view sentencing differently when someone admits
guilt than maintaining innocence. ' 48 The circuit court noted that the
judge himself then reacted to these issues by saying: "I hope sometime
I hear some defendant say, 'Judge, I am sorry, I am sorry for what I
did.' That is what I have in mind."49
In analyzing the issues involved in this particular sentencing,
Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit Court, who wrote the majority
opinion, stated:
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance concerning which
constitutional rights can tolerate some chilling effects and which cannot.
Perhaps the right to a trial, like the self-incrimination privilege but
apparently unlike the right to a jury, belongs in the latter camp. But
until the Supreme Court speaks, the practice of differential sentencing
should be evaluated with some attention paid to the nature of the price
extracted from those who plead innocent and why it is exacted.
Two arguments inevitably appear whenever differential sentencing
is discussed. The first is that the defendant's choice of plea shows
whether he recognizes and repents his crime. One difficulty with this
argument is that no court or commentator has explained why a defen-
dant's insistence upon his self-incrimination privilege is not also
evidence of a lack of repentence. Or his insistence that evidence
unconstitutionally seized should not be admitted.
Repentence has a role in penology. But the premise of our criminal
jurisprudence has always been that the time for repentence comes after
trial. The adversary process is a fact-finding engine, not a drama of
contrition in which a prejudged defendant is expected to knit up his
lacerated bonds to society.
There is a tension between the right of the accused to assert his
innocence and the interest of society in his repentence. But we could
consider resolving this conflict in favor of the latter interest only if trial
offered an unparalleled opportunity to test the repentence of the
accused. It does not. There is other, and better, evidence of such
repentence. The sort of information collected in presentence reports
provides a far more finely brushed portrait of the man than do a few
hours or days at trial. And the offender while on probation or in
prison after trial can demonstrate his insight into his problems far
better than at trial. 50
At a later point Judge Bazelon commented:
The second argument for differential sentencing is necessity.
Most convictions, perhaps as many as 90 per cent in some jurisdictions,
are the product of guilty pleas. Unless a large proportion of defendants
plead guilty, the argument runs, the already crowded dockets in many
jurisdictions would collapse into chaos.
Thus, to the extent that the appellant here received a longer
sentence because he pleaded innocent, he was a pawn sacrificed to
induce other defendants to plead guilty. Since this is so, to consider
the price he paid for the exercise of his right without regard for the




51Id. at 271, 272.
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The cases of Wiley and Scott both point up the necessity for judges
to explain differential sentencing in the negative: reward the pleader
rather than punish the defendant who stands trial. It seems from the
comments of the various sentencing institutes that this rationale is
proper and will be accepted by the appellate courts. The Supreme Court
has also seen fit to sanction (albeit dictum) this reward theory in
Brady v. United States.
52
C. The Propriety of the Overtly Negotiated Plea
The implicit bargain, the showing of leniency to the confessing
and presumably 'repenting" defendant is one thing; overt negotiation
for charge reduction or a promise of sentence leniency in exchange for
a guilty plea is another matter. In the first place, it is open and adver-
sary in its own right. It is not simply a form of normative practice
intrinsic to administrative efficiency. Whatever its degree of adversari-
ness, the contest occurs out of court without whatever controls are
provided by trial. Yet overt negotiation is common practice almost
everywhere, particularly in those jurisdictions where there are manda-
tory sentences for certain classes of crimes.
The basic legal issue of propriety of overt plea negotiation is
superficially simple but becomes complex when set against administra-
tive reality. The propriety question is normally phrased as follows:
whether guilty pleas which are induced by promises of state concessions
in charge or sentence are any more trustworthy or any less repugnant
than those engendered by threat or coercion. Some of the more specific
problem areas associated with overt bargaining are discussed below.
1. The Contested Bargain
Unlike the situation with regard to alleged coercion, the general
position of appellate courts reviewing cases involving induced pleas
(usually on appeal from a denial of a motion to withdraw the plea)
has been that they have viewed the situation as one of whether the prom-
ise made by the appropriate state official (commonly held to be either
the prosecutor or the judge but normally not including the police or the
defendant's own counsel 5s ) was, in fact, honored after the defendant ful-
filled his part of the bargain by pleading guilty. If the bargain was not
kept - that is, if the state reneged on its promise - appellate courts
have commonly allowed plea withdrawals, presumably on the grounds
that the state used fraud and trickery in obtaining the guilty plea and
52 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970).
5 3 People v. Smith, 120 Cal. App. 2d 531, 261 P.2d 306 (1953); cf. Swanson v. United
States, 304 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1962); Bryarly v. Howard, 165 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948).
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that these practices are not really significantly different from threat and
coercion.
54
The issue becomes sharper, though no more simple to answer, in
instances of induced pleas where in fact the state honors its bargains;
yet defendants challenge the "voluntariness" of their own guilty pleas
on grounds of inducement. Since such defendants have presumably
benefited by the contractual relationship - that is, they have received
reduced charges, dismissed counts, or sentences less than the criminal
court would warrant - it seems improbable that many such cases would
reach the appellate level since, in effect, there is no injured party.
However, one such case did reach the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit," and the conflicts, confusions and
uncertainties presented by it are still bothering American criminal
justice. The petitioner, Shelton, moved to have his one-year sentence
vacated on the ground that his guilty plea was induced by the promise
of a one-year sentence by the prosecutor. In the first Shelton decision
it was held that the guilty plea was involuntary because it was induced,
even though it was conceded that the grounds for the inducement were
fulfilled.5" In the majority opinion, Judge Rives stated: "Justice and
liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and barter.' '5 However, in
a dissent, Judge Tuttle distinguished between "proper" and "improper"
bargaining, basing his major argument for upholding Shelton's convic-
tion on the administrative necessity of plea negotiation. Judge Tuttle
said in part:
[Ajlthough no man should be allowed to bargain away his life or
liberty, it is not apparent why any innocent person would plead guilty
if not subjected to or threatened with illegal pressures (including
exhaustive inquisitions or threats to "frame" evidence of a more serious
charge), mislead by promises not to be fulfilled, or induced by prom-
ises inherently improper, merely because he receives assurances that
such a plea may lead to punishment less severe than that which he
would receive if unjustly (but fairly) convicted....
... It is generally known that the great bulk of criminal cases are
disposed of by pleas of guilty made after some discussion between the
defendant and/or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney in which
the latter frequently makes some commitment as to the sentence he will
recommend or as to other charges or prosecutions he will drop; if this
were not so, or if this court held that it may not be so, there would be
few inducements for any person to plead guilty....
In the present case it appears from the record and from his own
appearance before us that the petitioner was an intelligent man, fully
able to comprehend the alternatives open to him and the value of the
54 See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 876-78 (1964). See also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
487 (1962); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962); In re Valles, 364
Mich. 471, 110 N.W.2d 673 (1961); FRANK, CORAM NOBIS § 3.01(d) (1953).
5 Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on rehearing, 246 F.2d 571
(5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on confession of error of Solicitor General, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).




prosecutor's promises. It also appears that the prosecutor in good faith
tried to live up to his commitments and to a very large extent was
successful in his efforts .... Nor can it be said that any of the prom-
ises were inherently improper for the offer to help obtain the dismissal
of federal prosecutions in other districts does not differ fundamentally
from the usual practice whereby a prosecutor agrees to nolle prosequi
all except the charges in which the plea is to be entered. 5 8
In an en banc rehearing of the Shelton case, the minority position
(of Judge Tuttle) in the first decision became the majority opinion."
Judge Tuttle wrote:
In light of the full record, showing that the accused was not only
willing but anixous to have his plea accepted by the court, and the
present claim of involuntariness after he has fully enjoyed the benefit
of the dismissal of an additional count in the Atlanta indictment and
the nolle prossing of the 'more serious federal indictment' (as charac-
terized by Shelton) in Miami - the reinstatement of which is now
barred by statutes of limitations - and the imposition of the sentence
requested by him in the principle case, cannot deprive the plea thus
given of its character of voluntariness. 0
Judge Rives joined by Judge Brown dissented, saying, in part:
The very statement of that practice [referring to Judge Tuttle's
earlier reference to the frequency and administrative importance of plea
negotiation] however, concedes that such promises or commitments
are inducements for the accused to plead guilty. Such inducements in
any particular case may be sufficient to elicit an untrue plea of guilty.
The prevalence of that practice demonstrates the importance, indeed
the imperative necessity, for the court itself to determine that the plea
is so voluntarily made as to furnish reliable and trustworthy testimony
that the accused is in fact guilty....
... We err greviously when we allow ourselves to be diverted by
other inquiries, such as whether the accused made a good bargain and
whether the bargain was kept; the sole inquiry should remain, was
the plea of guilty made under such circumstances as to constitute it
reliable and trustworthy evidence of the accused's guilt of the offense
with which he was charged. 61
The Shelton case eventually reached the Supreme Court which
issued a per curiam decision, stating only "[u]pon consideration of the
entire record and confession of error by the Solicitor General that
the plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained, the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed
and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceed-
ings. ' 62 In a subsequent case, Brown v. Beto, 8 the Fifth Circuit con-
sidered the Supreme Court's per curiam action as neither an approval
RId. at 115, 116.
5 Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957).
60Id. at 573 (emphasis by the court).
61 1d. at 579, 580 (emphasis by the court).
62 Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
63 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967).
1970
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
nor a disapproval of either Judge Tuttle's or Judge Rives' view on plea
bargaining.1
4
2. Judicial Involvement in Plea Negotiation
A question has arisen in a number of cases as to whether plea
bargaining in which the sentencing judge is directly involved may be
improper, even if it is conceded that bargaining between prosecutor
and defense is proper.6 5 In United States ex rel Elksnis v. Gilligan,
66
District Judge Weinfeld stated in part:
[A] bargain agreement between a judge and a defendant, however
free from any calculated purpose to induce a plea, has no place in a
system of justice. It impairs the judge's objectivity in passing upon the
voluntariness of the plea when offered. As a party to the arrangement
upon which the plea is based, he is hardly in a position to discharge
his function of deciding the validity of the plea - a function not satis-
fied by routine inquiry, but only, as the Supreme Court has stressed
[citation omitted], by a penetrating and comprehensive examination of
all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.
67
While alluded to above, an interesting caveat to the judges "hands
off" role in plea negotiation was more explicitly dealt with by Judge
Bazelon in the Scott decision:
In announcing the rule that the trial judge should neither partici-
pate directly in plea bargaining nor create incentives for guilty pleas
by a policy of differential sentences, we must at the same time point
out that the trial judge cannot ignore the plea bargaining process.
A guilty plea must be not only voluntary, but also knowing andunder-
standing. If the defendant has decided to admit his guilt because of a
commitment from the prosecutor, it is essential for the validity of his
plea that he have a full and intelligent understanding of the nature and
extent of that commitment. 68
The ABA standards relating to pleas of guilty attempt to correct
the possibility of an attack like that in Elksnis by excluding the judge
as a participant in the actual negotiation process.69 The reasons given
by the ABA Committee are as follows: (1) judicial participation in the
discussions can create the impression in the mind of the defendant that
he would not receive a fair trial were he to go to trial before this judge;
(2) judicial participation in the discussions makes it difficult for the
judge objectively to determine the voluntariness of the plea when it
is offered; (3) judicial participation to the extent of promising a
certain sentence is inconsistent with the theory behind the use of the
presentence investigation report; and, (4) the risk of not going along
with the disposition apparently desired by the judge may seem so great
6Id. at 954.
65 d. at 956-57.
66256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
6Id. at 255.
6 Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
69 ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.3 (a).
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to the defendant that he will be induced to plead guilty even if
innocent. 0
3. Equal Opportunity to Bargain
However the general issue of the propriety of plea negotiation is
viewed, and whether one limits it by restricting the appropriate partici-
pants (such as by excluding the judge) or testing it against its fulfill-
ment in practice, there are still other dimensions of propriety which
arise and plague some appellate courts. For example, while the ABA
Minimum Standards state that similarly situated defendants should be
given an equal opportunity for plea negotiation,71 some cases have
recently arisen in which denial of knowledge of, or opportunity for,
bargaining and, therefore, failure to benefit from such dealings were
appealed on denial of equal protection grounds. In Dorrough v. United
States,72 the appellant contended that he did not fully understand the
nature of the charges against him, because the offense with which he
was charged contained a lesser included offense with a significantly
lower mandatory penalty, and he claimed that it was incumbent upon
the trial court to fully advise him of this fact. The majority opinion
rejected this argument, but Circuit Judge Goldberg in his dissent stated:
It would be uncandid also to fail to mention that upon learning
of a lesser included offense, the defendant might announce to the
prosecution that he would consent to plead guilty only to the lesser
offense, in the hope that the prosecution would allow him to plead
rather than go through the risk and bother of a trial. Plea bargaining,
at present, must be recognized as part of our system. 73
In Newman v. United States, 74 a case arising almost simultaneously
with Dorrough but in the D.C. Circuit, the equal protection issue was
more sharply drawn. The issue presented on appeal was whether it
was a denial of appellant's constitutional rights for the U.S. Attorney
to consent to a guilty plea tendered by appellant's codefendant for a
lesser included offense under the indictment, while refusing to consent
to the same plea for the appellant. Both defendants were indicted for
house breaking and petty larceny. One of the defendants, Anderson,
negotiated through counsel with the U.S. Attorney and obtained an
agreement allowing Anderson to plead guilty to the misdemeanors of
petty larceny and attempted house breaking. The U.S. Attorney, how-
ever, declined to consent to the same plea for Newman. In denying
Newman's appeal, Circuit Judge Burger (now Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court) said in part:
To say that the United States Attorney must literally treat every
offense and every offender alike is to delegate him an impossible task;
70 Id. § 3.3(a) (commentary).
71Id. § 3.1(c).
72 385 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd on En Banc rehearing, 397 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1968).
7 385 F.2d 887, 898 (5th Cir. 1967).
74 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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of course, this concept would negate discretion. Myriad factors can
enter into the prosecutor's decision. Two persons may have committed
what is precisely the same legal offense but the prosecutor is not com-
pelled by law, duty or tradition to treat them the same as to charges.
On the contrary, he is expected to exercise discretion and common sense
to the end that if, for example, one is a young first offender and the
other older, with a criminal record, or one has played a lesser and the
other a dominant role, one the instigator and the other a follower,
the prosecutor can and should take such factors into account; no court
has any jurisdiction to inquire into or review his decision.
It is assumed that the United States Attorney will perform his
duties and exercise his powers consistent with his oaths and while this
discretion is subject to abuse or misuse just as is judicial discretion,
deviations from his duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt
with by his superiors.7 5
How this discretion is exercised - i.e., the motivation of the prose-
cutor in his bargaining role -is apparently an important element of
the whole process. In People v. Byrd,76 Judge Levin, using his concur-
ring opinion to take to task the whole process of plea negotiation, made
the following points:
Unlike the private litigant who is encouraged to negotiate amicable
adjustment of differences, the prosecutor has a duty to exercise the
discretion his office vests in him strictly on the merits. The state of his
or the court's docket has nothing to do with the propriety of a particu-
lar charge reduction for a particular offender. Justice is not "individual-
ized" by making charge concessions available almost universally as long
as the offender pleads guilty. The only "individualization" is that those
who plead guilty do so to some other, lesser charge and those who stand
trial must answer for the greater offense. To defend this on the ground
it is "individualization of justice" is an obvious distortion of terms.
Defenders of plea bargaining cite as examples of laudable "indi-
vidualization" through plea bargaining, particular cases where noxious
charges have been reduced to less stigmatic ones. However, if such
individualization is deemed desirable it could be achieved without
exacting a plea in return for the reduction in charge, indeed, without
any negotiation with the defendant. It is hard to see how such discre-
tionary decisions are furthered by - or even how they can survive -
the plea bargaining system. If the reward of charge reduction is to
continue to serve as an inducement to guilty pleas, the prosecutor may
but infrequently hand out such reductions, even where his view on the
merits would warrant or demand it, unless the benefitted defendant
pleads guilty.
I do not mean to be understood as saying prosecutors do not, in
particular cases, exercise their discretion on the merits and permit
accused persons to stand trial on reduced charges. But, to the extent
prosecutors become dependent upon plea bargaining, and thus implicitly
devoted to maintaining the bargaining system, they become less free in
the exercise of their discretion.
77
Other than questions of judicial participation and equal plea oppor-
75Id. at 481-82.
76 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d 777 (Ct. App. 1968).
77 Id. 162 N.W.2d at 784, 787 (emphasis by the court).
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tunities, there is even more basic, idealistic opposition to the negotiation
of justice.
4. Bargaining as Intrinsically Improper
Judge Rives' statement in the first Shelton case that "[fjustice and
liberty are not the subject of bargaining and barter, ' 7 8 expresses the
intrinsic impropriety issue very clearly. In a Pennsylvania case71 the court
used even stronger language. In that case, defense counsel approached
the judge hoping to obtain a sentence promise prior to entry of a guilty
plea for his client and, having assumed he had received such a promise,
later attempted to withdraw the plea after the defendant was sentenced
to death. The lawyer claimed that a bargain was made and unfulfilled.
This elicited a statement from the sentencing court which, in comment-
ing upon the practice of an attorney approaching a judge prior to the
plea, referred to such conduct as "not becoming a member of the bar."80
The appellate court agreed with the trial court's refusal to allow with-
drawal of the plea, calling the defense counsel's conduct "indefensible
and outrageous. 81
There have been other sporadic expressions by appellate judges
about the impropriety of plea bargaining regardless of its advantages.
But by far the most detailed and elaborate recent analysis of the process,
with a final conclusion that plea negotiation is inherently and intrin-
sically improper, was written by Judge Levin concurring in the Byrd
decision. He said:
The negotiated guilty plea is, nevertheless, fundamentally unsound.
Besides the fact that it is inconsistent with established standards, those
regarding the exercise of discretion by public officers and those sur-
rounding the administration of justice generally, it is turning what used
to be an accusatorial-adversary judicial system into an inquisitorial-
administrative process. It encourages practices in which neither the
profession nor the judiciary can take pride and establishes precedents
which are bound to affect the administration of justice adversely in
other areas. It destroys the integrity of the conviction record with the
result that neither the parole board nor, upon commission of another
offense, a subsequent sentencing judge knows whether one originally
charged with X and allowed to plead guilty to X-1, X-2 or attempted X
or Y was really guilty of the more serious charge.
If the negotiated charge concession is not justified by the merits,
then the injury is to society. If a charge concession justified by the
merits can only be obtained by waiver of a jury trial, then it is the
defendant who is unjustly importuned, it is the constitutional right
which is tarnished. If the concession is illusory rather than real, e.g., a
reduction in charge but no reduction in sentence, the trial judge sen-
tencing just as he would on the greater offense, then, frequently, the
defendant has been misled into giving up his right to a trial.
78242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957).
79 Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964).
80d. 202 A.2d at 526.
81415 Pa. 218, 228, 202 A.2d 521, 526 (1964).
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A plea of guilty uninfluenced by official pressure (overt or covert)
or promise (explicit or implicit) is, of course, perfectly proper. But the
administration of criminal justice has become so dependent upon a large
volume of guilty pleas and the profession (prosecutorial and defense)
and some courts so widely encourage offenders to believe they have
something to gain by pleading guilty, that it is to be doubted whether
many who plead guilty do so without harboring the hope that they will
receive some leniency.
The present state of affairs was brought about by willingness to
reduce standards of justice to conform to the resources made available
for its administration. I suggest the time has come for the judiciary to
start moving in the other direction, and to insist on a return to first
principles as quickly as possible. It will, of course, take years, if not
decades, to accomplish the elimination of negotiated pleas. The neces-
sary increase in prosecutorial staff and judicial facilities cannot be
brought about within a short period of time.
The public must be made aware that, under present budgets, most
felons are permitted to plead guilty to a charge substantially less than
the crime of which they are guilty. We are all concerned with the
significant increase in crime. Yet many who are apprehended are too
soon back on the streets because of concessions that would not be con-
sidered if facilities for prosecution and adjudication were more ade-
quate. Police officers bring in an accused person and the prosecutor is
confronted with the choice of allowing him to plead guilty to a lesser
offense or waiting for months and sometimes years to bring him to
trial, by which time witnesses may have lost interest, memories may have
faded, and for those and other reasons prosecution is difficult, if not
impossible, all of which aids defense counsel in exacting concessions
which otherwise would not be at all appropriate and which no prose-
cutor would otherwise consider.
The judiciary need not accept the inadequate budgets allowed for
the administration of justice. Ours is a co-equal branch of government.
Those charged with the administration of justice may properly insist on
appropriations sufficient to enable prosecutors and courts to enforce
the laws that the legislature and local units of government enact.
I respectfully urge that we not continue to denigrate the judicial
system by attempting to organize the administration of criminal justice
around an ever declining prosecutorial and judicial budget per case.
The calendar problem is, of course, real. The administration of
criminal justice has become so dependent upon plea bargaining that
it could not be eliminated instanter by decree. To do so would be to
inundate our presently over-taxed prosecutorial and judicial facilities.
This, of course, is a matter for realistic concern - as is the fundamental
soundness of a system of justice whose very ability to function is said
to depend on the practices described.
The problem is not unlike that of segregated schools in that it is
too ingrained to be eliminated forthwith. I suggest that we proceed
to its eventual elimination.
82
IV. DIMENSIONS OF THE CONCERN FOR THE IMPROPRIETY
OF PLEA BARGAINING
Negotiation for pleas of guilty, particularly overt bargaining for a
plea when there is a reasonable likelihood that the person could be




convicted of a higher crime or be given a more severe sentence, raises
propriety concerns on a number of different levels. In addition to the
concerns with respect to the overt bargain discussed above, there are
larger, more far-reaching concerns about the plea negotiation process
in general that must be resolved if the process is to continue to exist
within our criminal justice system. These broad considerations can be
classified as either concern for the proper dispensation of justice or as
concern for a positive public attitude.
A. Concern for the Proper Dispensation of Justice
These concerns generally go to specific, undesirable side effects
that may be a byproduct of plea negotiation. Included within this
category are the fears that plea negotiation might increase the possibility
of convicting the innocent, introduce inequalities into adjudication and
sentencing practices, avoid the testing of many legal issues, and promote
"quick justice."
1. Plea Negotiation Might Increase the Possibility of Convicting
the Innocent
While there have been some steps taken by the United States
Supreme Court in its decisions88 and in its revision of the Rules of
Federal Criminal Procedure,8 4 by various states in altering their arraign-
ment requirements,8" and by recommendations of such groups as the
ABA's Minimum Standards Committee on Pleas of Guilty"'- all of
which compel judges to inquire into the factual nature of the crime
before accepting a plea - the fact remains that inducements can be so
attractive to some defendants, particularly recidivisits with long prior
records, that they might be willing to plead guilty in order to avoid
trial on a higher charge. 7 The trustworthiness issue is not fully satisfied
by the requirement of factual inquiry by the judge or even by such
elaborate procedures as post plea-of-guilty hearings which are the prac-
tice in some jurisdictions, 8 and pretrial screens (such as the preliminary
hearing). Even by means of carefully prescribed requirements for both
the quantity and quality of evidence, it is conceivable that one who is
innocent can be convicted even after availing himself of all the safe-
guards of the trial system. It is believed that the number of innocent
persons so convicted is very small, just as it is hoped that the percentage
of innocent defendants who plead guilty is also small. Either possibility
is certainly reprehensible to the underlying ideology of our system of
8 See notes 90, 91 infra.
84 See note 9 supra.
85 Id.
86 See ABA PROJECT, supra note 1.
87 Comment, supra note 4, at 220-21.
88D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 19-20.
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justice. Many judges take the position, therefore, that the possibility
of an innocent person pleading guilty should be given prime considera-
tion in arraignment proceedings. The ABA's tentative draft on standards
relating to The Prosecutor's Function provides that "[al prosecutor
may not properly participate in a deposition by plea of guilty if he is
aware that the accused persists in denying guilt or the factual basis for
the plea, without disclosure to the court.'"'" It is interesting to note that
this proposed standard apparently does not preclude a prosecutor from
accepting a plea of guilty, where he has evidence to substantiate to his
own satisfaction of the guilt of the defendant even though the defendant
maintains his innocence, provided that the court is aware of the defen-
dant's persistence in denying guilt.
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions, McCarthy v.
United States9" and the followup case of Boykin v. Alabama,9 have
been interpreted to make the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure"2 applicable to all states. Among other things,
these decisions are interpreted to now make it a requirement for the
judge to personally address the defendant and to satisfy himself that
there is a factual basis for the guilty plea. This would not eliminate the
possibility of convicting the innocent pleader, but hopefully would
reduce it.
2. The Sub Rosa Existence of Plea Negotiation Introduces
Inequalities into Adjudication and Sentencing Practices
There is a question of whether it is possible to work out equal
bargaining opportunities for all defendants. For example, those defen-
dants who know of negotiation possibilities have an intrinsic charging
and sentencing advantage over those who are strangers. Further, if the
existence of plea negotiation is known only to a segment of the bar and
if a defendant retains or is assigned counsel who is familiar with such
practices, then there is a built-in inequality in the system against the
defendant who is either without counsel or without counsel who is
familiar with plea negotiation.
To combat such problems, a section of the ABA proposed standards,
The Prosecutor's Function, provides: "(a) The prosecutor should make
known a general policy of willingness to consult with defense counsel
concerning disposition of charges by plea.""3 In effect, the ABA pro-
vision would require the prosecutor to give notice of the practice, so
that its availability would be common knowledge to all defendants,
8ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecutor's
Function, §4.2 (tent. draft, 1970).
90 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
91 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
92 See note 9 supra.
93 ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.1(c).
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rich or poor, resident or stranger. Furthermore, the ABA proposal also
requires defense counsel under certain conditions to explore the possi-
bility of negotiation: Proposed Standard 6.1 of The Defense Function
provides: "(b) When the lawyer concludes, on the basis of full investi-
gation and study, that under controlling law and the evidence a con-
viction is probable, he should so advise the accused and seek his consent
to engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor, if such appears
desirable. ' 9 4 In discussion thereafter, it is suggested that if a lawyer
lacks sufficient personal experience, he should consult experienced
colleagues.9 5
The negotiating skill of the attorney may also contribute to sentence
disparity;98 for perhaps a large part of sentence disparity is the result
of disparity in charging and plea negotiation. This is particularly critical
to both defendants and the community as it applies to the choice of
probation or imprisonment. In theory, persons selected to serve their
sentences in the community under supervision are chosen on the basis
of characteristics which call for low risk of recidivism and a chance for
successful community adjustment as law-abiding citizens. If, indeed,
probation is given as payment for plea bargaining, selection is then
based in part on skill in negotiation rather than on the other more
acceptable criteria. Granted, it may be that few dangerous or otherwise
serious offenders can actually deal for probation; nevertheless, selection
by negotiation leads to an insidious corruption of the probation service.
3. The Existence of Plea Negotiations Avoids the Testing of
Many Legal Issues That Are Now Cloudy
How effective is the exclusionary rule if defendants do not even
raise it because they decide to plead guilty? How effective are the other
constitutional rights so carefully safeguarded at trial if they are waived
by as many as 90 percent of the defendants passing through the courts?
How operationally important are such defenses as insanity or entrap-
ment if they are rarely raised? On these grounds alone- that is, that
plea negotiation avoids the articulation and refinement of legal defenses
9 ABA PROJECT ON MrNIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Delense Function,
§ 6.1(b) (tent. draft, 1970).
9 Id. § 6.1(b) (commentary). It is suggested that Legal Aid and Public Defender offices
could serve as sources of potential assistance. This points up an interesting opinion that
some experienced courtroom observers have voiced, namely, that persons represented by
a public defender are sometimes better off than those defended by retained attorneys.
The issue, of course, is not one of superior legal skills in a formal sense, but one of
savvy in the ways of the criminal courts, the prosecutor's office, and the hallways of the
courthouse. It is ironic perhaps, that legal ability necessary to properly defend a client
at trial is not necessarily the same as the knowledge and ability required for plea nego-
tiation. There can be little doubt that the Public Defender's Offices in most jurisdictions
are aware of plea negotiations and have a fair idea of a going rate for most charges, and
therefore those lawyers are able to get their clients at least as good a deal as most other
similarly situated defendants.




and concepts- it is considered by some to be an improper form of
criminal procedure.91 If police practice illegal searches and ques-
tioning and if the defendants, who have their rights so infringed
upon, plead guilty in the majority of such instances, the police will not
be as effectively deterred from such illegal acts. If wrongful enforce-
ment practices are not brought to light and if their concomitant defenses
are not used, a dynamic changing procedural law will be slow to develop.
4. Justice Can Be Too Quick
One quite proper legal and common administrative concern of
criminal justice is that its wheels grind too slowly. Excessive delay in
prosecution, trial, and sentencing are issues that are extremely bother-
some in our system of justice and, of course, are in themselves pressures
which support the plea negotiation system. Justice delayed is truly
justice denied in many instances. On the other hand, while it is true
that justice can be too slow, there is the inverse question of whether
it can be too speedy. "Quick justice" convictions in which defendants
are arrested, waive all their rights, plead guilty, and are sentenced and
transported to prison all in the course of a single day, while not com-
mon, occurs frequently enough to be bothersome and are seen as
intrinsically improper.9" The guilty plea system, including plea bargain-
ing, opens the real possibility of excessive speed in contrast to reflective
and careful adjudication.
B. Concern for a Positive Public Attitude
The issues in this category, unlike those listed above, generally
focus on the effect of plea negotiation on the public's view of our
criminal justice system. These considerations involve claims that plea
negotiation is inherently repugnant; that it makes a mockery of our
system of justice; that it fosters disrespect for justice; and that it creates
public dissatisfaction because of the relative lack of details emerging
from guilty plea convictions.
1. The State Becoming Involved in Bargaining With Criminals
Over Charges and Sentences Is Inherently Repugnant in a
Society Dedicated to the Rule of Law
Plea bargaining provides almost unbridled discretion on the part
of prosecutors and trial court judges to avoid legislative sentencing
mandates, and to encapsulate the adjudicatory and charging stages of
the process, so that it is simply a pro forma step in the mass production
of suspects from the streets to the prisons. In addition, there are some
9 Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968).
9 8 See DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947), rev'g People v. DeMeerleer, 313
Mich. 548, 21 N.W.2d 849 (1946); State ex rel Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486,
126 N.W.2d 91 (1964).
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prosecutors, especially those newly elected or appointed, who would
prefer not to negotiate or "deal" with alleged criminals or their repre-
sentatives. There are also some defense counsel who, for one reason
or another, have poor relationships with local prosecutors and, conse-
quently, are at a disadvantage in negotiating on behalf of their clients.
The fact that such inequalities exist and that personalities of officials
can affect uniform disposition of cases inherently detracts from a system
involving widespread negotiation of pleas in a society dedicated to the
rule of law and not to the rule of men.
There have been some recent allegations that plea bargaining,
either implicit or explicit, is not only repugnant but also violates both
the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution. In fact, the authors
of a recent note in the Harvard Law Review concluded:
Well aware of the need for legislative response to a judicial
decision that invalidates plea bargaining, judges have avoided analyzing
the constitutionality of the practice. The bar, which has actively partici-
pated in plea bargaining, has attempted to dress it in procedural niceties
and has manufactured weak or faulty justifications for it. But neither
the lack of an assured legislative response nor the bar's substantial
involvement in the practice should affect the legal profession's evalua-
tion of it. Lawyers and judges more than other citizens are under an
obligation to maintain the criminal process in conformity with the
Constitution. To restore the defendant's fundamental trial rights to their
traditional preeminence, plea bargaining should be declared unconsti-
tutional. 99
2. Plea Bargaining Makes a Mockery of Our System of Justice
The facade of the typical arraignment session - where the defen-
dant customarily denies that any promises have been made to him
while all in attendance know full well that promises have indeed been
made in exchange for his plea - is likely to produce a high degree of
cynicism in both the participants and observers of the system. Today,
however, some judges are changing their inquiries about promises or
inducements, limiting their questions to whether any promises have
been made to the defendant regarding sentencing. Sentencing promises
by the prosecutor or others are apparently viewed as a possibly wrongful
usurpation of the judge's powers whereas other bases of negotiation,
such as charge reduction, are ignored as strictly within the ambit of the
prosecutor's discretion. The issue here, as with the unhonored bargain,100
is not inducement per se but inducement that crosses lines of authority.
Yet as long as there is no recognition of the entire range of plea arrange-
ments, but rather an avoidance of the issue, even to a pretense that
9 Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1411 (1970).
See also Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Process or a Third Model of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L. J. 359 (1970). See note 61 supra, § 4.1 (a).
100See § III (C) (1) supra.
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negotiation does not occur, the in-court ritual of guilty plea arraignments
will be viewed by many as a mockery of justice.
3. Because of the Intrinsic "Horse-Trading" or "Settling Out of
Court" Nature of Plea Negotiation, an Aura of Disrespect
For Justice and For Criminal Procedure Is Produced Not Only
Among Those Involved But Also Among the Public in General
It might be paraphrased that "it is not what you do that deter-
mines your charge and sentence but whom you know." Some observers
have commented that plea negotiation is really no different from a
"fix" which is usually taken to mean a form of corruption involving
monetary bribery or the trading of favors for bending the law to benefit
certain violators.10' The sub rose nature of some plea negotiation con-
tributes to the aura of corruption that tinges this practice as it now
exists. All that a defendant may know is that he has paid his attorney
a certain set sum, and in return the lawyer has been able to obtain some
sort of "deal" which results in a lesser charge or sentence (or both)
than he expected when arrested. It has been suggested that some
attorneys permit this misapprehension of a "fix" to exist in order to
justify fees. In short, they do not disabuse the client of his belief that
the court, police officers, and/or the prosecuting attorney have been
"taken care of" in order to obtain the lesser charge or the lenient
sentence.1
0 2
4. There Is Public Dissatisfaction with the Relative Lack of
Detail Emerging from Guilty Plea Convictions, Particularly in
Cases Where There Is a High Degree of Public Interest
The relatively anonymous guilty plea proceeding, with nothing
but the formal words of the charge admitted, may have many advan-
tages for the reputation of the defendant and his family and may receive
general support on these grounds.103 In cases of great public interest
however, this anonymity is not necessarily viewed in the same way.
Where public figures are involved, either as perpetrators or victims,
there often is a demand for more information, while rumors and
suspicions that there is "more than meets the eye" abound. For example,
the guilty plea of Senator Edward Kennedy to the traffic charge follow-
ing his automobile accident in which a young girl was killed was
viewed by many Americans as an inadequate termination of the case.
In fact, the pressure for further explanation was so great that the
Senator went on national television to explain his position. Much the
101 See Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. Rav. 385, 395 (1951).
See also Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957); Wight v. Rind-
skoph, 43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877).
102 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, App. A at 12.
103 See § I supra.
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same situation applies to the apparently negotiated guilty plea entered
by James Earl Ray in connection with the murder of Dr. Martin Luther
King. Here again, the sparse information contained in the charge and
the monosyllabic guilty plea hardly satisfied those who are more con-
cerned about the full details of the murder of a notable public figure.
V. COMPROMISE: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PROPER
AND IMPROPER BARGAINS
The grounds discussed above and probably others are commonly
offered as reasons for assessing the practice of plea negotiation as an
improper form of charging, adjudication, and sentencing in our system
of criminal justice. Even if one agrees with any or all of the bases of
the impropriety of such practices (either in general or in particular
cases which might "shock the conscience"), the question remains of
whether it is administratively feasible - or even whether it is at all
possible -to abolish plea negotiation or, as Judge Levin put it, to
"'begin now gradually to eliminate plea bargaining.' '104
A position can be taken that if plea bargaining is improper per se,
then there can be no compromise with it. The administrative conse-
quences would not necessarily mean that all defendants be tried but
simply that the guilty plea in itself would be an irrelevant factor in
sentencing and that inducement of guilty pleas, under any circumstances,
would be outlawed.' °5 Those holding this position would not see it to
be a question of controlling or limiting plea bargaining any more than
there would be a question of controlling or limiting the third degree.
In brief, if plea negotiation is equated with coercion, then no adjustment
is possible.
At the present time, however, total rejection of plea negotiation
and of the implicit sentence bargaining in all guilty pleas is not the
majority position among commentators, including appellate courts, on
nontrial adjudication. It is more common to distinguish, both factually
and philosophically, plea negotiation from coercion and to at least
attempt to spell out conditions under which bargaining might properly
be used and conditions under which it would be considered improper
per se. This ability to distinguish between (and control) the proper
versus the improper exercise of charging and sentencing concessions
to pleading defendants might well be a sensible solution to matters of
propriety in plea bargaining situations.
This type of analysis is not new to criminal justice issues. For
example, in the matter of search where there is insufficient evidence
l04 People v, Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d at 798.
0 Judge Levin advocated this position in People v. Byrd, and his comments attack the
notion that a charge concession in exchange for a guilty plea is "individualization" of
justice. See his comments on this subject in the text, § III (C) (3) supra.
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to arrest a single suspect or to obtain a search warrant (as in roadblock
searches), the late Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson attempted to
distinguish the relative propriety of such "collective" searches on the
basis of the seriousness of the criminal conduct desired to be thwarted
or prevented, i.e., the motivation of the state. He stated that he would
possibly tolerate a roadblock search if the life of a kidnapped child
were involved but would not tolerate the same procedure if the purpose
was simply the recovery of a few bottles of untaxed whiskey and the
apprehension of a bootlegger."'0
It may well be that some propriety issues in plea negotiation can
be resolved on the same or similar grounds, i.e., on the motivation for
the bargain and the type of situation in which it occurs. For example,
courts are sometimes confronted with cases in which charges, while
technically correct, somehow seem inappropriate given the entire circum-
stances of the case and the characteristics of the perpetrator or the
victims. For example, in a forcible rape where the victim is random,
where violence is used, and where injury to the victim occurs, it would
seem to be inappropriate to reduce the charge to a lesser offense simply
to get a guilty plea. Not all rapes, however, follow this pattern. Some-
times a defendant is charged with rape when the victim is in fact a
semiprostitute who on the particular evening in question refused to
respond to advances as was her common practice. The defendant used
force to obtain what he had been led to expect; and, somehow, it
seems inappropriate that both his criminal record and sentence be
exactly the same as the rapist in the first instance, where the victim
was chosen at random, was otherwise innocent, and was injured. This
type of situation in which there are significant variations in the circum-
stances surrounding legally identical crimes is commonly faced by
prosecutors and courts, and it acts to confound the issue of the propriety
of plea negotiation, by entwining it within the ambit of the discretion
exercised by both prosecutors and judges, but hopefully in ways that
result in a system of equitable and just charging and sentencing.
In regard to the improper exercise of the practice, one could also
base the propriety concern on the motivation for plea bargaining on
the part of the state. For example, it could be argued that plea negoti-
ation is intrinsically improper if the sole purpose of the state is to
induce a guilty plea under one or a combination of three conditions:
(1) solely because the evidence held by the state is weak or inadmissible
and conviction at trial is doubtful, (2) solely to avoid court crowding
and overwork, or (3) solely because of fear on the part of the prose-
cutor of the skill of the defense counsel. There is some interesting
evidence that these factors are relevant considerations in the state's
current motivation for negotiating with defendants. The University of
106 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
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Pennsylvania Law Review asked a group of chief prosecuting officials
from various states to indicate the considerations that motivated their
bargaining decision.107 The most frequently listed consideration in
striking a bargain was the lack of strength of the state's case; some
85 percent of the prosecutors who responded noted this weakness as an
important factor. Some 37 percent said the volume of work was an
influencing factor; only 32 percent said the harshness of the law
influenced their decisions (the avoidance of mandatory sentences and
the like); and 27 percent said that sympathy for the defendant was a
factor." 8 On the other hand, the author of a more recent study
commented:
My impressions differ from the conclusions of the Pennsylvania survey.
Every prosecutor I interviewed considered the strength of the case
relevant and almost every prosecutor considered "sympathy" and the"workload" as well. Nevertheless, my impressions correlated with the
Law Review's conclusions on a basic point: If tactical considerations
are not the most important factor in bargaining, at least they are the
factor that prosecutors are most ready to avow. 109
If it is possible to list the primary consideration where plea bargain-
ing would be considered inappropriate by the state, the opposite should
also be true. That is, there should be conditions (controlled perhaps
by requiring the prosecutor to present a written explanation of his
reasons or the judge to write such an opinion or both) under which
plea negotiation would be considered proper:
1. When the motivation is to avoid excessive consequences of manda-
tory sentences when they are clearly inappropriate in a particular case.
This is simply the frank delegation of discretion to the prosecutor and
the trial court to distinguish between cases about which the legislature
has generalized. This is not an attempt to usurp legislative power but
is merely a way to introduce equity into a system that would otherwise
work some excessive hardships. Legislatures, after all, are political
collectivities which, when confronted with a particular crime situation,
are sometimes prone to enact excessively repressive legislation. For
example, some of the narcotics laws, if universally applied to all defen-
dants who technically fit within the descriptions of the crimes, would
wreak havoc with any attempt to tailor the sanction to the total circum-
stances of any criminal action and to the characteristics of individual
defendants. After all, while a teenager selling a single marijuana
cigarette to a friend and a professional pusher of heroin may both be
guilty of sale of narcotics and subject to lengthy mandatory incarcera-
tion, their cases can be distinguished on the trial court level without
really violating the legislative purpose in condemning drug sellers.
107 Note, supra note 54, at 896-907.
lMId. at 901.
U0 Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 50, 59 (1968).
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2. When the motive is to avoid a criminal label which would imply
in the public mind that the defendant was guilty of conduct which is
really not consistent with the actions that formed his criminal violation.
For example, in a case".. in which a number of college students were
having a noisy party in an apartment near their campus, the police
arrested and charged the student owner of the apartment with, of all
things, "operating a disorderly house." Confronted with this charge,
the judge explained to the prosecutor and the arresting police officer
that the connotations of such a label were so negative that he would
not accept a plea of guilty even though the offense was a misdemeanor.
The charge was modified (not really reduced) to disorderly conduct.
The label of disorderly conduct against the male owner of the apart-
ment was not felt to be particularly onerous or misleading. Likewise,
in another case in which a girl was arrested for shoplifting and was
charged with disorderly conduct, the judge refused to accept a plea
to this count, pointing out that a record of disorderly conduct in a case
of a young girl could be wrongfully interpreted as involving sexual
misbehavior, whereas petty larceny (again not really a lesser charge)
would likely be less damaging to the defendant in the long run.
3. When there is a crime involving co-defendants of unequal culpa-
bility. Again, this is simply a recognition of the prosecutor's discretion
to distinguish what the legislature cannot do; that is, to determine the
degree of involvement in a single offense on the part of multiple
persons involved in the crime. The same can hold true when there are
other mitigating circumstances, such as the participation of the victim
in a criminal activity (e.g., confidence games), or when the victim in
some other way contributed to the commission of the crime.
4. When the therapeutic benefits of alternative sentences can best
be achieved by charge reduction or by awarding probation to guilty
plea defendants, where normally such would not be the case. It has
been suggested by the drafters of the A.L.I. Model Penal Code that
such considerations be taken into consideration after the plea is tendered
so that the judge has the power to downgrade a charge to achieve this
end without first using it to induce the guilty plea.11" ' This is really an
extension of sentencing discretion which, while it may achieve the
same end of individualizing sentences as negotiated pleas, ignores
the operational significance of a preplea bargain. This is indeed a
"mercy of the court" situation which ignores the other administrative
advantages of negotiation. In any case, there may be situations in which
the sentencing structure is such that maximum benefit to the individual
110This illustration and the one which follows are from field observations made during
the preparation of the AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION SURVEY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1956-58).
11 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, § 6.12, Reduction of Conviction b) Court to Lesser Degree
of Felony or to Misdemeanor (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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offender (with due consideration to the consequences for his victims)
can be achieved only by charge reduction or some other state concession.
If this were the primary motivation, then such reduction could well be
considered proper.
5. When charge reduction and sentencing leniency are used to
support law enforcement efforts by rewarding informants, state's wit-
nesses and the like. This is sometimes called "trading the little ones for
the big ones"; but the fact remains that unless differential court leniency
is shown such persons, major cases cannot be developed. This is harder
to justify on proprietary grounds if one is initially unwilling to support
an informant system. If, however, one sees a relationship between the
activities of the court and the activities of law enforcement in the com-
munity, then a decision must be made about the propriety of using one
aspect - namely, sentencing or charge reduction -to support the
activities of the other.
6. When the ultimate sentencing consequences may be too harsh.
This situation may arise when the consequences of new conviction are
excessive, because it may move a candidate closer to becoming labeled
an "habitual criminal" (with the attendant consequences) when, in
fact, the total circumstances of the case and the defendant's character-
istics do not so indicate. This, again, is simply an adjustment of the
adjudicatory sentencing process - including alternatives like revocation
of parole in lieu of new prosecution - to achieve equity when full scale
conviction and sentencing would be too harsh.
Without attempting to exhaust the number of situations in which
plea negotiation might be considered proper, the point is that there may
be a distinction in the propriety of plea negotiation depending upon
the motivation of the state in engaging in the practice. When the
purpose of the negotiation is to avoid simple overcrowding, to push
through weak cases, or to bargain from fear, then plea negotiation is
clearly improper. On the other hand, an affirmative case can be made
for the individualization of justice and for the equity basis of plea
negotiation on the part of the prosecutor and the court. If such a
distinction can be made operational, then, of course, it must be circum-
scribed; it is necessary that all the controls enunciated by the ABA
112
and others are followed.
The price paid for a motivational basis of proper plea negotiation
may be similar to that of the exclusionary rule, namely, the freeing of
offenders when the constable has blundered."' 3 Inevitably, there will
be cases in which the state opts for a negotiated plea conviction not
212 See generally ABA PROJECT, supra note 1.
113 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); cf. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585
(1926), per Judge Cardozo, "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered." Id. at 21, 150 N.E. at 587.
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from altruistic reasons but because the evidence is weak or the witnesses
uncertain.114 This risk and its attendant costs will have to be weighed
against the desirability of the recognition of plea bargaining as proper
or improper under certain conditions.
VI. CONTROL OF PLEA NEGOTIATION
If the basis of proper plea negotiation hinges on its purposes,
then, in addition to the admonitions of the ABA Committee, 1 5 there
must be more explicit expression of the details of the way pleas are
induced and a more elaborate record of the reasons and motivations
for reductions or other promises that are made. This is necessary if
such practices are to become reviewable by appellate courts.
Further, an accurate record of all plea agreements should be kept,
not only for purposes of review, but also so that followup studies can
be made to evaluate and analyze this practice in general. For example,
it would be clearly inconsistent with the equity purposes of negotiation
to release dangerous persons back into the community on probation in
exchange for a guilty plea. If this turned out to be a significant problem,
then no matter how beneficient the negotiation motives were at the
time, other controls would have to be introduced. Furthermore, allega-
tions of discrimination would be easily testable if accurate records of
demographic, as well as criminal, activities of the offenders involved
in plea negotiations and those denied plea negotiation were kept by
the courts. The burden of such recordkeeping should be on the prose-
cutor and the judiciary, much as prisons and parole boards assume
obligations to evaluate their practices and their effectiveness in correc-
tional decisions, such as release on parole and recidivism.
In addition to accurate recordkeeping, there should be limits (by
court rule or statute) on the range of charge reduction, since one of
the equal protection issues is not only the deal which can be made but
also the extent of the deal. That is, the reduction of murder to man-
slaughter may be one thing, but the reduction of murder to disorderly
conduct is quite another. Clearly, there should be no overcharging on
the part of the prosecutors in order to induce pleas. Likewise, there
probably should be no downgrading to "illogical" lesser offenses
where the actual charge bears no relationship to the criminal conduct
of the offender involved. In short, there must be some range set to
permissible downgrading no matter how noble the motive of the
prosecutor and the court.
114 Organized crime cases may fit this pattern. The prosecutor might bluff the defendant
into pleading to a lesser charge when the prosecutor knows the admissible evidence is
in all probability not sufficient for conviction.
I5 Supra note 112.
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However, in each instance of plea bargaining there should be a
lesser charge available for a plea. This is not always the case. For
example, there is a problem now existing in the federal system because
certain crimes, such as a violation of the Dyer Act (interstate transpor-
tation of a stolen motor vehicle), contain no lesser included offense
to which a plea may be entered.1 16 Most defendants charged under
this section are teenagers, many having no prior records and no intent
to permanently deprive the owner of his vehicle. The prohibition against
illogical downgrading places federal prosecutors in a position of either
taking a plea to the Dyer Act felony on the nose or dismissing the charge
in its entirety. In most cases, some other charge - possibly a misde-
meanor - would be preferable but is not available in federal courts.
Since under current conditions the burden of showing improper
negotiation is entirely with the person contesting his conviction, another
suggested change is that the state make affirmative statements in either
agreeing or refusing to negotiate. This is evidently being done in some
jurisdictions. For example, the Erie County District Attorney's Office
in New York has a written form on which defense counsel submit their
request for plea negotiation."1 Attorneys are required to set forth the
lesser plea they are seeking and the reasons that they believe justify
their request. This document is then submitted to the District Attorney's
Office for his approval or disapproval and for his comments. It is then
given to the judge for his disposition and eventually filed with the
court.
It would appear that such a formal procedure, well-posted and
publicized, wherein negotiation matters are reduced to writing, attested
to by defense counsel and a member of the prosecution's staff, and
approved or disapproved by the court, is one way to move plea negoti-
ation into the realm of visible and orderly processing. Only when this
occurs, can the various facets and full dimensions of negotiated justice
be subject to the tests of effectiveness and propriety which our system
of criminal justice deserves.
APPENDIX
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CITY COURT OF BUFFALO
D ate ................................ ........ . .................................. D ocket .....................................................
Defendant............... . Charge ..................................................
P art ........... __.......... ............................ R etu rn ab le .........................................................................
116 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
117 See APPENDIX, p. 405 infra.
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As attorney for the defendant, I offer a plea of guilty to a violation
of .... . ............................ ................. ............................... ........................................
I submit that this would represent substantial justice and would
give the Court ample latitude to deal properly with the matter.





STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY COURT : ERIE COUNTY
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
-VS - Indictment No ................................
Defendant (s)
SIR:
WHEREAS, you have been retained or assigned to defend the
above named defendant(s) on Indictment No .................
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an Order of the County
NEGOTIATED JUSTICE
Court a General Calendar Call will be held on .......................... ,
1968, at ......................... a.m ., County Court, Part ............................ ; at which time
the said indictment will be moved for trial;
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the District Attorney:
(1) Demands that if alibi testimony is intended to be offered on
behalf of the defendant that such information be supplied
pursuant to Section 295-L of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(2) Hereby gives notice of his intention to offer into evidence
against the defendant upon the trial any and all confessions
and or admissions oral or written, alleged to have been made
by him/them pursuant to Section 813-F through 813-1, inclu-
sive of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Rule XII of the
Erie County Court Rules.
(3) Requests that if the defendant at the time of the commission
of the crime was between the ages of 16 and 19, any appli-
cation requesting Youthful Offender treatment must be
processed immediately.
(4) Any application for a plea in this indictment must be made
by you in writing immediately. This request should contain a
detailed statement of the background of your client as well




District Attorney of Erie County
Attorney for the People
Erie County Court Building
25 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, New York
D a te d : ................................................... . . ........................................
T o ................................................ . ..................... .............................
Attorney for Defendant
Office and Post Office Address
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THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT OF
1966: NHSB DRIVER LICENSING
STANDARD- POWER NOT USED
By JOHN H. REESE*
This article is concerned with the Highway Safety Act of 1966
and the administration of the provisions of that Act by the National
Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB). After a discussion of the coverage
of the Act, Professor Reese assesses its constitutionality along with a
consideration of the pre-emptive intent of Congress as evidenced by the
enactment. The focus of the article then shifts to the NHSB and its
philisophical approach in administering the Act. The effects of this
approach are exemplified in the "Driver Licensing Standards." Al-
though this is only one of the NHSB's areas of responsibility, Professor
Reese points out that the philosophy has led to "non-standards" in this
area, partially thwarting the intent of Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
TRADITIONALLY, highway safety has been viewed as a local
problem, primarily subject to state authority. Some groups con-
tended that highway safety was a local concern as a matter of "states'
rights" and seemed to give little attention to analysis of the nature of
the problem to determine how governments - state and federal-
could best attack it.'
I See, e.g., Foreword to NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND OmDI-
NANCES, UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE (1962):
It is generally agreed that achieving uniformity in traffic laws across the Nation
is properly a task of the States, not the Federal government. Numerous national
conferences on street and highway safety, many Federal and State officials,
and informed laymen in the traffic safety field, have taken the position that
centralization of highway traffic control in the Federal government is undesir-
able; that under our constitutional concepts, this control is primarily the respon-
sibility of the States, and that uniform traffic regulation should have its
foundation in uniform State laws. A basic tenet of the Uniform Vehicle Code
is its approach through voluntary cooperative State action.
Id. at IV; accord, H.R. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959) (THE FEDERAL
ROLE IN HIGHWAY SAFETY); Hearings on S. 1467 Before the Subcomm. on Public Roads
of the Comm. on Public Works - Authorization Bill for Highway Beautification Wsd
Highway Safety Programs, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 452 (1967) (statement of Lewis P.
Spitz, Executive Director, American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators)
(hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1467). There are those who regard the 1966 federal
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However, this "local problem" premise has been rejected, and
highway safety is now viewed as a national problem; for in 1966,
Congress lost patience with the attempts of state governments to create
effective highway safety programs. 2 After at least forty years of exhor-
tation to cooperate and to structure uniform and comprehensive safety
programs,3 the states remained divided in their approaches to the
problem. State highway safety programs were extremely diverse as to
intervention as an improper intrusion. See Hearings on S. 3052 Before the Subcomm. on
Public Roads of the Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 148-50 (1966) (state-
ment of Charles F. Schwan, Jr., Director, Washington Office of Council of State Gov-
ernments); Compare Hearings on S. 1467 supra referring to implied consent standard
promulgated:
The specificity of this particular standard severely limits the options available
to a State legislature and practically dictates what the State legislature must do.
In effect the National Highway Safety Agency is telling the state legislature
what it must do in order to comply - pass implied consent legislation and also
reduce blood alcohol percentage . . . I am saying here you are limiting very
much the area in which a State legislature may want to operate....
Id. at 288 (statement of David J. Allen, Administrative Assistant to the Governor of
Indiana) with statement of John De Lorenzi, Managing Director, Public and Govern-
ment Relations, American Automobile Association. Id. at 222.
2The congressional attitude is subtly revealed in the Hearings on S. 3052 Before the
Subcomm. on Public Roads of the Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)
(hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 30521. It is stated, for example: "Our survey of
present highway safety efforts throughout the Nation clearly shows that Federal, State,
and local efforts have proceeded separately with little or no coordination and that major
gaps and weaknesses exist in present programs. Id. at 7 (statement of John T. Connor,
Secretary of Commerce). More specific is H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966):
The Committee on Public Works maintained diligent contact with the Depart-
ment of Commerce, anxious to learn what progress the Secretary was making
in his conferences with the States for the development of standards for the
voluntary highway safety programs the amended section 135 encouraged the
States to establish. [Baldwin Amendment] There was no real prograss ...
For 40 years the various safety-related organizations, both public and private,
have been trying to persuade the several State legislatures to adopt at least
minimum uniform regulatory statutes, with lamentable lack of success.
Id. at 4, 6.
3 H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
It should also be noted that when he was Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover called
a large number of interested groups to attend a National Conference on Street and High-
way Safety. Eight study committees were at work on the problem for six months in
advance of the Conference. Findings and a consolidated report were prepared by the
Conference after its deliberations. In 1926, the Conference was convened again to con-
sider interim work of committees. The 1926 Conference approved a suggested model for
a "uniform vehicle code," which had been prepared by the Committee on Uniformity
of Laws and Regulations. This "code" consisted of three separate acts covering (1)
registration and certificate of title, (2) licensing of operators and chauffeurs, and (3)
rules governing the operation of vehicles on highways. The three acts were recommended
to the states for adoption. These documents were later combined into a UNIFORM
VEHICLE CODE, likewise recommended to the states. It has been maintained and amended
through the years and is currently in the custodianship of the National Committee on
Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. It was last revised in 1968. H.R. Doc. No. 93,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1959) (THE FEDERAL ROLE IN HIGHWAY SAFETY). In
the interim, in 1926 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved the act covering licensing of operators and chauffeurs under the title "Uniform
Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act" and recommended it to the
states. It was revised in 1930. However, in 1943 the Conference of Commissioners de-
clared it "obsolete" and "'no longer recommended for adoption." HANDBOOK OF THE




areas of coverage; and where coverage was similar, standards were often
different.
4
In his 1966 Transportation Message to the Congress, 5 the President
described motor vehicle accident losses in lives, personal injury, and
property damage as a national problem, second in magnitude only to
the Viet Nam War.' His characterizations seemed to provide the catalyst
which quickly produced a congressional consensus that the federal
government should intervene. Congress recognized that it was fallacious
to perceive highway accidents as merely local problems and concluded
that the existing piecemeal methods of regulation were not a sensible
manner in which to attack the highway safety problem, even if the
problem is arguably local in nature.7 Hence, Congress concerned itself
with developing legislation which would combine two premises: (1)
that highway safety is a national concern and (2) that all facets of
the highway transportation system having a safety implication must be
dealt with systematically. Therefore, vehicle, roadway, and driver would
receive attention in terms of their relation to the safety aspects of
"highway transportation."
8
I. THE HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT OF 1966
The most extensive federal involvement in the highway safety
field occurred with the passage of the Highway Safety Act of 1966.'
4The diversity as to both coverage and standards is apparent upon cursory examination
of the volumes in the series entitled TRAFFIC LAWS ANNUAL, published by the National
Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. See also H.R. REP. No. 1700,
89 Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
5 N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1966, at 20.
Old.; accord, Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 82 (statement of Howard Pyle, Presi-
dent, National Safety Council).
7H.R. RaP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966);
S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6, 7, 15 (1966) (The Highway Safety Act
of 1966); accord, H.R. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 142, 145 (1959) (THE
FEDERAL ROLE IN HIGHWAY SAFETY).
Id. See also Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 63-64 (statement of Herbert J. Bing-
ham, Executive Secretary, Tennessee Municipal League); 65 (statement of J.O. Mattson.
.President, Automotive Safety Foundation); 81-82 (statement of Howard Pyle, President,
National Safety Council); 116 (statement of William G. Johnson, General Manager,
National Safety Council); 162-63 (statement of William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Chair-
man, The President's Committee for Traffic Safety); 233 (statement of Senator Ran-
dolph, Committee Chairman).
923 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1970). At the federal level, the Bureau of Public Roads has
for years participated in creating and prescribing standards of highway design and con-
struction for federal-aid highways (initiated by the Federal Road Aid Act of July 11,
1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355). However, its historical responsibility does not include
control of human factors; hence, its operations are not to be considered. According to
49 U.S.C. § 1652(f)(4) (Supp. 1970), the Federal Highway Administrator is also
made Director of Public Roads. As such he controls human factors to the extent he
exercises the authority transferred to him from the Interstate Commerce Commission to
promulgate qualifications requirements of motor carrier operators. Until this transfer,
the Bureau had no human factors control power.
The Beamer Resolution of 1958 (Act of August 20, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-684,
72 Stat. 635) constituted advance Congressional consent to the creation of interstate
compacts between States in the field of highway and traffic safety, including driver
1970
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This Act vests authority in a federal administrative agency to assert
control over human factors relevant to highway accidents."°
A. Powers of the Secretary of Transportation and the National
Highway Safety Bureau
The provisions of the Act are to be administered by the Secretary
of Transportation acting through the National Highway Safety Bureau
(NHSB)." Although the Highway Safety Act deals with roadway
and driver factors, it does not confer upon the Secretary direct regu-
latory authority over individuals who operate motor vehicles. His power
is directed to the states as political entities. 12 Thus, the Secretary and
the NHSB do not engage in issuing or withdrawing drivers' licenses.
As will be seen, however, the manner in which the statutory program
is structured and the available sanctions imply that the Secretary's power
will be felt ultimately by individual licensees.
The essence of the Secretary's authority is contained in the follow-
ing expression:
Each State shall have a highway safety program approved by the Secre-
tary, designed to reduce traffic accidents and deaths, injuries, and
property damage resulting therefrom. Such programs shall be in
accordance with uniform standards promulgated by the Secretary.' 3
licensing and human factors research. However, this was essentially an enabling act to
permit states to act in concert using the compact device. Congressional approval is re'
quired by the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 10.
The Roberts Act of 1964 (Act of August 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-515, 78 Stat.
696) is not included in this analysis because it dealt with vehicle safety devices and
not human factors. Furthermore, although it did transfer power to the Administrator of
General Services, his authority to prescribe motor vehicle safety devices was limited to
vehicles purchased by GSA for government use.
The House version of the Baldwin Amendment (Act of August 28, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-139, 79 Stat. 578) to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1965 (23 U.S.C. 101
Supp. 1967) ) came close to transferring power to the Secretary of Commerce to cut off
federal highway funds to states which did not have approved highway safety programs.
However, this provision of the House Bill was stripped down to a statement that state
highway safety programs "should be in accordance with uniform standards approved
by the Secretary," as the bill was finally passed by the Congress (23 U.S.C. 135 (1964)).
Obviously, the power of the Secretary to cut off all highway funds to non-conforming
states was effectively eliminated.
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-
1425 (Supp. 1970)) is also not included. Although it builds on the theory of the
Roberts Act and transfers power to the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe mini-
mum motor vehicle performance standards for all motor vehicles manufactured for sale
or introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce in the interest of
public safety, it does not confer power of control over human factors to the NHSB.
Although there are other illustrations of federal government intervention in the
field of highway safety, this sampling should suffice to describe the sort of intervention
with which this analysis will not be concerned. This study constitutes an attempt to
evaluate the sort of involvement, which gives some organ of the federal government
power to devise the "law", i.e., the actual program policies which are brought to bear
directly or indirectly on individuals who operate motor vehicles.
10 23 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1970).
I1 49 U.S.C. § 1652(f)(2) (Supp. 1970).
12 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).
HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT
Acting through the NHSB, he is further directed to address the "uni-
form standards" to these goals:
[A] [T]o improve driver performance [including but not limited
to education, testing, examinations, and licensing and]
[B] [tjo improve pedestrian performance."14
More specifically the uniform standards are to include, but are not
limited to:
[1] [Aln effective record system of accidents (including injuries and
deaths resulting therefrom),
[2] accident investigations to determine the probable causes of acci-
dents, injuries and deaths,
[3] vehicle registration, operation, and inspection,
[4] highway design and maintenance (include lighting, markings, and
surface treatment),
[5] traffic control,
[6] vehicle codes and laws, [and]
[7] surveillance of traffic for detection and correction of high or
potentially high accident locations .... 1.5
Although these goals have been legislatively determined, the
Secretary's (NHSB) power to promulgate uniform standards on any
subject believed to be relevant to highway "safety" may render these
goals, in fact, illusory. To illustrate: There is abundant commentary
indicating that current highway "safety" knowledge is based upon
research which is nonempirical, or out-of-date, or both." Therefore,
it is submitted that the word "safety" is not precise and can mean
many things to many people. It is essentially a normative term which
is defined administratively, according to the NHSB's sense of values
and its conception of how much safety restriction is compatible with
efficient movement. If this analysis is correct, the NHSB effectively
determines the goals of the legislation as well as the standards by which
they are to be achieved.
In addition to the Secretary's authority to promulgate uniform
standards, he is empowered to "amend or waive standards" on a
"temporary basis" for the purpose of evaluating new or different
programs instituted by one or more states on an "experimental, pilot,
or demonstration basis" if he finds that such amendment or waiver
141d.
1Id.
16 For a sample of such comments, examine H.R. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8,
121, 141, 142, 147 (1959) (THE FEDERAL ROLE IN HIGHWAY SAFETY):
Through enlargement and orderly refinement of the body of fundamental
knowledge concerning highway accidents will come opportunities for deeper
insight, for formulation and testing of accident causes by hypothesis, and for
practical development of means for safer street and highway travel.
H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966);
S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6, 14, 15 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of
1966); Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 7, 8, 10, 50, 85, 104, 111, 131, 142, 222;
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 180, 205, 328, 332, 335.
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would serve the "public interest. '' 7 The lack of descriptive content in
the subjective phrase "public interest" means the Secretary (NHSB)
may approve or disapprove experimental, pilot, and demonstration
programs without running afoul of the statute.
The Secretary (NHSB) is given yet another power, one involving
the expenditure of federal highway safety funds. To insure that local
(urban) highway safety programs would not suffer at the expense of
the state programs, the Congress provided that at least 40 percent of
all federal safety funds apportioned to a state for any fiscal year would
be expended by the political subdivisions of the state on such programs,
if the local program is approved by the governor of the state and if it
is in accord with the promulgated uniform standards." However, the
Secretary is given the power to waive the 40 percent requirement in
whole or in part for a fiscal year for any state.' 9 The only control on
this authority is the requirement that the Secretary determine that
"there is an insufficient number of local highway safety programs to
justify the expenditure" of 40 percent of federal funds locally during
that year.2" He decides how few local programs are an "insufficient
number," and he determines what is a justified expenditure of federal
funds.
B. Limitations on the Power of the Secretary of Transportation and the
National Highway Safety Bureau
Despite the broad power grants to the Secretary (NHSB), the
Congress did provide some effective limitations in its legislation. These
limitations take the form of threshold requirements which must be met
by the states. In evaluating state highway safety programs, there are
certain program requirements over which the Secretary (NHSB) has
no control and, hence, no power of choice. Specifically, a state highway
safety program must: (1) provide that the governor of the state is
responsible for its administration; (2) authorize political subdivisions
of the state to carry out local highway safety programs as part of the
state program, if they are approved by the governor and meet the
Secretary's uniform standards; (3) provide that at least 40 percent of
the federal funds received will be expended on local programs, subject
to waiver of this requirement by the Secretary; (4) provide that the
aggregate expenditure of state and local funds for such programs will
be maintained at a level equal to the average level of such expendi-
tures for the two fiscal years preceding enactment of the statute;
(5) provide for comprehensive driver training programs including
1723 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).





driver education in schools, training of qualified school instructors,
appropriate regulations of other driver training schools, adult driver
training programs and retraining programs for selected drivers, and
development of practice driving facilities, simulators, and similar teach-
ing aids.2 '
C. Sanctions Applicable to Noncomplying States
As one sanction applicable to noncomplying states after Decem-
ber 31, 1968, the statute provides that "the Secretary shall not apportion
any [safety] funds .. . to any State which is not implementing a
highway safety program approved by the Secretary in accordance with
this section." 22 Further, after January 1, 1969, states not "implementing"
an approved program will lose 10 percent of the federal-aid highway
funds they otherwise would have received, until such time as they are
implementing an approved program."3 The responsibility to determine
what constitutes "implementing" is in the Secretary (NHSB) .24 Fur-
thermore, whenever he determines it to be in the "public interest," the
Secretary may suspend - for such periods as he deems necessary - the
application of this 10 percent reduction of federal-aid highway funds.2"
Apparently, he has almost complete authority to waive this sanction,
for the vague term "public interest" does not limit his discretion and
there is no statutory control on the time period which he might deem
"necessary."
Such potentially powerful financial sanctions put the Secretary
and the NHSB in a persuasive position vis-a-vis recalcitrant states.
They have available "carrot and stick" techniques to secure compliance
with the uniform standards. However, the existence of this awesome
power to secure compliance by the withholding of funds does not
necessarily mean that it should or will, in fact, be used.26
II. THE FEDERAL-STATE POWER BALANCE
The authority of the NHSB to establish driver performance stan-
dards and grant exceptions, to approve or disapprove state programs,
and to impose financial sanctions on noncomplying states suggests the
NHSB program may result in a modification of the current power
balance between the state and federal governments in an area in which
lId. §§ 402(b)(1)-(2).
21d. § 402(c).
3 Id. Federal-aid highway funds are administered under authority of the provisions of 23
U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
2'This arises from the fact that the statute does not provide any suggestion as to how
"implementing" should be interpreted. The Secretary (NHSB) must, therefore, make
the determinations on whatever basis he deems appropriate.
25 23 U.S.C. § 402(c)(Supp. 1970).
0 Safety Hassle, The Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1969, at 1, wherein Secretary Volpe
indicated he might withhold funds from recalcitrant states.
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power has been traditionally left to the states. This thought leads to
a consideration of both the legality and the extent of the federal
involvement in the field of highway safety.
A. Constitutionality
There is little doubt that the Congress possesses, on several
grounds, the authority to assert itself in the area of driver control.
The evolution of the Commerce Clause as a power base from Gibbons
v. Ogden27 through Champion v. Ames 8 to Darby Lumber Company,"'
Wickard v. Filburn,30 Heart of Atlanta Motel,3 and Katzenbach v.
McClung,32 need not be described in detail. The United States Supreme
Court's broad reading of the Commerce Clause - as demonstrated in
these cases - lays to rest any serious doubt that the Court would not
sustain highway safety legislation based on the commerce power. Fur-
thermore, the Court impliedly recognized latent power in Congress
in the highway safety area in the early case of Hendrick v. Maryland."3
It was held therein that the State of Maryland had the authority to
require a District of Columbia resident temporarily using its highways
to register his vehicle or secure permission to operate it as a non-resident.
In the course of its opinion, the Court suggested the existence of a
paramount but unexercised power of Congress to enter the field: "In
the absence of national legislation covering the subject a State may
rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and
order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles
- those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. ' 8 4 By this
language the Court implied not only power in Congress to legislate but
also power to pre-empt the area and supplant the regulations of the
various states with its own.35 However, unless the Congress acts
affirmatively, state regulation is permitted so long as its measures do
not unduly burden"6 or discriminate" against interstate traffic.
27 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
28188 U.S. 321 (1903).
2United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
30317 U.S. 111 (1942).
31 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
32379 U.S. 294 (1964).
33 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
341d. at 622. The Court reaffirmed this position in Kane v. New Jersey, 252 U.S. 160,
167-68 (1916).
3 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524n.5 (1959); cf. Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 769 (1945). See also Cooley v. Board, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
36 Id.
3 South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); cf. Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520,
524 (1959). See also Cooley v. Board, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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Congress may rely upon, in addition to the Commerce Clause, other
constitutionally granted powers to intervene in the field of highway
safety. For example, Congressional power to spend for the general
welfare has been approved by the United States Supreme Court in such
broad, unlimited terms as to allow comprehensive federal programs in
a multitude of areas of national concern. 8 The only limitation on this
power is that its use must relate to some national, as distinguished from
local, purpose or problem.! 9 Congress could also use the technique of
attaching conditions to federal grant-in-aid funds, so long as the condi-
tions bear a relation to a national purpose or problem;4° and the power
to "establish post offices and post roads, ' 41 might also be employed
by implication to support federal highway safety legislation.
In summary, it is reasonable to assume that any one or a combi-
nation of these formal Congressional power bases would indeed support
federal legislation injecting the national government into the highway
safety field.
B. Federal Pre-emption in Law
If the federal involvement of 1966 is assumed to be legitimate,
the next question is whether the legislation has, in fact, changed the
federal-state power balance in the field of highway safety. If some
change in the balance is presumed, the extent of the change should be
considered. The most extensive change would occur if the legislation
had the effect of pre-empting the field as was implied to be permissible
in Hendrick v. Maryland.42
1. General Pre-emption
Congressional hearings, committee reports, presidential statements,
and later testimony of officials indicate reservations on the part of
Congress to entirely supplant the states as policy makers in the field
of highway safety. There are several statements to the effect that the
3 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); see Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936); U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power: (1) To lay and collect taxes, duties.
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States ...." Id.
3 9 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936).
40Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). Despite an argument
that such legislation violated the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld with-
drawal of a portion of Oklahoma's share of federal highway funds for failing to remove
from office a member of the State Highway Commission who took an active part in
political activities. His actions constituted a violation of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 7324 (1967), which forbade political activities financed in whole or in part with
federal funds. Id. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Stone, J.,
dissenting opinion).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 2 3 5 U.S. 610 (1915).
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federal government is to supply "leadership" in the field and "help" the
states develop adequate highway safety programs.48 While there are
also several expressions of demand for specific uniform standards in
specified areas of highway safety action policies, 44 these latter expres-
sions may signify only that Congress desired federal "leadership" '
to take the form of pre-emption in the designated areas, as opposed
to general pre-emption. Perhaps the words "cooperation" and "leader-
ship" were used to make some limited form of pre-emption more
palatable to the Congress and the states. In any event, whether "leader-
ship" means limited pre-emption or merely federal guidance, the
legislative history of the Act would not appear to support an argument
of general pre-emption of the safety field.
2. Interstitial Pre-emption
As indicated above, if there is pre-emption intent in the Act, it
might take a limited form which could appropriately be termed "inter-
stitial" pre-emption. That is, Congress may have desired to provide
leadership in highway safety generally - and thus have intended no
complete pre-emption - and, at the same time, it may have determined
that the working safety policy should be made at the federal level and
applied uniformly, where there are expressions of a desire for some-
thing more than "leadership"." The fact that the precise federal
policies would be made by an administrative agency (NHSB) instead
of the Congress is of no moment, for this has presented no difficulty
in cases involving pre-emption by the regulations of other administra-
tive agencies.47
Driver licensing is one of those facets of the highway safety prob-
4 Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 5, 6-7, 42, 131, 151.
4id. at 131; H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Highway Safety Act of
• 1966).
45 Hearings on S. 3052, supra note 2, at 5, 6-7, 42, 131, 151.
46 For instance, House Report No. 1700, refers to the Baldwin Amendment of 1965 (23
U.S.C. §135 (1965)) which provides that states "should" adopt highway safety pro-
grams in accord with uniform standards promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce.
The Report concludes that the Secretary got nowhere in conference with the states and
that "[t)here was no real progress." H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
At another point the Report refers to the fact that for forty years various safety
organizations "have been trying to persuade the several State legislatures to adopt at
least minimum uniform regulatory statutes, with lamentable lack of success." Id. at 6.
However, the Report does recognize what it calls a "paramount" role for the states since
states register automobiles, license drivers, educate the children, police traffic and enforce
statutes. Nevertheless, any desire to leave these traditional state functions in state hands
is not necessarily inconsistent with the pre-emption argument, for each of these functions
could continue to be performed and applied uniformly by all states according to stand-
ards adopted federally. The Report speaks of the insufficiency of most state programs
and concludes that a "mandatory program" (id. at 7) insisted upon by the Congress
may save more lives.
47 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926). See also Florida Lime &




lem where there is reason to believe that Congress may have acted to
pre-empt interstitially. House Report No. 170048 addresses this area:
The wide variation from State to State, and the failure to achieve any
semblance of control or uniformity, bespeak pressures and adherence
to customs long out of date. Driver licensing is apparently more a
source of revenue than a safety control. A person licensed to drive in
one State, however, is in fact licensed to drive anywhere. State lines are
not barriers to drivers in our highly mobile society, nor would anyone
want them to be. But strict uniform licensing and renewal procedures
must be developed and adopted, covering minimum age limits, manda-
tory physical and eyesight examinations, competent skills tests and
written or oral examinations on traffic laws, varieties of traffic condi-
tions, and emergency situations that arise in the operation of an
automobile.49
Like the House Committee Report, the report5" accompanying the
Senate Bill provides: "The value of uniformity is clear in such matters
as standards for driver training and education and periodic re-exami-
nation of drivers. ""
If genuinely sought, the "strict uniformity" mentioned in the House
Report can come about only through uniform federal licensing stan-
dards. In our form of federalism, only a "senior partner" sovereign
(the federal government) possesses the necessary power ("leadership")
to force ("lead") "strict uniformity" of licensing upon state sovereign-
ties. If expressed in precise terms, such standards will have the effect
of pre-empting the states in the area of driver licensing.
3. Minimum Standards Pre-emption
Within either form of pre-emption - general or interstitial - an
alternate form exists by which the Secretary (NHSB) may take action.
Rather than establishing comprehensive uniform standards, the Secre-
tary (NHSB) may promulgate minimum standards to be applied
uniformly. To illustrate: It is plausible to read the federal legislation
as involving driver licensing pre-emption only to the extent requiring
minimum levels of uniformity. This approach would recognize con-
tinuing power in the states to adopt driver licensing standards higher
than the minimum requirements imposed by the NHSB. On the other
hand, state standards not meeting the federal minimum would be
supplanted by the federal standards.52
This form of pre-emption raises issues inherent in the higher-lower
standards dichotomy. That is, when federal action is characterized as
a requirement of minimum uniformity, a different licensing standard
4H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
49 Id. at 9.
50S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
slId. at 5.
52The distinction between the pre-emptive effect of minimum standards and uniform
federal standards is described in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 146-52 (1963).
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established or proposed by a state may be viewed in one of two ways:
It may be considered to relate to the imposition of further controls to
prevent driver failure, or it may be viewed as necessary to protect indi-
vidual freedom of travel.5 8 Thus, what is "higher" in terms of safety
is also more restrictive, i.e., "lower," in terms of free travel. Likewise,
a control which is "lower" in terms of safety is less restrictive, i.e.,
"higher" in terms of protecting free travel.
It is important to recognize that, at some point, the goal of
increased highway safety must yield to demands for social efficiency.
Hence, Congress is probably not to be understood as justifying higher
standards of safety to the extent of completely disregarding the impact
of safety policies on the need to travel, with a driver's license serving
as a primary means of expressing that need.54 Such an interpretation
would permit the states to adopt any sort of repressive control measure
which could be shown to contribute to highway safety and to justify the
controls in terms of the National Highway Safety Act. Absolute safety
on the streets and highways cannot be expected; the corresponding loss
of efficiency in transportation would not be worth the social cost.
4. Determination of the Pre-emption Issue
Of course, the decision as to whether there is legal pre-emption
of the driver licensing field would be provided by the courts. This result
is apparent from the fact that a body of court-created doctrine has been
developed.55 Hence, the above comments are only speculative, for as
yet the courts have not confronted the question. However, there is
sufficient material available on which to base a plausible pre-emption
argument. No doubt such an argument could prove useful to the person
whose license is withdrawn under a state statute or regulation believed
to be inconsistent with uniform standards promulgated by the NHSB.
C. Federal Pre-emption in Fact
Whether there has been pre-emption in law by Congress in the area
of highway safety may be an academic question for the reason that
there may be pre-emption in fact. This follows from the political and
economic leverage over the states which is enjoyed by the federal gov-
53 The right to travel has been accorded Constitutional protection. E.g., Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1941); see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); cf. Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920); Williams
v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873);
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
54 The importance of the motor vehicle as a mode of expressing mobility in American
society is amply demonstrated in the APPENDIX infra.
55 See generally S. Doc. 39, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 282-94 (1964) (THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION).
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errment. The states may have no real choice other than to comply with
the federal mandates in the field of highway safety.
The key to the federal "leadership," "partnership," or "coopera-
tion" with the states - however labelled - is simply money! State
governments need federal grants-in-aid to accomplish the many social
programs which they pursue. What makes possible pre-emption in fact
is the legal doctrine which permits Congress, in the exercise of its
spending power, to fix the terms on which allotments of federal funds
will be made.5" The doctrine is such that a state which receives "offers
of seductive favors ' 57 from the federal government is expected to
submit to the terms on which the favors are offered or "adopt 'the
simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion.''58
However, given the shift of economic power to the federal govern-
ment through the income tax and other federal funding measures, is it
realistically possible for states to refuse federal grants-in-aid, despite
distasteful conditions which are imposed? The "simple expedient
' 59
of refusing to be coerced is a simplistic answer in a society which, in
fact, depends on economic adjustments to be made by the federal govern-
ment no matter what form they may take.
Hence, Congress, well aware of the limited or nonexistent choice
available to states, has created many federal spending programs to
which conditions are attached. Relevant to highway safety, the interstate
system of highways and the federal-aid systems are two examples of
such programs. While both of these projects are the combination of
many years of state-federal "cooperation" in this field, 0 the Federal
Highway Administration 61 promulgates the detailed specifications
which must be met by state programs, and it approves state project
proposals which are to be federally funded in part.6 2 These programs
have been successful in securing more highway mileage of higher quality
than would have been built if states had been forced to go it alone, and
the states have come to depend on such grants-in-aid.
The relevance of such programs to the highway safety program
lies in the power of the NHSB to refuse to approve a state safety pro-
gram. 63 With a broad base of transferred power- supported by the
authority to impose financial sanctions on recalcitrant states - and
5 See Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
57 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 599 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting
opinion).
58 Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947).
59 Id. at 143.
60 23 U.S.C. §§ 103, 107, 111, 113, 115, 127 (1966).
61 Id. § 109.
6
2 Id. § 106.
63 Id. § 402 (a) (Supp. 1970): "Each State shall have a highway safety program ap-
proved by the Secretary . . " Id. See text accompanying notes 22-26 srupra.
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given the economic position of the states, it appears that the NHSB
can, indeed, provide the "leadership" necessary to inspire the states to
adopt highway safety programs in accord with its uniform standards.
In the final analysis there may be pre-emption of state power in fact,
if not in law. In either case the federal role in highway safety will
ultimately become dominant. This will follow if the NHSB makes
efficient use of its standard setting and sanctioning authority.
III. NHSB PHILOSOPHY REGARDING STANDARDS
As his explanation of the approach taken by NHSB to its initial
standards, former Federal Highway Administrator Lowell Bridwell
stated:
I should point out that a policy choice was involved in our adoption
of the new standards. If all States were to be required to meet every
portion of every provision of the standards by the end of next year,
[December 31, 19681 this course would have called for adopting
standards with a fairly low level of performance.
Alternatively, the standards could reach much higher levels if they
were to specify high but realistic goals to which the States could aspire
in their programs. For that reason, the policy was adopted of setting
goals as the only feasible method of procedure. The standards are
therefore phrased in broad terms, permitting some variation in State
regulations and allowing for a degree of flexibility between the States
in experimenting with different program approaches to produce more
effective results.
6 4
Dr. William Haddon, Jr., then Administrator of NHSB echoed
Mr. Bridwell as follows:
If the programs of all States were required to meet all aspects of
all standards by the end of 1968, this would necessitate standards ap-
proaching the lowest common denominator of present State and com-
munity programs. If, on the other hand, the standards were to set goals
which the States could work toward, they could be set at much higher
levels. This latter alternative was adopted as the only one which would
adequately satisfy the purposes of the Act. 65
At another point Dr. Haddon stated: "The standards, therefore specify
what is to be done, and not 'how' or by whom." '
A. The Relationship Between the Philosophy and the Act
Perhaps this NHSB approach to its standards development func-
tion is justifiable as to the overall program and, in general, as to the
thirteen initial standards,67 but it is doubtful that the NHSB can justify
its argument that the standards had to be expressed in "broad terms"
and at "realistic" levels. In part, the NHSB philosophy may be criti-
6Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 174-75.
65Id. at 178.
"Id. at 180.
87 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1970).
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cized for erroneously assuming that the National Highway Safety
Act required states to meet all NHSB standards before January 1, 1969.
It is true that Sec. 402 (b) of the Act forbids approval of any state
highway safety program which does not contain the five mandated
provisions;" however, there is no statutory requirement that the man-
dated provisions or other standards promulgated by NHSB must be
operational by that date. Conversely, the statute provides that states
which are implementing (i.e., progressing toward compliance) approved
programs on January 1, 1969, will not lose federal safety or highway-aid
funds."9 Therefore, it is fallacious to assume that NHSB cannot include
high performance level components in its standards. Implementation
of state safety program elements may occur over a period of time. This
implementation concept is consistent with statements of the Under-
secretary of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administrator.' 0
Further, there are at least three reasons why states would not be
forced to lose federal funds if the NHSB were to adopt exacting and
precise standards. First, the NHSB has discretion to approve late imple-
mentation of approved state programs, so long as some real progress
is made. Congress accepts this without question.7' Second, the Act gives
the Secretary of Transportation power to protect the state share of
highway funds (but not the safety funds), authorizing him "in the
public interest" to suspend the safety program approval requirement
of any state "for such period as he deems necessary." '72 Third, the Act
6823 U.S.C. § 402(b) (Supp. 1970).
BaId. § 402(c).
70 The NHSB policies emphasize implementation of state safety programs over a period
of time. The NHSB believes it has power to approve state program plans on December
31, 1968, but allow for full implementation later as the state progresses in fulfilling its
obligations under the plan approved. For example, Under Secretary of Transportation
Everett Hutchinson stated to the National Highway Safety Advisory Committee:
The law provides that each Governor shall submit to the Secretary of Trans-
portation, for his approval, a comprehensive highway safety program by De-
cember 31, 1968. Each program will be reviewed in the light of the progress
the plan calls for over the existing level of safety program performance in the
State. A plan does not have to provide for full implementation of the standards
the Secretary will promulgate by any specific point in time.
In the final analysis, I cannot image [sic] a State being penalized 10 per
cent of its highway funds except in a very extreme situation. Of course, the
public interest will be served by early implementation of the safety programs.
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 176-77 (quoted as part of the statement of Lowell
K. Bridwell, Federal Highway Administrator). See the statement of Dr. William
Haddon, former Director of NHSB, in the Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 177-79,
and the response of Mr. Bridwell to a question by Senator Cooper:
As I understand, it is absolutely correct that what you have to do is gauge the
progress that is being made and make a determination as to whether or not a
State is making not only a good faith effort, but also a substantial effort to
implement the regulations. Is that correct?
MR. BRIDWELL. Yes, sir; I think that certainly agrees with my assess-
ment.
Id. at 179. See also Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 206-07 (statement of Lowell
K. Bridwell).
71 Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, indicate this acceptance.
72 23 U.S.C. § 402(c) (Supp. 1970).
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gives the Secretary of Transportation power (in the "public interest")
to "amend or waive standards on a temporary basis for the purpose of
evaluating new or different highway safety programs instituted on an
experimental, pilot, or demonstration basis, by one or more States...."
This congeries of express power is ample authority upon which the
NHSB might justify individual state deviations from the exacting
standards which it could promulgate. In short, the NHSB was not
forced into the philosophy it chose to adopt.
B. Factors Contributing to the Philosophy
The philosophy adopted by the NHSB for determining the initial
standards may have been influenced in part by the probable federal
funding drain occurring as a result of demands imposed by the Viet
Nam war. Without sufficient federal grant-in-aid funds, high quality
state safety programs could not be implemented. However, this factor
does not justify the setting of low federal standards. The NHSB could
construe "implementing" to mean whatever progress is possible within
the budgetary limitations imposed.
Another factor which could have contributed to the perspective of
the standards chosen is the statutory requirement that the standards
must be developed in cooperation with the states, their political sub-
divisions, and appropriate federal agencies.14 The cooperative relation-
ships described in the Act may have been taken too literally, and the
desire for federal "leadership", which was expressed in the committee
reports of both Houses of Congress, may have been lost. In effect, the
philosophical rationale announced may have evolved during the NHSB
deliberations with states, political subdivisions, and other federal agen-
cies as to the standards which could "cooperatively" be agreed upon.
The determination to set "realistic goals' '7 also may have been
influenced by a desire to reassure the states that most of them would
be able to meet NHSB expectations without resort to the waiver process.
Innocuous standards may be promulgated to demonstrate that the
NHSB is fulfilling its responsibilities. Unfortunately, such standards
may be erroneously assumed by the general public to make a significant
contribution to improved driver performance. Political considerations
may get in the way of crusading spirit; and thus watered down, the
crusade enters a new phase in which the social problem, which led to
the creation of the agency, may become relegated to a secondary position.
The danger is that the mix of decision factors may become such that the
agency concerns itself with deciding standards' questions primarily on
the basis of what is expedient rather than what is needed.
73 id. § 402(a).
74Id. § 402(e).




IV. NHSB DRIVER LICENSING STANDARD
Inasmuch as the standards are based on the philosophy described
above, they should be analyzed to determine the effect of the imple-
mentation in light of the stated philosophy. For purposes of this paper,
the NHSB driver licensing standard will serve as an example of the
effect of the philosophy on a single aspect of the federal program. It is
submitted that the philosophy, in this instance, has subverted the Con-
gressional desire for "uniform standards." However, it should be borne
in mind that driver licensing is only one of thirteen standards promul-
gated by NHSB. For this reason, the general success or failure of the
NHSB standards to achieve the goals set by Congress should not be
expected to be forecast from the analysis which follows.
A. General Provisions
Under the Act, the NHSB could have promulgated the mandatory
driver education and training standard"6 as the sole federal requirement
- 23 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(E) (Supp. 1970) wherein the Congress declared that no state
highway safety program should be approved by the Secretary of Transportation, unless
it provides for comprehensive driver education and training programs.
NHSB may be justified in expressing this standard in broad terms, for the reason
that driver education and driver training are two of the most expensive elements in any
highway safety program. The question of "where do we get the money?" looms large in
the minds of both state and federal officials. The Viet Nam War has resulted in a
drastic curtailment of federal safety funds available to NHSB. Furthermore, Congress
did not make successful completion of either a driver education or driver training course
a prerequisite to being licensed to drive. Hence, this standard relates to driver licensing
in the larger sense, in that it is also designed to improve driver performance, but it is
not imposed on individuals as a licensing control measure.
For these reasons, it is difficult to fault the NHSB driver education and training
standard. The congressional mandate has been met, for the standard does require estab-
lishment of such programs, and it contains all of the elements which appear in the
statute, with possibly one exception. The standard is vague on the point that the driver
education program must be within the state school systems and administered by appro-
priate school officials. Perhaps it is present by implication, but this statutory require-
ment could well be stated more explicitly.
The standard indicates that the content of the high school driver education course
will be expected to consist, at a minimum, of practice driving and instruction in the
following:
1. Basic and advanced driving techniques, including handling emergencies;
2. Rules of the road and other state and local laws and ordinances;
3. Critical vehicle systems and subsystems which require preventative maintenance;
4. Vehicle, highway, and community features which aid the driver in avoiding
crashes, protect him and his passengers in crashes, and maximize salvage of the
injured;
5. Signs, signals, highway markings, and design features of highways which must
be understood if one is to drive safely;
6. Differences between urban and rural driving, including use of expressways;
7. Pedestrian safety.
Highway Safety Program Standard No. 4, Driver Education, 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1970).
Finally, students are to be encouraged to enroll in first aid training. Id.
Other than providing for the high school course, states are further expected to:
(a) establish a research and development program leading to procurement of practice
driving facilities, simulators, and other teaching aids; (b) establish a program for adult
driver training and retraining; (c) establish a policy for control of commercial driving
schools by licensing them and certifying their instructors; and (d) evaluate its entire
program periodically, and provide NHSB with an evaluation summary. Id.
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in the area of driver controls for state programs. However, it exercised
its discretion to promulgate an additional standard pertaining to driver
licensing.7 7 This standard establishes "minimum" state licensing pro-
gram content; hence, states must adopt at least these licensing control
measures, but they are also obligated to structure their licensing pro-
grams to prevent needlessly removing the opportunity of the citizen to
drive.78 The eight components which comprise the standard will be
discussed consecutively along with relevant portions of the NHSB
Highway Safety Program Manual,79 which provides more specific
recommendations for implementing the standard.
B. Component I: One-License Concept
The state must adopt the one-license concept and identify the types
of vehicles the licensee is authorized to drive. 0 With a multiplicity of
licenses, the driver is in a position to continue driving until his supply
is "exhausted" by suspension, revocation, or expiration of all his licenses.
Multiple licensing makes it difficult to construct viable controls through
point system pressures and formal license actions by administrators or
courts. Thus, the one-license system makes it illegal to possess more
than one license and requires surrender of all valid licenses when apply-
ing for a license.8 If all states apply this concept, eventually all drivers
will be limited to a single license.
This requirement appears to be a worthwhile standard which is
within the power granted NHSB. It is useful, because it helps prevent
drivers from escaping licensing controls. It is relevant to improved
- Highway Safety Program Standard No. 5, Driver Licensing, 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Standard No. 5).
78 Id.
7 9 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, HIGHWAY SAFETY PROGRAM MANUAL, VOL. 5,
DRIVER LICENSING (1969) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
The NHSB Manual is a publication proposed for the states to give them more specific
recommendations for implementing the Standards:
To assist the States in developing the details of their highway safety programs
under the new standards, the Bureau is now preparing a set of policies and
procedures to be issued with regard to each individual standard . . . . These
policies and procedures will provide specific recommendations for matters to
be incorporated in State and local program regulations. When State safety
projects are presented to the Department for approval, consideration will be
given to the extent to which the State has followed the recommendations em-
bodied in these policies and procedures.
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 174 (statement of Lowell K. Bridwell, Federal
Highway Administrator).
To assist them [states] in the administration of their program, we have in-
cluded several projects, one of which will develop guidelines in the form of
texts and manuals, describing managerial policies, techniques, methods, and
procedures for conducting the safety programs.
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note 1, at 201 (statement of Dr. William Haddon, former
Director of the NHSB).
80 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(I).
81NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, UNIFORM
VEHICLE CODE § 6-101 (c) (Revised 1968).
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driver performance, for it helps make effective license withdrawal
decisions. The single-license concept may be evaluated as to its success
or failure as a safety measure by a determination of whether it permits
more effective control over individual drivers and makes it possible to
subject them to measures designed to improve driver performance.
However, evaluation must await the accumulation of sufficient experi-
ence data. It is not the sort of "broad generalized recommendation"
the House Committee rejected as unacceptable."'
C. Component II: Proof of Date and Place of Birth
Drivers must submit acceptable proof of date and place of birth
when applying for an original license.88 This component complements
the policy of establishing minimum age limits, which is based upon the
assumption that there is, in fact, a predictive relationship between age
and being involved in an accident. Furthermore, information with
respect to age makes it possible to collect accident statistics and relate
them to age. Hence, the proof requirement contributes to an evaluation
of the success or failure of age requirements as driver control measures.
It is acceptable as something more than a "broad generalized recom-
mendation."
8
D. Component III: Examinations
1. Initial Examination
All drivers must pass an initial examination in which the applicant
demonstrates his (1) "[albility to operate" the types of vehicles for
which he seeks a license; (2) "[a]bility to read and comprehend"
traffic signs and symbols; (3) "[kjnowledge of laws relating to" traffic,
safe driving practices, vehicle and highway safety features, emergency
situations, and other driving responsibilities; and (4) "[vlisual acuity,
which must meet or exceed State standards.
' 85
There is little doubt that all four parts of this component are
relevant to the goal of improved driver performance. Current knowl-
edge is not complete and empirical, but it is sufficient to justify assuming
a relationship exists.8"
2 H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
8 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(11).
8
4H.R. REp. No. 1700, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
8 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, §§ 204.4(111) (A) (1-4).
86 Dr. Haddon, former NHSB administrator stated:
I think also that if we were to wait for adequate information with respect to
all of the more clearly important aspects of highway safety we, in effect, would
be doing nothing for a good many decades.
The issues are just so complicated that obviously we can, and I believe
should, move ahead for quite a few years on the best information that we have
available without waiting for the momentum of perfect information.
Hearings on S. 1467, supra note I, at 205.
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But are these expressions acceptable as the sort of "performance
criteria"8' 7 standards which Congress expected from the NHSB? Are
they capable of being evaluated as to their success or failure "in actual
application" ?"8 Are they anything more than "broad generalized recom-
mendations" ?89 If they are neither of these, then in what sense are they
"uniform" ?90 Are they actually "nonuniform nonstandards" and outside
the meaning of the Act?
Phrases such as "[a]bility to operate,' 1 "[a]bility to read and
comprehend," 92 "[k]nowledge of law,""3 and "[v]isual acuity"'94 are
sufficiently amorphous to require further definition if they are to be
applied by the states. By making it necessary for the states to give their
own content to these phrases, the so-called "standard" is revealed to be
devoid of content. Furthermore, the "strict uniform' 95 licensing pro-
grams sought by the House Report on the Act are likely to be lost
because states may individually ascribe whatever meaning they desire
to the phrases. For example, State A may require an extensive, in-depth
demonstration of ability to operate, while State B may require no more
than a superficial demonstration. Yet, both states may contend, with
justification, that they have met this part of the federal standard!
State A may require visual acuity of 20/40 correctable in both eyes,
while State B may require only 20/40 correctable in one eye. Yet, both
states may contend that they are in compliance with the visual acuity
requirement.
Where is the uniformity which Congress sought? Is not each state
left to write its own standards as has been the practice? About the most
that can be said for this component of the standard is that it informs
the states that they are supposed to "do something" in the areas identi-
fied without telling them what is really expected.
In order to "do something" which would result in NHSB approval
of the state program when reviewed after December 31, 1968, the state
had few ways in which to discover what was actually expected of it.
Aside from conferences with NHSB personnel, the only other source
of information appears to be the NHSB Highway Safety Program
Manual, Vol. 5, Driver Licensing (1969).6 It provides little specific
V 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).
8 H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
89 Id.
90 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).
91 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(111) (A) (1).
9
2 1d. § 204.4(111) (A) (2).
9 3 1d. § 204.4(III) (A) (3).
94 1d. § 204.4(111) (A) (4).
9 5 H.R. REP. No. 1700, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) (Highway Safety Act of 1966).
96 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 6-7.
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guidance for state administrators as to the meaning of the vague
language of this component of the driver licensing standard.
For example, the required demonstration of "ability to operate
' 9 7
is explained to mean that a road performance test should be given and
should include- but not limited to- the road test recommendations
of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators in Test-
ing Drivers.98 In addition, the examiner is expected to explain any un-
satisfactory performance to the applicant, and the road performance
test may be omitted if a licensee with a satisfactory driving record is
applying for renewal or if the applicant possesses a license from another
state having an acceptable licensing program.99 The specific licensing
policies' 00 which the states are expected to adopt are not articulated
in the Manual.
The required demonstration of ability to read and comprehend
traffic signs and symbols is also not explained further in the Manual.10'
Similarly, the required demonstration of knowledge of laws relating to
traffic, safe driving practices, vehicle, highway and other safety features
is amplified only briefly. 10 2 The specific elements of the knowledge test
are not indicated and must be created by each state.
The required test of visual acuity is amplified in the Manual to
include an evaluation of field of vision.'03 This raises a related question:
If the NHSB believes license applicants should be examined for field
of vision, why is it not included in its standard? The Manual implies
visual acuity is only one of several vision factors which relate to
improved driver performance. Perhaps the explanation is found, in
part, in the NHSB administrative philosophy to establish "watered-
down" standards with which states could more easily comply.'0 4
2. Licensee Re-examination
After an initial examination, each licensee must be re-examined
every four years for "at least visual acuity and knowledge of rules of
the road."' 0 5 This component presses the states to recognize that con-
tinuing driver controls are necessary, since it is fallacious to assume
97 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4 (III) (A) (1).
98 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 6.
9 Id. ch. IV, at 6-7.
10 I.e., the actual criteria of decision applied as working policies in the state licensing
program.
101 MANUAL, supra note 79. ch. IV, at 5.
'
0 2 Id. ch. IV, at 5, 6.
103 Id. ch. IV, at 5. These visual characteristics, along with depth perception, muscle bal-
ance, and color perception, are believed, by the American Optometric Association and
the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, to be relevant to proper
performance of the driving task. AMERICAN OPTOMETRIC ASSOCIATION, VISION SCREEN-
ING FOR DRIVER LICENSING 12-13 (1966).
10 4 See notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
105 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(111) (B).
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that physical and mental characteristics of drivers do not change after
initial licensing. Periodic re-examination facilitates discovery of licensees
who no longer qualify. This requirement should also help eliminate
the license renewal by mail practice - followed in some states - which
destroys the utility of the license renewal process as a safety device,
at least insofar as the renewal function is expected to involve a re-
evaluation of the licensee. Thus, periodic re-examinations are relevant
to improved driver performance. Furthermore, the re-examination
requirement will be capable of being so evaluated as to its success or
failure in actual application, after sufficient experience to permit accu-
mulation of a base of data.
Unfortunately, however, this component uses the same type of
vague phrases which appear in the previous component and is thus
subject to the criticism that it, too, is devoid of content. The states are
told they must re-examine licensees on at least two of the factors tested
for initial licensing; but they are not told what is expected because the
standard is so vague as to be meaningless. The NHSB driver licensing
Manual indicates the re-examination should occur prior to license
renewal at least every four years and should include as a minimum
"the tests for visual ability and knowledge of rules and regulation.
10 6
The road test may be waived at renewal if the applicant's driving record
is satisfactory.
107
E. Component IV: Driver Record System
This component imposes on states recordkeeping responsibilities,
which should lead to a future source of detailed information on indi-
vidual drivers. It requires the state record system to provide rapid entry
of data, controls to eliminate delay in obtaining data for the system,
rapid response to requests for status of license validity, ready avail-
ability of data for statistical purposes, and ready identification of
drivers.108 The Manual suggests that close liaison should be maintained
with state education, highway, health, welfare, and traffic records
agencies in order to facilitate an interchange of information. "09
Such a requirement is useful, because it facilitates collection of
information for both highway safety research purposes and for the
driver identification and license validity purposes. The building of a
base of appropriate licensee information obviously has relevance to
improved driver performance, if only because it makes possible more
sophisticated research on driver behavior.
106 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 4, 8.
107Id. ch. IV, at 6, 7.
108 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, §§ 204.4(IV) (A)-(E).
109 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 11.
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F. Component V: Specific Term and Renewal of Licenses
This portion of the federal licensing standard requires states to
issue licenses for "a specific term,"" 0 and they must be "renewed"''
to remain valid. At the time of both issuance and renewal, the appli-
cant's "record must be checked.""'
Yet the NHSB's meaning of "specific term""-' is not clear. Does
it mean any period of time adopted by the state which has an identi-
fiable beginning and end? If NHSB desires the term to be no longer
than the four-year maximum term established for re-examination in
Component III, why doesn't it so specify? Such vague language in the
standard presents the states with the same problem described above
with respect to the initial examination requirements.
However, if state officials examine the licensing Manual, they will
discover that NHSB expects the maximum "specific term" of a license
to be no longer than four years." 4 Why is this information not included
in the language of the formal standard? Why is it tucked away in a
publication designed to interpret standards purportedly expressed as
"performance criteria" ?'" If NHSB knows this is what it will expect
of the states, why does it not so state in a straightforward manner?
Without the Manual, the states would be left to their own interpre-
tations of the phrase.
The component imposes the further requirement that a "driver's
record must be checked''16 at the time of issuance or renewal of the
license. For what is the record to be "checked"? The Manual merely
repeats the language of the standard.1 7 However, it does provide that
before issuing an original license, each state should request the National
Driver Register to "verify the applicant's eligibility for licensing."" 8
These appear to be the only statements which refer to checking the
applicant's "record." Furthermore, even if it were possible to ascertain
what is expected as a "check," what is the state supposed to do about
the matters which it checks? Under the present standard, a state may
"check" for many things and still determine that it is appropriate to
issue or renew a license. If the NHSB expects states to deny initial and




114 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 8.
115 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1970).
116 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(V).
117 MANUAL, Supra note 79, ch. IV, at 9.
118 Id. ch. IV, at 7. The Register is fully described in THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY SAFETY
BUREAU, THE NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTRa (1967). The Register acts as a clearing
house for driver identification and records information received from states.
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renewal licenses on the basis of certain factors to be checked, why
doesn't it so state?
In large measure, this entire component leaves the states to their
own devices to determine what NHSB expects of them. Yet safety
program approval by NHSB is required if states are to continue to
qualify for federal safety and highway-aid funds.
G. Component VI: Driver Improvement Program
Each state is required to establish a driver improvement program
"to identify problem drivers for record review and other appropriate
actions designed to reduce the frequency of their involvement in traffic
accidents or violations."" 9 The vagueness of this standard raises a
number of questions: What criteria are to be used to select those
licensees who are to be termed "problem drivers"? What sorts of
license actions are deemed "appropriate" and in what circumstances?
What assumptions lie behind the notion that frequency of "involve-
ment" in accidents should be reduced? Does this expression indicate
that NHSB assumes "involvement" in an accident to be the equivalent
of causation (i.e., fault) based on human failure ?12o Like the language
of other components, states may interpret the language of this standard
very differently and still be within its terms. As a result, there is no
assurance of uniformity among the states; it is another example of a
"nonuniform nonstandard." Again the states must consult the Manual
to determine what NHSB expects of them; and, fortunately, the
Manual describes more precisely the content of the driver improvement
program it expects states to establish. 12 '
Basically, the state licensing agency is expected to establish a
system of identification and rehabilitation of drivers who "repeatedly"
become involved in accidents and traffic law convictions.' 22 The selec-
tion of persons for treatment is to be made on the basis of a point
system such as that described in the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators publication, Guide to Driver Improvement.12 3
The essence of a point system is the assignment of a numerical value
to traffic law convictions and accidents according to their "severity."' 24
When the total number of points reaches a predetermined action level,
119 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(VI).
120 For a full discussion of this question, see J. REESE, POWER, POLICY, PEOPLE: A STUDY
OF DRIVER LICENSING ADMINISTRATION Pt. II, ch. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as J.
REESE).
121 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 12-15.
12 Id. ch. IV, at 12.
123 Id.; NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, UNIFORM
VEHICLE CODE § 206(b), wherein there is included a point system for the identification
of problem drivers.
124 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 12. What is meant by "severity"?
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the administrative machinery is activated, and some "reform' 25 action
designed to improve driving performance is taken.
The action is initiated by specially trained driver analysts who are
expected to review the record of each driver.126 According to the
Manual, the first action should consist of sending an advisory letter
to drivers who have accumulated a certain number of points but who
are not yet considered to have become serious problem drivers.' 27 The
second action should consist of a personal interview - to be conducted
by a driver analyst - after an advisory letter has been sent followed
by the accumulation of more points. The interview is expected to
"[rJesult in recommendations by the driver analyst of remedial measures
designed to improve the driving performance . "... 1128
The range of remedial choices available to the analyst for recom-
mendation includes (but is not limited to) the following:
(a) Referral to a Medical Advisory Board - This recommenda-
tion is justified when the analyst has "reason to believe" that the
licensee has a physical or mental limitation which impairs his driving
performance.1 9 However, the Manual does not provide the factors
which the analyst should use to conclude that there is "reason to
believe" medical evaluation is necessary. The Manual suggests that
states should establish their own guidelines to assist the analyst to select
the most suitable measures. 130 The results of any medical examination
are to be reviewed by the Medical Advisory Board before further action
is taken. 3 ' However, the medical criteria and standards to be applied
by the Board are not stated. Perhaps the primary reason statements
regarding mental and physical limitations on driving are not more
precise is that not enough is known about the driving task to permit
its elements to be identified and quantified. 1 2 Until this has been
accomplished, there will be a great deal of calculated guessing by
analysts and medical boards.
(b) Instruction- The analyst may decide driving performance
can be sufficiently upgraded by discussing with the licensee "the specific
problem areas"' 33 believed to have caused poor performance. How the
analyst determines the problem areas or when such a decision is
appropriate remains unstated, and no examples are given.
'25Id. ch. IV, at 12.
128Id. ch. IV, at 12-13.
127 Id. ch. IV, at 13. How is the "serious" problem driver to be identified? The point system
per se does not make the selection. Someone must establish an action level, and the
action level may vary widely from state to state. The uniformity Congress sought is
sacrificed.




132J. REESE, supra note 120, pt. II, ch. 1.
13 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 14.
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(c) Driver improvement school - The analyst is expected to
require attendance at such a school when he "has concluded that such
treatment may improve the licensee's driving performance."'3 4 Yet
upon what factors is the analyst to base such a conclusion? There are
no illustrations. The Manual is as useless as the standard! To permit
analysts to make this judgment on factors known only to themselves
makes it impossible to evaluate and control analysts' choices within the
range of recommendations. If this situation occurs, it is virtually impos-
sible to determine whether the agency has provided the due process
and equal protection of the law's guarantees which the general public
is entitled to expect of its administrative agencies. The factors of choice
should be made known.
(d) The final three remedial choices available to the analyst are
license probation, license suspension, and license revocation."3 5 Suspen-
sion is expected to be recommended when the analyst concludes that
it "[w]ill produce an improvement in an individual's driving habits
.... "186 How the analyst is to decide and what factors he is to use
in estimating the probability of improvement of habits are not stated.
Such vagueness vests in the analyst a broad case of uncontrolled
authority to make the critical initial withdrawal decision which, in all
probability, will become that of the agency. Without knowledge of the
specific criteria of decision, it will be difficult to evaluate and control
the analysts' recommendations.
The Manual suggests probation in lieu of suspension when deemed
appropriate.' 37 Yet the factors which should be used to decide when
probation is appropriate are not indicated in the Manual.
Revocation is said to be appropriate when the analyst concludes
that the attained driving record "precludes the immediate upgrading
of the individual's driving ability' '1 3 8 through any of the other choices.
Again, the Manual is of no assistance, for it does not indicate the
criteria on which the recommendation should be based.
A final driver improvement program suggestion found in the
Manual is that all licensees suspended "may"' 39 be re-examined in the
same manner as are original license applicants before their licenses are
restored. Further, the Manual provides that an examination must be





137id. ch. IV, at 7.
3
8 
1d. ch. IV, at 14.
13 Id. ch. IV, at 4. The use of the word "may" is an invitation to states to delay instituting
a policy requiring re-examination of licensees following expiration of a period of sus-
pension. "May" transfers power to the states to choose not to re-examine.
140 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 4.
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The existence of the Manual suggests several questions about the
formal language of the licensing standard. First, if the NHSB expects
its Manual recommendations to be part of the state programs, why does
it not state them in the standards? If it can reduce them to writing in the
Manual, it can include them in the language of the standard. It must not
be forgotten that NHSB has power to approve state safety program
plans which have not yet been fully implemented. 14 1 Therefore, a
standard containing specific requirements would constitute a useful
policy statement to which backward states could aspire.
Second, several instances have been described wherein the Manual
is either silent on the particular topic or speaks in the same terms as
the standard. The Manual, therefore, does not provide the specific
recommendations which Mr. Bridwell and Dr. Haddon promised.
14 2
Third, the net effect of parroting the language of the formal
standard in the Manual is to leave the NHSB with almost total discre-
tion to approve or disapprove the driver licensing provisions of state
safety programs on whatever basis it desires. The NHSB has not com-
mitted itself except in general terms, for it has promulgated a "non-
standard" which is inadequately explained in its Manual. This is
particularly true of the initial licensing examination component, the
renewal process component, and the driver improvement program
component.
H. Component VII: Medical Evaluations
1. Establishment of a System
States must establish a system which provides for "medical evalu-
ation" of licensees whom the agency "has reason to believe have mental
or physical conditions which might impair their driving ability."' 48
The NHSB licensing Manual contains two elements pertaining to
medical evaluation of specific licensees: The first is the authority of the
driver analyst to refer licensees to a medical advisory board, licensed
physicians, or specialists for examination as part of the driver improve-
ment program, 144 and the second is a requirement that the results of a
physical examination should be reviewed by the medical advisory
board before any license action is taken by the agency.' 45
A curious feature of both the standard and the Manual is that they
appear to assume medically trained persons possess competence not only
to evaluate physical conditions but also to determine to what extent
those conditions relate to performance of the driving task. It is sub-
141 23 U.S.C. 402(c) (Supp. 1970); see notes 69-71 supra.
142 See note 79 supra.
143 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4(VII) (A).




mitted that, at best, the conclusions of the physician relative to appro-
priate licensing action will be largely guesswork. This contention is
based primarily on the fact that high quality research into the nature
of the driving task has been unable to describe the task in terms which
permit its quantification.' 46 Until this has been done, the actual relation-
ships of mental and physical abilities to the driving task remain in large
measure speculative.
No doubt it is useful to acquire medical opinion before licensing
action based on physical and mental qualities is taken. No doubt such
decisions will be made despite the lack of knowledge on the critical
issue of relevance to the driving task. However, medical opinion should
be recognized as offering no panacea to driver licensing administrators.
Although it is an informed judgment, the licensing recommendation of
a physician is nothing more than an opinion. It should be recognized
and treated as such. As more information on the nature of the driving
task becomes available and relevant characteristics are identified, the
licensing agencies, including NHSB, should make certain that medical
examiners base evaluations on those physical and mental factors known
to relate to the driving task. In short, the criteria of medical judgment
must be readily adaptable to change with the base of knowledge
acquired if medical judgment is to be rational. Furthermore, it would
seem that some knowledge of the driving function currently exists
although it is far from perfect. 147 Assuming this to be true, NHSB
should identify the physical and mental factors believed to be relevant
to driving and instruct the medical examiner to base his conclusions on
those factors insofar as it is possible. Criteria of judgment should be
indicated to the medical examiner no matter how imperfect. Surely
some such identification of criteria can be made, and hopefully, the
medical profession will insist upon it. Otherwise, the medical examiner's
responsibility to both the licensee and the traveling public may not be
met.
These comments also apply to the medical advisory board which
reviews the medical examiner's recommendations. 4 Although it is
composed of medically trained persons, there is no reason to assume
the board is more competent to determine the relevance of physical and
mental factors to the driving task. Similarly, medical advisory boards,
whose members may be unfamiliar with driver behavior research, should
be provided with guidance by those who make an occupational specialty
of high caliber highway safety research. It is they, if anyone, who should
148 According to Dr. Ross McFarland, and other researchers, our knowledge of the driving
task is fragmentary. See their statements to this effect, in J. REESE, supra note 120, pt. II,
ch. 1.
147 Highway Research Board Pilot Workshop on Human Factors in the Design and Opera-
tion of the Highway Transportation System (1968, proceedings not published). See
generally A. LITTLE, INC., THE STATE OF THE ART OF TRAFFIC SAFETY (1966).
14
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MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 13.
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be familiar with the current state of scientific knowledge of the charac-
teristics of driver performance. If the medical advisory board is not
given such guidance in its review task, its decision may actually be
irrational, because it may be based on factors irrelevant to driving
performance; at the very least, it may be heavily colored by irrelevant
factors, erroneously thought to be relevant because of the "folklore"
and dogma of traditional safety literature which is typically based on
unreliable research conclusions.
149
2. Identity of Applicants for Aid to the Blind
States are expected to establish a procedure which will inform the
licensing agency of the identity of licensees who have applied for or are
receiving any type of aid to the blind or the near blind.' 50 This require-
ment establishes a form of licensee surveillance which, on its surface,
should aid in enforcing vision requirements for drivers. So viewed, it is
a commendable requirement. However, its effect in application may be
to drive into "hiding" licensees with serious vision deficiencies who
must choose between the receipt of state aid and the risk of losing their
licenses. It has been asserted that statutes making denial of the license
mandatory where epilepsy is involved have had that effect in some
states. 5 ' With respect to this requirement, the NHSB Manual makes
no specific recommendations; it merely restates the requirement in the
language of the standard.
3. The Medical Advisory Board
The states are expected to create a medical advisory board, or its
equivalent, "to advise the driver license agency on medical criteria and
vision standards.' 5 2 Such a requirement is comforting, for it suggests
that some licensing decisions should be made on medical criteria known
to be related to driver performance. It is also psychologically comforting
to be told such criteria ought to be established by "qualified person-
nel,"' 53 even though no statement of qualifications for appointment to
the Board is made. Considered together, these suggestions offer further
comfort, for they imply licensing decisions should not be made on
factors irrelevant to driving performance, e.g., morality, character, eco-
nomic status, or race. Therefore, such statements have the salutary
effect of reiterating the goal of driver licensing to be improved driver
performance and not the general regulation of antisocial conduct.
1"That such unreliable research exists is apparent from the comments of Dr. Ross Mc-
Farland, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
DRIVER SAFETY AND DRIVER LICENSING 44 (1964); W. HADDON, E. SUCHMAN, D.
KLEIN, ACCIDENT RESEARCH: METHODS AND APPROACHES 30 (1964).
15 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4 (VII) (B).
151 Fabing & Barrow, Restricted Drivers' Licenses to Controlled Epileptics: A Realistic
Approach to a Problem of Highwa) Safety, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 500 (1955).
152 Standard No. 5, supra note 77.
15 Id. § 204.4(VII) (c).
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However, the requirement is disquieting in other respects. What
basis exists for NHSB to presume that people who are "qualified"
(medically or otherwise) for appointment to such a Board are, in fact,
sufficiently acquainted with the current state of empirical research
knowledge to be competent to advise licensing agencies on "medical
criteria" and "visual standards" for driver license actions? A doctor
may be a good medical man and still know nothing about medical
factors or vision requirements in the context of driver performance.
Is this possibility recognized by NHSB? Are the Board members
instructed to study research findings and recommended norms of pro-
fessional groups in the licensing context (e.g., AAMVA-AOA vision
norms'. 4) in order to make medical and vision licensing criteria recom-
mendations? Why cannot significant research findings be compiled by
NHSB, or by one of its research contractors, be used as the basis of
medical and vision criteria and be written into NHSB standards? Per-
haps this kind of work is being done;.. but meanwhile, there is some
danger that local medical boards may suggest the use of irrelevant
medical factors as criteria for license actions.
Another difficulty with this federal standard in its current form
is that it presents the possibility of losing the desired uniformity of
licensing standards throughout the nation. As in other instances, the
language of the federal standard is imprecise. The quoted phrases are
so broad as to be meaningless. Similarly, the licensing Manual is not
helpful; it offers no more specific recommendations or definitions than
the formal language of the standard. 5 ' Hence, further definition will
be provided by the boards themselves, and there is no assurance they
will establish the same interpretations in all the states. Hence, what
begins as a vague expression in a so-called "uniform standard" promul-
gated by NHSB may actually result in fifty different sets of "medical
criteria" and "vision standards." If that occurs, the only assured uniform-
ity is that there will be boards and they will have made recommenda-
tions. This sort of uniformity can hardly be termed that which is
expected by Congress, for the concept of uniform performance criteria
is effectively destroyed. Another "nonuniform nonstandard" has been
promulgated by NHSB.
J. Component VIII: Periodic Evaluation of a State Licensing Program
The final component of the licensing standard is a requirement
that the state program shall be "periodically" evaluated by the state
1
5
4AMERICAN ASS'N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS & COMM. ON MOTORISTS'
VISION AND HIGHWAY SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN OPTOMETRIC ASS'N, VISION SCREEN-
ING FOR DRIVER LICENSING (1966).
165 The Institute for Educational Development, Newport Beach, California and Spindletop
Research, Lexington, Kentucky have been awarded NHSB research contracts to evaluate
driver licensing programs and inventory and evaluate licensing criteria.
166 MANUAL, supra note 79, ch. IV, at 19.
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and that a summary of the evaluation shall be given to the NHSB.
The evaluation is expected to attempt to ascertain the extent to which
driving without a license occurs; yet the standard does not make clear
to what extent and by what methodology the NHSB expects the states
to conduct such an evaluation, nor does it indicate what span of time
is meant by "periodically." Similarly, the licensing Manual does not
suggest a specific time span; and, while a sample checklist of questions
to be asked in establishing a base for evaluation of the licensing program
is provided,'57 it does not provide any suggestion of a research model
which the states should use to attempt to determine the extent to which
driving without a license occurs. Until such suggestions are made, the
states may make all sorts of interpretations of the evaluation language
of the standard.
On the other hand, some insight into the expected content of the
periodic review is gained from NHSB indications of the type of report
which will be expected from the states. The Manual states that a report-
ing system should encompass program operations, program manage-
ment information, and program evaluation.' 58 The NHSB intends to
ask the states for summary reports containing information similar to the
checklist in chapter IV of the Manual.' The checklist questions are
oriented toward determining the extent of state compliance with the
driver licensing standard. "'
K. Recommendations
As the above analysis makes evident, the NHSB driver licensing
standard is essentially illusory. It may be described as a "nonuniform
nonstandard." Because of its lack of precision, state programs may
vary greatly and yet meet the standard; and because the standard is so
vague, the states must confer individually with NHSB to determine
what licensing criteria will be deemed to meet the standard.
The driver licensing Manual is also generally unsatisfactory. As
has been shown, it contains little explication of most of the components
of the licensing standard. In large part, the more specific recommen-
dations which were promised are not contained in the Manual, and the
states are left largely to develop their own interpretations.
The NHSB could strengthen its driver licensing program by pro-
mulgating an amended standard more precisely stating the national
expectations, or it could amend its Manual to provide more specific
recommendations to the states. As a third alternative, the NHSB could
promulgate both a new standard and a new Manual. What is important
167Id. ch. V, at 6-11.
15lId. ch. VI, at 1.
159 ld. ch. VI, at 4.
160Id. ch. V, at 6-11.
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is that NHSB proceed to develop an improved driver licensing standard,
and it should do so with a commitment to monitor and modify both the
standard and Manual as new knowledge becomes available in ensuing
years. This is essential, for sound research may be expected to identify
new relevancies with respect to the "human factors" aspects of highway
collisions, and it may serve to expose the fallacy of current "folklore"
licensing policies as contributing nothing to the solution of the problem
of driver failure which results in highway accidents.
The commitment to monitor and modify is essential because of
our history of protecting persons from unwarranted governmental
controls on their activities. The American tradition has been to foster
liberty of the individual by limiting governmental interference when-
ever possible. Hence, through its standard-setting authority, the NHSB
may be viewed as having the responsibility of balancing the interests
of individuals against those of society in light of emerging highway
safety knowledge. Fortunately, the NHSB seems aware of this responsi-
bility; the introductory language of its driver licensing standard pro-
vides: "Each State shall have a driver licensing program: (a) to insure
that only persons physically and mentally qualified will be licensed to
operate a vehicle on the highways of the State; and (b) to prevent
needlessly removing the opportunity of the citizen to drive."'' While
the vagueness of the components of the present driver licensing standard
allows sufficient flexibility to adjust control measures to avoid unduly
restricting the need to drive, that same vagueness may permit states to
adopt licensing program policies which "needlessly" remove the oppor-
tunity to drive. This problem might be eliminated if the United States
Supreme Court, which on several occasions has recognized individual
mobility to be a Constitutionally protected interest, would also recognize
that driving an automobile is the primary means by which this mobility
is expressed.' 62 The significance of such a Supreme Court decision would
be to require state and federal governments to adopt driver control
statutes, administrative standards, and administrative procedures which
meet federal requirements of due process of law and equal protection
161 Standard No. 5, supra note 77, § 204.4.
162 The right to travel has been accorded constitutional protection; e.g., Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966);
Optheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1941); see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); cf. Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920); Wil-
liams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). It is not to be expected
that the Court would hold motor vehicle operation to be a constitutional "liberty" or
"right" of the individual. The constitutional protection lies in mobility and not its
method. However, since the purpose of the motor vehicle is mobility, a Court decision
that driving a car is the primary means by which mobility is expressed would have the
same effect. The data collected in the APPENDIX infra leave no doubt that the motor
vehicle is, in fact, the overwhelming choice of the American public.
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of the laws. Such a holding would press the NHSB to effectively
consider all interests - individual and governmental - and thus truly
implement the introductory language of the driver licensing standard
noted above.
V. SUMMARY
In 1966, social facts were translated into formal legal policy
through congressional recognition that highway safety is a nationwide
problem. The thrust of the 1966 legislation was to inject the federal
government into the field to provide, if possible, national leadership
out of the chaos which claims more lives than the Viet Nam War.
The federal leadership is to be provided by the National Highway
Safety Bureau through its power to set national standards designed to
press states to create more effective programs to attack the problem;
through its power to approve or disapprove state programs which are
not in compliance with the national standards; and through its authority
to impose financial sanctions on states which do not adopt safety
programs which it is willing to approve.' 6"
In developing a philosophy by which to implement its powers,
the NHSB decided to promulgate broadly stated goals to which states
could aspire rather than specific standards with which the states would
be eventually expected to comply.' Yet it is arguable that Congress
expected more precision, uniformity, and strictness than the NHSB
provided; for various committee reports and other sources of legislative
history suggest that the statutory language may have been intended to
have the legal effect of pre-empting the states in certain areas.' 5 The
agency's decision appears to be based on the premise that the statute
required compliance with all NHSB standards by January 1, 1969;
a more accurate reading of the statute would permit compliance at a
later date, so long as the state is making good faith progress toward
meeting the standards.
The result of the agency's decision to develop broadly stated goals
instead of specific standards is evidenced in the NHSB driver licensing
standard.' 66 In promulgating a standard, the NHSB has the duty to
provide responsible leadership while encouraging states to upgrade and
unify their driver licensing programs. This responsible leadership would
take the form of an NHSB obligation to make a dual evaluation of its
licensing standard and state licensing program policies, based upon both
183 See § I(C) supra.
164 See § III supra.
165 See § II(B) supra.
166 See § IV supra.
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the need for greater safety on the highways and the need of individuals
to drive motor vehicles in an auto-oriented society. Such responsibility
would seem to imply the need for more precise standards in order to
achieve uniformity which, in turn, would prevent states from interfering
unduly with the need to drive.
Yet the major criticism which may be levelled at the licensing
standard is that its components are, in general, not sufficiently precise
to achieve more than a modicum of uniformity in state driver licensing
programs. Because of the vagueness of the component expressions, state
licensing programs may be widely different and yet comply with the
literal language of the standard. The broad terminology and vagueness
apparently result from the philosophy behind the NHSB standards,
which precluded use of its authority to set standards at high levels and
grant waivers for non-compliance to states which could not implement
the standards immediately.
1 67
In short, NHSB did not actually commit itself to a program of
leadership by its driver licensing standard. Hence, NHSB actually
retains broad discretion to approve or disapprove individual state driver
licensing programs on whatever criteria it chooses to apply. The lack
of precision in the standard has the effect of leaving the NHSB in
a position of great flexibility with respect to evaluation of individual
state licensing program content. Lack of commitment does not serve to
promote the strict uniformity of which Congress spoke with respect to
standard setting in the field of driver licensing. It is unfortunate that
NHSB did not provide stronger leadership in the area of driver licensing
through its standard setting function.
Despite our dissatisfaction with NHSB action in the field of driver
licensing, it would be inappropriate to fail to recognize that driver
licensing is only one facet of the total problem of highway safety which
the NHSB must confront. The driver licensing standard is only one of
thirteen standards promulgated by the NHSB in its initial attempt to
accomplish its task. It should not be assumed from these comments that
similar criticisms are inferred with respect to other aspects of the safety
agency's program. Perhaps it should be assumed that the NHSB has
met its responsibilities in other areas until analysis shows otherwise.
The crucial problem of lack of adequate funds for staffing and
research may serve in large measure to explain the relative ineffective-
ness of NHSB standard setting in the driver licensing field. For these
reasons, the question of the general success or failure of the NHSB
program remains unanswered; the jury is still out.




A SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
I. URBANIZATION OF THE POPULATION
The 1960 census figures indicated that almost two of every three
Americans live in metropolitan areas.168 The population concentration
in metropolitan areas is evident in the following percentages of the
total population living in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas: 1900
- 32 percent; 1920-44 percent; 1940- 51 percent; 1960- 63
percent. 69 Projections of the metropolitan percentage by 1980 are in
the range of 70 percent to 80 percent.'7 The Stanford Research Institute
believes the Interstate Highway System will reinforce and accelerate
the trend toward metropolitan concentration for the reason that it
focuses on the present metropolitan areas and maximizes their acces-
sibility.'
7 '
II. URBANIZATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES
Since motor vehicles could be expected to be found and used
where the population is located and in view of the fact there are rela-
tively few highly populated metropolitan areas, it is interesting to note
that 54 percent of the motor vehicles registered in the United States are
located in ten states. 72 Furthermore, these ten states include thirteen
of the twenty largest metropolitan areas7'7 and account for 54 percent
of the nation's licensed drivers.' 74 In addition, the same states report
53 percent of the annual vehicle miles traveled in the nation and 61
168 THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. DEVELOPING METROPOLITAN TRANS-
PORTATION POLICIES 18 (1965) thereinafter cited as THE COMMITTEE].
19 Id. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas are defined generally as:
A county or group of contiguous counties containing at least one city of 50,000
or "twin cities" with combined populations of at least 50,000 persons. Con-
tiguous counties are included in an SMSA if they are essentially metropolitan
in character and are socially and economically integrated with the central city.
Prior to some revision in definition in 1959, these areas were designated
Standard Metropolitan Areas.
Id. at 18.
170 The 70 percent projection is by the CED staff, COMMITTEE, supra note 168, at 18.
A 75 percent projection is made by SMITH & ASSOCIATES, FUTURE HIGHWAYS AND
URBAN GROWTH iii (1961) [hereinatfer cited as SMITH & ASSOCIATES). An 80 percent
prediction is made by Rouse, Transportation and the Future of Our Cities, SYMPOSIUM-
DYNAMICS OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 2-5 (1962). See also Mylroie, Predicting the
Public's Changing Appetite for Better Transportation Facilities and Services, PLANNING
TOMORROWS STREET AND HIGHWAY SYSTEM 91 (1960).
171ALLEN & MCELYEA, IMPACT OF IMPROVED HIGHWAYS ON THE ECONOMY OF THE
UNITED STATES 86 (1958).
172UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 553 (1968) (hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF CENSUS]; accord, AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS' ASS'N, INC., AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND FIGURES 18 (1969) [herein-
after cited as AUTOMOBILE ASS'N]. The states are California, New York, Texas, Penn-
sylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Florida, and Indiana.
173 THE COMMITTEE, supra note 168, at 26.
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percent of the total urban and municipal vehicle miles.' However,
only 48 percent of the traffic deaths of 1967 occurred there.176
Empirical data is essential to an assessment of the extent to which
there is harmony between social fact and social policy. Fortunately,
some empirical studies have been made with respect to motor vehicles
which should serve to help describe those who use motor vehicles,
where the vehicles are located, and how they are used.
In general, it may be said that 79 percent of all American house-
holds (48 million) own passenger cars, and 25 percent of them own
two or more.177 Sixty-two percent of the households owning passenger
cars are in metropolitan areas and 38 percent in nonmetropolitan areas.
Of the 62 percent in metropolitan areas, 12 percent are in central
cities of more than 500,000 population, 16 percent in central cities of
less than 500,000 population, and 34 percent in suburbs of metropolitan
areas.
178
By income groups 63 percent of the nation's households earning
an income of less than $4,000 per year own passenger cars. Ownership
in the higher income groups ranges from 76 percent to 95 percent.
Privately owned passenger cars accounted for 80 percent of the
total vehicle miles traveled in 1967. Trucks accumulated 19 percent,
while all other vehicles combined accounted for 1 percent. 79 Urban
traffic alone accounted for 50 percent of the total vehicle miles, and
passenger car operation accounted for 43 percent of that 50 percent.
The significance of these figures is that 50 percent of the travel occurred
on urban streets which comprise only 14 percent of the total road mile-
age, and 37 percent occurred on main rural roads which consist of 15
percent of the road mileage. With 87 percent of all travel occurring on
29 percent of the road mileage, it is apparent that the traffic capacity
problem is concentrated in a relatively small part of the total road
mileage.
180
175 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 49; Dickerson & Corvi, Motor Vehicle Traffic
Estimates, 33 PUBLIC ROADS 148-50 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson & Corvi].
17
6
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 64 (1968 ed.). But note that BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, supra note 172, at 573, indicates that 50 percent of the traffic deaths
of 1966 occurred in these states.
177 AUTOMOBILE ASs'N, supra note 172, at 44.
178 AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, INC., AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND FIGURES
41-42 (1965). These figures are based on ALFRED POLITZ RESEARCH, INC., NATIONAL
AUTOMOBILE AND TIRE SURVEY (1964) (a sample survey sponsored by LOOK magazine).
179 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 50, based on Bureau of Public Roads, Table
VM-1, 1967; Dickerson and Corvi, supra note 175, at 150.
180 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 50, 52. The definition of urban used in this
study included areas within the political boundaries of municipalities, such as cities,
boroughs, and villages. A similar Bureau of Public Roads study of 1964, in which state
highway officials were asked to estimate the traffic in their states for 1962, defined
urban as "'an area including and adjacent to a municipality or other urban place having
a population of 5,000 or more .. " Under this narrower definition, urban traffic was
reported as 46 percent of the total vehicle mileage. See also RECK, A CAR TRAVELING
PEOPLE 31 (1960); SMITH & ASSOCIATES, supra note 170, at v.
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At the request of the Bureau of Public Roads, 24 states conducted
empirical research on the uses of passenger cars by their inhabitants
between 1951 and 1958. In addition, the Bureau of the Census con-
ducted relevant studies as a part of its 1963 Census of Transportation.
The findings tell a great deal about the purposes for which Americans
use their motor vehicles.
Combined data for the state studies show that passenger cars are
used as follows: 46 percent of the trips and 44 percent of the vehicle
miles are for earning a living, including travel to and from work, and
related business; 29 percent of the trips and 19 percent of the vehicle
miles are for family business, including medical and dental trips, shop-
ping, and miscellaneous purposes; 8 percent of the trips and 4 percent
of the vehicle miles relate to educational, civic and religious activities;
while 17 percent of the trips and 34 percent of the mileage are social
and recreational, consisting of vacations, pleasure rides, and other
purposes.
Therefore, 75 percent of the trips of the passenger car and 63
percent of its mileage are directly related to earning a living and family
business. Educational, civic and religious activities, along with social
and recreational use account for only 25 per cent of the trips, but 37
percent of the mileage.' It should be noted that rush hour congestion
is largely explained by the fact that almost half the trips and vehicle
miles are directly related to work, travel, and business. Two-thirds of
these trips occur in two or three hours of the day during the working
week as travel to and from work.'
8 2
In incorporated areas of high population density (population of
100,000 or more), the combined data indicate the following: 51 per-
cent of the trips and 48 percent of the mileage are for earning a living;
26 percent of the trips and 15 percent of the mileage are for family
business; 6 percent of the trips and 3 percent of the mileage are for
educational, civic and religious purposes; 17 percent of the trips and
34 percent of the mileage are social and recreational. Thus, in highly
populated metropolitan areas, 77 percent of the trips of the passenger
car and 63 percent of its mileage are directly related to earning a living
and family business.' 83
As for length of trip, the state studies indicated the average
distance to the first stop was 8 miles. The breakdown for the above
purpose was: earning a living - 8 miles; family business - 7 miles;
educational, civic and religious - 4 miles; social and recreational (ex-
1S8 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 40; Bostick, The Automobile in American Daily
Life, 32 PUBLIC ROADS 243 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bostick]. In these studies, a
"trip" is defined as a one-way movement from starting place to the first stop for one
of the purposes shown.
182 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 61; Bostick, supra note 181, at 241.
18 Bostick, supra note 181, at 249.
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cluding vacations) - 13 miles. Vacation trip length averaged 296
miles one way.
18 4
As has been noted, use of the passenger car for work travel is an
important part of its function. The state studies disclosed that two out
of three of the nation's workers travel to work as drivers or passengers
in cars. Fifteen percent use public transportation and 12 percent walk
to work.185 The 1963 Bureau of the Census survey indicated that of
all commuting workers, 82 percent travel by passenger car, while 14
percent use public transportation, and 4 percent use other means or
walk. In the core cities of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 67
percent of the commuters use cars and 29 percent use transit. Even
there, the passenger car is favored by two to one. Outside the core city,
commuters favor the passenger car by ten to one. Such widespread
selection of the passenger car is said to be due largely to the fact that
about 43 percent of the work commuters do not have ready access to
mass transit.1 86
A 1967 Bureau of the Census survey covered national travel, which
was defined as travel by one or more members of a household to and
from (a) an out-of-town place for overnight or longer or (b) a place
at least 100 miles away. It excluded travel of persons while serving as
crews, commuting trips, and travel by military personnel under orders.
The findings were that 79 percent of all such trips are by automobile,
and they account for 86 percent of the travelers.
187
III. SUMMARY
Such studies as these portray automobile ownership and use as
follows: Privately owned automobiles account for 80 percent of all
motor vehicle mileage. About half of this travel is on urban streets,
and the private automobile accounts for almost all of it. Three-fourths
of the nation's households own automobiles of which two-thirds are
owned by metropolitan area households. About one-third of the auto-
mobiles will be found in the suburbs of the great metropolitan centers,
one-third divided between metropolitan central cities of more than or
less than 500,000 persons, and one-third in rural areas.
Cars are used primarily for earning a living or for family business,
on trips between seven and eight miles in length one way. Only one out
of four car trips is for social, educational, or recreational purposes. The
18 4AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 40. A 1961 survey by the United States Bureau
of the Census showed the average trip length to be 9 miles. Its breakdown was: earning
a living- 12 miles; family business- 7 miles; educational, civic, religious- 5 miles;
social and recreational - 14 miles.
185 Bostick, supra note 181, at 243.
186 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF CENSUS, PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION SURVEY: HOME TO
WORK TRAVEL, 1963 CENSUS OF TRANSPORTATION 76, 77 (1965); AUTOMOBILE ASS'N,
supra note 172, at 41.
187 AUTOMOBILE ASS'N, supra note 172, at 37.
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car may be used on a vacation trip which will be about 300 miles one
way.
Two-thirds of the nation's workers commute to and from their
jobs. Four out of five of these commuters drive or ride in passenger
cars. Even in central cities of metropolitan areas, two out of three
commuters use cars rather than transit. Of commuters living in suburbs
of metropolitan areas, the car is used in a ten to one ratio over transit.
FINDERS AND FINDERS' FEES
By ROBERT E. BENSON*
Finders have long played an integral role in the world of com-
merce but only recently has a body of common law been developed
to deal with their activities. This is due in part to the peculiar nature
of a finder's business and in part to the reluctance of courts to depart
from traditional legal concepts that "almost" fit the legal problems
raised in finders' cases.
In his article, Mr. Benson describes the normal operations of a
finder, compares finders to brokers and agents, and analyzes the
finder's operations in hopes of determining appropriate legal princi-
ples. The case of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo.
149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967) is used to illustrate a typical factual situation
in finders' cases and to provide a basis for the legal analysis presented
in the paper. The author concludes by presenting the key elements in
any case involving a claim by a finder for his fee.
INTRODUCTION
W HILE finders are as old as commerce, it is only in recent years
V that finders have assumed an acknowledged position in the
entrepreneurial world, and with it, a developing status in the common
law. Early cases involving finders often used the terms finder, broker,
and agent interchangeably,' and the confusion is understandable since
their functions, modes of operation, and rights to compensation are
very similar.' More recently, however, courts have recognized that the
traditional rules of law relating to brokers and agents are not always
adequate to define the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a finder.3
Consequently, today's decisions reflect a tailoring of the traditional
legal principles to fit the unique role of the finder in modern business
life.
This article will first examine the nature of a finder and then
review the case of Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts,4 a finders'
fee case that provides an excellent illustration of the developing factual
and legal framework within which the finder works. Thereafter, the
*Associate, Holland & Hart, B.A. University of Iowa, 1962; LL.B., University of Penn-
sylvania, 1965.
1 Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 157, 425 P.2d 282, 286 (1967).
2 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117-1-2 (1963) defines broker as "any person, firm, partner-
ship, association, or corporation who, in consideration of compensation by fee, commis-
sion, salary, or any thing of value, or with the intention of receiving or collecting such
compensation, engages in or offers or attempts to engage in either directly or indirectly
by a continuing course of conduct or by any single act or transaction, any of the following
acts ...."
3 As is always the case, when a new subject category of common law develops, the rules
of analogous areas are borrowed. Thus, in many ways a finder is a "broker" within the
customary legal structure, and these broker principles are borrowed to start the legal
structuring of the "finder."
4 162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967).
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specific problems of the finder's legal position will be considered;
namely, the elements of a finder's cause of action and the measure of
recovery to which a finder is entitled.
I. DEFINITION OF A FINDER
Probably everyone from time to time is a finder, whether the
"find" be a bargain at the local department store or a hot tip for in-
vestments. The finder with which this article is concerned, however, is
the professional finder, the man who finds and reveals information of
business opportunities for a fee- e.g., he who finds businesses avail-
able for purchase or sale; prospective buyers or sellers of goods; and
available financing, investments, and employment.5 Finders are also
active in connection with corporate mergers and securities underwriting,
many men devoting their full time to finding employment opportunities
for underwriters and underwriters for companies seeking to issue stock.'
In addition, finders are often engaged in seeking funds which are avail-
able for purchasing securities issues.
The role and efforts of a finder may vary dramatically according
to the needs and wishes of the parties with whom he is dealing and the
type of opportunities with which he is familiar. As a result, the de-
scription of a finder's functions and the legal principles applicable
thereto have varied considerably. In Seckendorff v. Halsey, Stuart &
Co.,' the court apparently felt that finders play a very limited role with
minimal duties:
Plaintiff was in nowise a broker.... He was merely a finder of this
piece of business. He was to receive his compensation for finding the
business and bringing the same to the attention of Rogers, Caldwell
& Co. and its associates. He claimed his compensation solely on the
ground that he was the originator of the business and had disclosed
to Rogers, Caldwell & Co. and its associates the opportunity to engage
in its financing.8
And in Baldwin v. Grymes,9 the court also saw a limited role for the
finder but recognized that his services might consist of something more
than merely revealing an opportunity: "A 'finder,' it has been said, is
one who finds, interests, introduces and brings together parties for
5See, e.g., Lindeman v. Textron, Inc., 229 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1956) (presenting the
advantageous purchase of one textile company to another); Weinreb v. Strauss, 80 A.2d
47 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1951) (finding a retail liquor store for sale); Garrett v. Wall,
29 Ga. App. 642, 116 S.E. 331 (1923) (finding and introducing prospective purchaser
of saw mill timber); Miller & Demton v. Batten, 247 Ky. 339, 57 S.W.2d 33 (1933)
(introducing a prospective purchaser of an oil and gas lease).
6 An illuminating description of the role of finders in the securities field is set forth in
C. ISRAELS & G. DUFF, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 36-40 (1962).
7234 App. Div. 61, 254 N.Y.S. 250 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 250 N.Y. 353.
182 N.E. 14 (1932).
81d., 254 N.Y.S. at 260.
9 232 Md. 470, 194 A.2d 285 (1963).
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a deal, even though he has no part in negotiating the terms of the trans-
action."1
0
On the basis of the language in Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Roberts," the finder's duties, at least in the oil and gas industry, may
be more substantial:
The usual type of broker's commission case in the regulated real estate
business in Colorado, as is urged by the defendant, is not necessarily
in point here. For example, oil and gas brokers do not evaluate the
properties, nor do they necessarily enter into the negotiations or con-
summate the transactions, i.e., handle the dosing. Such brokers' or
finders' principal activities and services are to locate a property or lease,
bring it to the attention of a prospective buyer and thereafter to obtain
the requested data if possible. He is then only paid a commission if
the property is actually acquired by his prospect.'
2
From the above cases it is apparent that the appropriate definition
of a finder is often a factual question and that the only description that
would include all those properly considered to be finders might simply
be one who "finds, introduces, and brings together parties to a business
opportunity . '. ..,8 Any more extensive definition of a finder's role,
the conditions as to his compensation, or the opportunities with which
he deals would inevitably be honored only in its exceptions.
Having briefly examined the nature of a finder's activities, a com-
parison of finders to brokers and agents is necessary to further clarify
a finder's role and the legal principles applicable thereto. Depending
upon the services a finder undertakes to perform and his relationship
to his "buyer", he may act as an agent or as a broker. When he is
engaged by another to locate a specific type of opportunity, he functions
much like an agent and the law of agency may be determinative of his
duties, rights, and obligations. 14 For example, the finder would have
the customary responsibilities of loyalty and good faith to his prin-
cipal,' 5 and he could neither deal in the agency matter for his own
benefit without the knowing consent of his principal,'" nor could he
act adversely to the interests of his principal by serving or acquiring
any private interest of his own in antagonism or opposition thereto.' 7
Further, he would be required to account to his principal for any secret
'lid. at 472, 194 A.2d at 287.
11 162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967).
121d. at 157, 425 P.2d at 286.
13Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1164 (1969).
14 Because a finder seldom acts as an agent and because his duties are not totally consistent
with most agents' duties, he would probably be considered a slightly peculiar type of
agent, but the general laws of agency would still apply.
15 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-98 (1957). The determina-
tion of the existence of an agency capacity of a finder generally would be no different
than any other agent.
6 1d. § 389.
171d. § 387.
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profit he may have realized in the course of his agency, even though
the principal has suffered no loss.'
It is also true that as an agent, a finder cannot act for both parties
to the opportunity, unless both parties consent at least as to matters
involving the exercise of discretion.19 Indeed, if the agent does so act,
principal has a right to all compensation received by the agent from
the other party; 20 has no obligation to compensate the agent; 2 ' and
may even have the right to avoid the transaction. However, if the
double agency is known to both principals, there is no violation of
duty.
22
When a finder learns of an opportunity independently and then
seeks out persons who might be interested in such an opportunity, he
acts not as an agent but as a broker. In such capacity he may introduce
parties, assemble information, and assist in negotiations but cannot
attempt to serve the particular interest of either side. His efforts are
directed toward consummation of the transaction," and to this end he
assists either party. In these circumstances, the finder has no obligation
of loyalty or duty to either party. 24 Similarly, he may receive a fee from
both parties to the proposed transaction.
While the above discussion might suggest that a finder is a broker
when acting independently, a finder can be distinguished from a broker
by the limited subject matter of a broker's activities, the minimal duties
of a finder, and the informality of the agreement between a finder and
and the parties to the underlying transaction or opportunity. The Con-
solidated Oil case makes this distinction clearer and also suggests some
of the problems which arise in finders' cases.
II. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts 25 involved a somewhat
typical finder situation, wherein the plaintiff sought compensation for
disclosing a business opportunity to the defendant. While the court
was somewhat ambiguous in its determination of the legal status of
18 Id. §§ 388, 403.
19 Id. §§ 391, 392, 394.
2oId. § 388.
21 Cf. Whittenberg v. Carnegie, 328 Mich. 125, 42 N.W.2d 900 (1950); McMichael v.
Burnett, 136 Kan. 654, 17 P.2d 932 (1933).
2 Cf. Fitzsimons v. Southern Exp. Co., 40 Ga. 330 (1869); Brockman v. Delta Mfg. Co.,
184 Okla. 357, 87 P.2d 968 (1939); Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 20 A. 513 (1890).
23 The fact that the finder performs services may be relevant to our earlier considerations.
First, it may indicate an implied assent that he is required to perform other services in
order to be entitled to compensation. Second, particularly if the services aid the party
from whom no compensation is sought, services may indicate an implied acknowledgment
that consummation of the transaction is a condition to the finder's right to compensation.
24 Except perhaps to not reveal the opportunity to others while the parties are negotiating.
2 162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967).
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the finder and his right to compensation, its opinion nevertheless touches
upon or suggests the broad spectrum of problems of the legal status,
rights, and obligations of a finder.
The facts, in brief, were as follows: Plaintiff Roberts was a broker
in the oil and gas business and in this capacity learned that defendant
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. was interested in acquiring companies in
the oil and gas business. In August of 1959, Roberts advised the officers
of Consolidated of an oil company with whom Consolidated might
merge, although he did not reveal the name of the company at that
time. At Consolidated's request, Roberts submitted pertinent engineering
data on the company and then informed Consolidated that the name
of the prospect was Midland Oil Co. Consolidated did not ask Roberts
to perform any further acts in connection with the transaction.
In the fall of 1960, approximately one year after Roberts dis-
closed the name of the company to Consolidated, the two companies
merged on basically the same terms that had been proposed when
Roberts first advised Consolidated of the opportunity. Roberts requested
from Consolidated a reasonable "finder's fee" for his services in con-
nection with the merger and commenced an action when his request
was refused.
The court held that Roberts was entitled to recover on an implied
contract basis, 26 since there was no express agreement between the
parties and since the amount of compensation had not otherwise been
agreed upon. The court was not overly specific as to the particular type
of implied contract 27 which it determined had existed between Roberts
and Consolidated, but it set out the following elements as essential
to establishing the claim:
The circumstances from which such a contract may be implied seem
to be two; first, that the broker or agent has rendered services, and
is permitted to do so in such a manner as to indicate that he expected
to be paid for these services; and second, that the services are beneficial
to the party sought to be made liable.
2 8
Recognizing the duty to render services in order to be compensated, the
court was faced with the issue of how much or what quantum of
services to require. To this it was said:
The measure of performance of an oil and gas broker or finder would
seem to require only that he present a property available for acquisition
and then procure any requested information needed to evaluate the
2 81d. at 156, 425 P.2d at 286.
27 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 5 (1933); Comment "a" refers to an express con-
tract as being one the terms and existence of which are expressed verbally or in writing,
an implied contract as one the terms and existence of which are expressed by the actions
of the parties, and quasi contract as not being based upon apparent intention of the
parties but created by law for reasons of justice. The latter two types of contracts are
both implied but are based on different considerations!
28Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 156-57, 425 P.2d 282, 286
(1967).
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property. His compensation is dependent upon the subsequent purchase,
but not upon his efforts toward accomplishing the purchase. 29
The last sentence makes it clear that the right to compensation is not
dependent upon the quantum of services rendered, once the minimum
requirement of making the opportunity available and providing re-
quested information is met. It is also significant that this was only a
finding of fact based upon evidence of the custom of the oil and gas
industry30 and presumably did not establish as a matter of law the
amount of services required to be performed by finders in all instances,
or even within the oil and gas industry itself.3
Even though the court only set out a minimum service requirement,
it did add that for Roberts to be entitled to compensation there had to
be a continuing connection between his services and the merger. To
this point, citing cases involving claims for real estate broker's com-
missions, Consolidated asserted that Roberts did not prove that he was
the "efficient agent" or "procuring cause" of the transaction.3 2 The
court rejected the argument that those requirements that are generally
applicable to recovery of a real estate broker's fee applied to finder's
cases. It said:
[Those] [c]ases . . . relied on by the defendant, are not applicable
here, for this is not the type of transaction where a broker, at the
initial contact, produces a ready, willing and able buyer who purchases
the property, upon the terms and at a price then designated by the
principal. Those cases though do stand for the proposition, which is
applicable here, that the broker must be the efficient agent or procuring
cause of the sale ...
We discussed the rights of a so-called "finder" in George v.
Dower, 125 Colo. 45, 55, 62, 240 P.2d 897 (1952) to the effect that he
who is entitled to the commission is the one who sets the chain of
events in motion which result in the sale.
33
The term "procuring cause" suggests a primary or principal cause, but
the court's explanation of this phrase-that a finder must set the
"chain of events in motion which result in the sale" - suggests a
lesser contribution by the finder. Again, the court was not clear but
apparently felt that since Roberts had performed all the customary
services required in the oil and gas industry, the services had suffi-
2 9 1d. at 158, 425 P.2d at 287.
30 Custom of the industry is normally implied into every contract, and a fortiori, into every
quantum meruit relation. See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 631, 632, 653, 654 (1960);
S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 887(A), 887(AA) (3d ed. 1962).
31 At some point custom may be judicially noticed, perhaps once a higher court has
recognized the custom of an industry. Ultimately, requirements based upon custom may
become statements of law.
32Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 151, 425 P.2d 282, 286 (1967).
Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299 P.2d 120 (1956) and Babcock v. Merritt, 1
Colo. App. 84, 27 P. 882 (1891) were the cases relied on by Consolidated.




ciently set the "chain of events" in motion . 4 According to this analysis,
if the finder performs all services customarily required of finders in the
same industry, and if the transaction is consummated, the "procuring
cause" or "chain of events" requirement is a fortiori satisfied.35
Consolidated did not raise as error the trial court's determination
that the requirement of benefit and the requirement that the services
be rendered with a reasonable expectation of compensation were met."
Consequently, the Supreme Court's opinion does not specifically discuss
these two elements, except to say generally that they were satisfied.
3 7
The court closed with the following statement which appears to
summarize the sole evidence needed to allow Roberts to recover his
finder's fee:
Clearly, no dispute existed as to the following facts: that Roberts
brought Consolidated the deal; furnished all requested financial and
engineering data; that a deal was made for a value in excess of that
found by the trial court as the minimum; that that Goodstein, after
being put in touch with defendant by Roberts, later dealt with the
defendant through Straus.3 8
Roberts was awarded judgment in the amount of $30,000, based upon
evidence that the usual (customary) commissions on a sale (or merger)
up to $1,000,000 was 5%, although it might range from 3% to 15%
with a scaled reduction on sales over $1,000,000.8 9
III. ELEMENTS OF A FINDER'S CAUSE OF ACTION
Although the factual setting of a finder's activities vary con-
siderably, two factors must be considered in determining whether a
finder is entitled to compensation: First, has the finder performed
the services that are required of him; and second, have the events oc-
curred (over which the finder may or may not have any control) which
are conditions to his right to compensation ?" The services the finder
must perform and the other terms and conditions upon which a finder's
compensation may be dependent may be set forth in an agreement
between the finder and recipient of his services. If there is no agree-
ment, the services to be performed by the finder and the other conditions
34 1d. at 158, 425 P.2d at 287.
3 The court did not discuss, but from its use of the "procuring cause" or "chain of events"
requirement presumably left open the possibility of intervening causes resulting in the
consummation of the transaction. Thus, while the finder might perform all that is
required of him by the custom of the industry, there might be a break in the chain of
events such as to deprive him of his compensation.
38 Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 152, 425 P.2d 282, 284 (1967).
371 d. at 157, 425 P.2d at 286.
38 Id. at 160-61, 425 P.2d at 288.
39 1d. at 156, 425 P.2d at 284.
40 One such condition evidenced by Consolidated is benefit. As will be discussed infra,
benefit may also require the consummation of the transaction as well as a connecting
link between the services rendered and the benefit bestowed.
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precedent to his compensation, if any, are implied in law or fact under
the legal theories of quantum meruit or implied contract. In either
case the issues remain the same.
A. Agreement
Obviously, the finder and the persons to whom he renders services
can agree upon the amount of, and conditions to, his compensation.
This agreement can be oral, written, or implied in fact.41 The parties
may specifically define the services to be rendered by the finder, the
dollar or percentage amount of the finder's fee, and/or the conditions,
if any, to be attached to the payment of the fee. If such an agreement
is made, it will be controlling, and the court will not imply any con-
ditions or terms inconsistent with those expressed in the agreement.
42
Similarly, if the conditions in the agreement are not satisfied, no
recovery will be allowed, even though the finder has performed all
services required of him by the agreement. This situation is illustrated
by the case of Scott v. Huntzinger43 which involved a claim by a real
estate broker for a commission. The written agreement provided: "If
the deal with White results in our sale of the property as provided in
the agreement with him, then we will pay you a commission ....
The "agreement" referred to gave White an option to buy certain
property. White did not exercise the option but purchased the property
from the defendant after the option expired. The Colorado Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a commission, stating,
"the right of a broker to recover a commission depends upon the par-
ticular terms of the broker's employment. ' 45 The agreement between
plaintiff and defendant provided that plaintiff's brokerage fee was
contingent on White purchasing the land under the option to buy. Since
the option was not utilized in buying the property, the broker was not
entitled to compensation, even though he had performed all services
required of him by the contract.
Similarly, as early as 1894 the New York court in Knauss v.
Gottfried Krueger Brewing Co.46 said:
The record shows that there was evidence of the employment of the
plaintiff for the mere purpose of bringing the possible buyer and
41 Generally, finders' contracts do not need to be in writing. However, where the subject
matter of the finder is within a statute of frauds and under the terms of a few statutes
relating to employment contracts, a finder's contract must be in writing. See Annot..
24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1168-70 (1969). Otherwise, recovery is available on an implied
contract theory.
See generally Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1176 (1969). See also cases collected and
discussed in Annot., Validity, Construction and Enforcement of Business Opportunities
or "Finder's Fee Contract," 24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1168-70 (1969).
4 2 See A. CORBIN, supra note 30, §§ 95-102, 556.
4 148 Colo. 225, 365 P.2d 692 (1961).
4Id. at 228, 365 P.2d at 693.
45 Id. at 229, 365 P.2d at 695.
40 142 N.Y. Reports 70, 36 N.E. 867 (1894).
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seller together, and with the understanding that, if a sale were to
result, the plaintiff was to have some compensation from the defen-
dant for his services. The plaintiff testified that he was to have
nothing to do with fixing the price or the terms of the sale; the
principals were to do that part of the business; all he had to do was
to bring them together, and if, through their subsequent negotiations,
a sale should result, the plaintiff was to be entitled to some com-
pensation.
47
By agreement, if (1) the finder introduced the parties and (2) a sale
resulted, the finder was entitled to the agreed compensation.
However, if the agreement is silent as to any conditions (other
than the finder's services) to a finder's right of compensation, such
conditions may nevertheless exist. The custom of the industry may im-
pose conditions, and custom is normally a part of every contract, unless
expressly excluded or unless inconsistent with the express terms of the
contract.48 The custom of finders in any particular sector of business
may include conditions to his right to compensation. To the degree
conditions are asserted when the written contract is silent, the law of
quantum meruit and implied contract is applicable.
B. Quantum Meruit and Implied Contract
When there is no agreement as to the services to be performed or
the conditions precedent to compensation, recovery may be dependent
upon proof of a quantum meruit cause of action. The definitions of
the courts suggest that the finder has no duty or responsibility other
than revealing the opportunity, but the holdings often belie the defi-
nitions, and his right to compensation may well depend upon sub-
sequent events.
The requirements for recovery by a finder in quantum meruit
were set out in Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts.49
[F]irst, that the broker or agent has rendered services, and is permitted
to do so in such a manner as to indicate that he expected to be paid
for these services; and second, that the services are beneficial to the
party sought to be made liable.5 0
1. Services by the Finder
In most instances, the services that a finder must perform are
questions of fact. Consolidated held that in the absence of agreement,
the services that must be performed by a finder in order to be entitled
to compensation are defined by custom in the industry. 1 In Consoli-
dated, for example, the sole effort required of a finder in the oil and
gas industry was "to present a property available for acquisition and
47 Id.
48 See A. CoRBiN, supra note 30, §§ 95-102, 556.
19 162 Colo. 149, 425 P.2d 282 (1967).
5old. at 157, 425 P.2d at 286.
51 Id.
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then procure any requested information needed to evaluate the prop-
erty."52 It is implicit from the statement of facts that any duties created
by requests for information may be defined by the person to whom
the opportunity is revealed. And if a finder refuses to perform such
further tasks, he may not be entitled to a fee or may receive a reduced
fee.
While most finders are active in areas where there is considerable
finder activity and, concomitantly, a finder custom, there seems no
reason why a finder could not receive quantum meruit compensation
for merely introducing parties or revealing an opportunity - subject
to such conditions subsequent as may be imposed - if the finder were
involved in an area in which no custom existed. Indeed, in the absence
of a custom of the industry and in the absence of additional services
being requested, the judicial definitions of a finder suggest such a
conclusion, if the other conditions not related to the scope of the finder's
services are fulfilled.3 Further, while the issue of the services required
of the finder in Consolidated was resolved as a finding of fact, other
courts appear to have held as a matter of law that a finder's services
may consist simply of revealing an opportunity. 4
Yet according to Consolidated, the finder must also expect to be
compensated for his services. With respect to this condition, it is
usually sufficient that the person sought to be charged knew, or reason-
ably should have known, that the services were being rendered with
the expectation of payment,5 5 even though the person sought to be
charged did not know that the party performing the services expected
compensation and did not actually intend to pay for the services.
This requirement presents a special problem in finder's fee cases;
for the typical quantum meruit case, the mere fact of performance of
services and benefit to the recipient carries with it an implication or
presumption that the services are rendered with the expectation of
compensation, i.e., people do not normally render services without
5
2 1d. at 158, 425 P.2d at 286.
53With respect to real estate brokers, the quantum meruit terms for recovery of compensa-
tion are well established, although these principles of law probably have their roots in
the custom of the real estate business.
54E.g., Lindeman v. Textron, Inc., 229 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1956); Crofoot v. Spivak, 113
Cal. App.2d 146, 248 P.2d 45 (1952); Seckendorff v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 234 App.
Div. 61, 254 N.Y.S. 250 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 250 N.Y. 353, 182 N.E. 14
(1932). But see Towers v. Doroshaw, 5 Misc. 2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct.
1957). A more complete discussion of the measure of recovery follows in a later section,
but it should be noted here that the quantum of services has not to date been a significant
factor in this decision.
55 E.g., Nagele v. Miller, 73 Ida. 441, 253 P.2d 233 (1953); Johnson v. Nasi, 50 Wash.
2d 87, 309 P.2d 380 (1957); see City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Bright, 73 F.2d 461 (6th Cir.
1934); Spencer v. Spencer, 181 Mass. 471, 63 N.E. 947 (1902); Poppa v. Poppa, 364
S.W.2d 52 (Mo. App. 1962); Kellogg v. Gleeson, 27 Wash. 2d 501, 178 P.2d 969
(1947); cf. Mills v. Sharpe, 129 Colo. 589, 272 P.2d 641 (1954); Millard v. Loser,
52 Colo. 205, 121 P. 156 (1912). But cf. Towers v. Doroshaw, 5 Misc. 2d 241, 159
N.Y.S.2d 367, 375-76 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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expecting compensation therefor.56 However, the relationship of the
parties may change this presumption.
For example, it is often held that where a family relationship
exists between the performer and recipient, there is a presumption that
compensation was not intended, the services being presumed to have
been rendered gratuituously.5 7 Perhaps such a presumption should be
applicable to a finder's fee claim based upon quantum meruit, when
the finder is claiming the fee from a business associate with whom he
regularly or frequently deals on other types of business, or when the
opportunity is volunteered without mention of, or agreement for, com-
pensation. This presumption would be based upon a conclusion that
many opportunities are revealed in the business world by business
associates without any expectation of compensation for revealing such
opportunity. In fact, the difficulties inherent in the claim for com-
pensation by one who freely broadcasts or volunteers his knowledge
of an opportunity and the multiple sources from which a person might
learn of opportunities suggest the desirability of requiring that such
agreements be in writing.
In any event, the relationship between the finder and the bene-




2. Benefit to the Recipient
Often, however, the principal issue in a finder's claim for com-
pensation is what constitutes benefit so as to entitle the finder to
compensation. Knowledge of an opportunity, as knowledge of anything,
may be benefit per se. If so, revealing an opportunity would satisfy
the benefit requirement without more. Thus, the finder's services may
consist only of revealing the opportunity, the definition of a finder's
services and the benefit that must be received by the recipient being
the same.
56 E.g., Dieterle v. Gatton, 366 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1966), appealed after remand, 397 F.2d
155 (6th Cir. 1968); Ferber Co. v. Ondrick, 310 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 911 (1963); Meredith v. Marks, 27 Cal. Rptr. 737, 212 Cal. App.2d 265
(1963); Leoni v. Delaney, 83 Cal. App. 2d 303, 188 P.2d 765 (1948); Dixie Builders,
Inc. v. Partin, 54 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1951); Maui Aggregates, Inc. v. Reeder, 446 P.2d
174 (Hawaii 1968); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Ida. 44, 324 P.2d 380 (1958); In re Winan's
Estate, 77 Ill. App. 2d 462, 222 N.E.2d 546 (1966).
57 In re Moyer, 190 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Va. 1960); Russell v. Baumann, 239 Ark. 830,
394 S.W.2d 619 (1965); Wilson v. Equitable Sec. Trust Co., 52 Del. 353, 158 A.2d
281 (1960); Tanner v. Tanner, 106 Ga. App. 270, 126 S.E.2d 838 (1962); Morris v.
Bruce, 98 Ga. App. 821, 107 S.E.2d 262 (1952); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Ida. 44, 324
P.2d 380 (1958); Ferris v. Barrett, 250 Iowa 646, 95 N.W.2d 527 (1959); McDaniel
v. McDaniel, 305 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1957); Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548, 148
A.2d 42 (1959); Porter v. Ferguson, 53 Wash. 2d 693, 336 P.2d 133 (1959).
58Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149, 156-57, 425 P.2d 282, 286
(1967). Consolidated said that the finder must not only provide services but his relation-
ship with the principal must be such as to justify a reasonable expectation of compen-
sation on the part of the finder.
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Yet the services and the benefit are not the same; for while knowl-
edge is desirable, it is beneficial in a legal sense only when used by the
recipient. Utilization of the information seems to be a condition prece-
dent to a finder's compensation or a necessary part of the "benefit"
requirement, even though his services may be completed when he
reveals the opportunity. Hence, in any discussion of benefit, two other
factors must be considered: the need for a connecting link between
the services and the benefit, and the necessity for a consummated
transaction.
a. Chain of Events or Procuring Cause
Obviously, there must be some connection between the finder's
services and the benefit to the recipient of the services for recovery of
a finder's fee on the theory of quantum meruit. Consolidated described
this connection as a "chain of events" or the services as being the
"procuring cause"5 of the benefit and held that if the finder performed
all that was required of him by custom or request and if the benefit
was realized, the connection requirement was fulfilled.
Often, however, there can be such interruptions and intervening
causes such as to deny the finder his fee. The issue and the approach
to the resolution of the question of link or connection between the
finder's services and the benefit obtained cannot be more precisely
phrased than it was in Consolidated. When such circumstances arise,
the issue can normally be resolved by the same principles as are applied
by the courts in analogous situations involving brokers.6°
b. Consummated Transaction
Perhaps the most critical facet of the benefit requirement - and
perhaps a separate requirement in itself - is the need for a consum-
mated transaction. Indeed, the author's research has disclosed no case
in which a finder has recovered compensation if the opportunity re-
vealed by the finder was not exploited. While the parties may con-
tractually provide for a finder's fee regardless of the use made of
r9Id. at 157-58, 425 P.2d at 286: The law of brokers requires the broker to be the procuring
cause of the sale. This procuring cause has been defined as the "effective cause" or the
"predominating effective cause"; see, e.g., Hayutin v. DeAndrea, 139 Colo. 40, 45, 337
P.2d 383, 385 (1959). See also Pass v. Industrial Asphalt of Calif., Inc., 239 Cal. App.
2d 776, 49 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1966): " 'Procuring cause' has been defined as the cause
originating a series of events that, without break in their continuity, result in the accom-
plishment of the prime object of the employment." Id. 49 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
60 In the real estate industry, if more than one broker is employed, the broker who is the
first to present a ready, willing, and able party is entitled to the commission. See Pueblo
v. Leach Realty Co., 149 Colo. 92, 368 P.2d 195 (1962). Of course, such rule should be
subject to a finding of an uninterrupted chain of events. It is generally held that the
broker is entitled to his commission if his client is the cause of the failure of the sale
to be consummated. See, e.g., Circle T. Corp. v. Crocker, 155 Colo. 263, 393 P.2d 744
(1964); Pueblo v. Leach Realty Co., 149 Colo. 92, 368 P.2d 195 (1962).
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the information disclosed by the finder,61 in the absence of such a
contractual provision the exploitation of the opportunity by the recipient
of the finder's information should be held to be a condition subsequent,
implied by law or implied in fact to the right of a finder to compen-
sation,6" whether the action is ex contractu or quantum meruit.63
The importance of whether the consummation of the transaction
is a condition to a finder's right to compensation lies in the mode of
operation of a finder. Whereas a broker usually is specifically employed
by a party for the purpose of a particular transaction, a finder often
is employed by no one. The finder often simply approaches persons
whom he feels may be interested in the opportunities of which the
finder has knowledge. Often the finder is not revealing a specific
proposal; he is revealing a very general concept of an opportunity. The
transformation of this opportunity into a transaction may occur long
thereafter, and the finder may have nothing to do with the transforma-
tion. Hence, a problem then arises, because the finder will often fail to
state the terms of compensation prior to revealing the opportunity,
and the "ready, willing and able" concept applicable to a broker's right
to compensation can rarely be applied to a finder. In most instances,
the finder's compensation must be tied to actual exploitation of the
opportunity, without an exception for the failure of the exploitation
due to the refusal or neglect of the party to whom the finder disclosed
the opportunity.
The conclusion that utilization of the finder's information is
normally a condition to a finder's right to compensation was reached
by the New York court in Towers v. Doroshaw," wherein plaintiff
sought a finder's fee for merely telling the defendant of a merger
opportunity which was never consummated.
[T]he Court does not consider the question .. . whether, upon satis-
factory proof of the promise so made, a party might be held liable
to pay for the mere mention to him of a corporation or firm with
which he might subsequently do business .... In no case cited by
61 With respect to real estate agents, COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117-2-1 (1963) provides
that no such agent shall be entitled to a commission for finding a purchaser "until the
same is consummated or is defeated by the refusal or neglect of the owner to consummate
the same as agreed on." No doubt this provision merely reflects prior case law. Query.
could the parties make a contract contrary to the terms of CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 117-2-1 (1963)?
62An argument for finding the condition to be implied may be based on two theories:
First, that there is an established custom in particular industries which would give the
principal notice of the finder's expectation upon consummation; second, that common
sense compels the conclusion that the consummated transaction is the benefit for which
the principal must compensate the finder, the absence of which estoppes the finder from
claiming compensation. See Towers v. Doroshaw, supra note 54.
63COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117-2-1 (1963) provides:
No real estate agent or broker shall be entitled to a commission for finding a
purchaser who is ready, willing and able to complete the purchase of the real
estate as proposed by the owner, until the same is consummated or is defeated
by the refusal or neglect of the owner to consummate the same as agreed upon.
645 Misc. 2d 241, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 367 (App. Div. 1957).
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the plaintiff has there been enforced an obligation to pay compensa-
tion to a "finder" for the disclosure of the name alone, without an
introduction or negotiations leading to an eventual transaction between
the defendant and the buyer. Certainly, when such an agreement is not
reduced to writing, the plaintiff must sustain his burden of establishing
the contract by evidence of a quality and quantity sufficient to satisfy
the court of a clear and unequivocal intention by the defendant to
pay for the mere disclosure. 65
In holding that the plaintiff could not recover in quantum meruit if
the transaction proposed was not consummated, the court said: "A
broker is never entitled to commissions for unsuccessful efforts. The
risk of failure is wholly his. The reward comes only with his success. '"66
While generally the custom of the industry in which the finder operated
would be the basis of the holding and the consummation of the trans-
action would be a condition subsequent implied in fact, " the result in
Towers appears to be a conclusion of law, i.e., a separate condition
implied by law into the contract or into the quantum meruit
relationship.68
Even in the absence of custom, the consummated transaction con-
dition should be implied in law, unless there is evidence of circumstances
showing an intention (or justification) of the parties that the finder
would be paid for merely revealing the opportunity regardless of what
transpired thereafter. Such constructive conditions, as defined by Corbin,
are founded on grounds of justice, independent of expressed intention
or consideration. 69 With respect to finders, it seems difficult to concede
that the parties would have intended the finder to be compensated
regardless of the outcome of the transaction if they had considered it,7"
since the sole purpose of the relationship between the finder and
exploiter is to consummate the proposed transaction.
5Id. at 249, 159 N.Y.S. 2d at 376.
6Id. at 252, 159 N.Y.S. 2d at 379, quoting Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N.Y. 378,
383 (1881).
67 "In truth, usage is one of the agencies by which the law has been gradually formed and
still is not only added to, but otherwise amended." That usage may harden by repeated
decisions into such new rules of law as do not contradict any previously existing rule is,
however, clearly stated. S. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 655 (3d ed. 1961). Perhaps the
custom of consummation of the transaction as a condition to compensation has already
become a part of the common law of finders' fees.
68Perhaps this conclusion is merely the result of sound logic and common sense. It seems
highly unlikely that compensation to the finder would be agreed upon regardless of
whether the information resulted in actual benefit to the obligor. However, the benefit
should be defined in terms of exploitation of the opportunity rather than the amount
of profits realized therefrom, although the latter fact may be highly important to the
question of amount of compensation.
69See generally A. CORBIN, CONTRACrs §§ 631-32, 653-55 (1960).
"One might approach the issue by way of the commercial frustration doctrine. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 288 (1932). Ordinarily, both parties would assume the
opportunity would be exploited, and if the promisor is unable to exploit the opportunity
through no fault of his own, the objective has been frustrated. However, most often the
failure of the exploitation is because of an inability to agree upon terms.
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In rationalizing such an approach, some courts have implied the
condition that the transaction be consummated by applying the principle
that one must accomplish what he undertook to do in order to recover
compensation for his services. 71 Applying this rule, a finder does not
merely undertake to reveal an opportunity; he undertakes to obtain
an advantageous transaction for another. Unless the opportunity re-
vealed by the finder is exploited, the party to whom the opportunity
is revealed has not obtained an advantageous transaction. While this
approach results in the proper conclusion and while no doubt both
parties to a finder's arrangement anticipate that it will culminate in
an advantageous transaction, it is not precise to say the finder under-
took to accomplish the advantageous transaction. At most, the finder
undertook to present an advantageous transaction and, perhaps, to do
what he could to assist the parties in consummating the transaction.
The consummating of the transaction is ordinarily left to the parties
involved.
Another way in which the consummated transaction is made into
an implied condition is based on the "procuring cause" requirement, i.e.,
the finder must have procured a consummated transaction or he is not
entitled to compensation. The same conclusion can be reached in a
quantum meruit case by a holding that no benefit has been received
unless the recipient of the finder's disclosure utilizes the information
to his benefit.
While the requirement of a consummated transaction can be
based on several theories, perhaps it can best be explained by the
doctrine of commercial frustration. Under this doctrine, it is held that
[w]here the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be
attained by either party to a contract forms the basis on which both
parties enter into it, and this object or effect is or surely will be
frustrated, a promisor who is without fault in causing the frustration,
and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty of performing
his promise unless a contrary intention appears.
72
Thus, in the circumstances of a finder, exploitation of the oppor-
tunity or information is normally a desired object or effect which forms
the basis of an agreement or quantum meruit relation upon which a
finder's fee is asserted. This assumption is obviously logical, and unless
the finder can prove a "clear and unequivocal intention by the defen-
71 Here, the difference between a broker and a finder may be most apparent. At the time
a real estate broker, for example, comes on the scene, the deal that his principal wants is
normally defined in specific terms. In the business of the finder, e.g., corporate mergers,
there is often only a vague concept of the terms upon which the "deal" could be
consummated because of the sundry alternatives that can be followed to consummate a
merger.
2
RESTATEMENT OF CONrRACTS § 288 (1933). See also A. CORBIN, CONTRACrS §§ 1351-
61 (1962).
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dant to pay for the mere discloser, ' 7 8 the finder's right to a fee should
be held to be conditioned upon exploitation of the disclosure.
IV. DETERMINATION OF THE FEE
A. Agreement
If the parties have agreed upon the amount of the finder's fee,
this is ordinarily conclusive.
7 4
B. Quantum Meruit
Under the theory of quantum meruit, "reasonable compensation"
is recoverable. Obviously, many factors are relevant to the determination
of reasonable compensation. Therefore, no attempt will be made here
to define the scope of evidence admissible on the issue of reasonable
compensation, 73 except to point out that generally the type of evidence
necessary to establish the amount of any quantum meruit claim should
also be relevant to a finder's fee quantum meruit claim. Thus, the time
spent by the finder, the skill of the finder, and the value of the subject
Although the usual evidence of reasonable compensation in a
quantum meruit cause of action is relevant, it rarely provides much
guidance to the determination of a reasonable finder's fee. The time
spent and scope of services provided by the finder may provide some
guidance, but it is difficult for such factors to be persuasive, since a
finder is usually paid on a commission basis. Indeed, a finder's com-
pensation, not unlike a lawyer's contingent fee, must compensate him
somewhat for the failures for which he received no compensation as
matter are all relevant to the determination of the value of the services.
well as for his successes. Of course, if the fee is claimed, even though
the opportunity was never exploited, consideration of factors such as
time involved would be appropriate.
In either case, proof of customary finders' fees will normally be
the mode of proving a reasonable fee. Evidence of fees customarily
received for similar services is admissible to show the reasonable value
of services rendered by the finder.76 The admissibility of evidence of
customary fees is based on the presumption that a fee would not attain
78 Thus, in the circumstances of a finder, exploitation of the opportunity of information
is normally the desired object or effect which forms the basis of an agreement or
quantum meruit relation upon which a finder's fee is asserted. This assumption is
obviously logical, and unless the finder can prove a "clear and unequivocal intention by
the defendant to pay for the mere disclosure," the finder's right to a fee should be held
to be conditioned upon exploitation of the disclosure.
74 When finder's fees are negotiated, relevant factors include the dollar size of the oppor-
tunity, the anticipated profit, and the scope of the services to be performed by the finder.
However, often the agreed upon fee is merely a recognition of the finder's fee that is
customary in the particular industry.
75
See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 46 (1935); A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§§ 1004, 1112 (1964).
7
6Geiger v. Kiser, 47 Colo. 297, 305, 107 P. 267, 270 (1910).
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the stature of custom if it were not reasonable. Evidence of customary
fees is also admissible on the ground that custom is incorporated by
law into every contractual or quantum meruit relationship. In Fleming
v. Wells,7" a case wherein the plaintiff sought to recover reasonable
compensation for real estate broker services, the court said:
The right of one rendering service for another to have their
value estimated under a quantum meruit upon a basis of commissions
can only arise out of a general custom, so that where such custom
exists in reference to certain kinds of business, anyone actually or
presumptively having knowledge of it, and employing the persons
engaged in such business to perform services in their line without
special contract, will be presumed to have done so with reference to
such custom .... 78
However, sometimes both of the parties will not be a part of the
industry whose customary fees are sought to be used as evidence, and
this is particularly true with respect to finders. The rule in this circum-
stance is that customary charges are evidence of reasonableness but
are in no way conclusive.7"
CONCLUSION
By reason of the informal manner in which most "finder" business
is conducted, the scope of services to be performed by the finder and
the terms upon which he is to be paid will usually not be expressed.
Evidence of custom of the industry may be used to fill some of these
gaps. However, often because of the difficulty of obtaining testimony
of an industry's custom, or due to the absence of a custom in the
industry, the gaps in a finder's arrangement cannot be filled in this
manner. In such a situation, the courts should not hesitate to fill the
gaps by applying logic and making their own determinations as to
what the parties would have reasonably contemplated had they in fact
considered these issues. Ultimately, as in the case of real estate brokers,
many of the arrangements will be defined by law as a matter of law.
77 45 Colo. 255, 101 P. 66 (1909).
7Id. at 259, 101 P. at 67; cf. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162 Colo. 149,
425 P.2d 282 (1967).
79Fleming v. Wells, 45 Colo. 255, 101 P. 66 (1909): "In an action for reasonable
compensation by one employed to sell real estate and who effects the sale, but who is
not regularly engaged in that business, evidence of the customary charges of real estate
agents for such services is relevant, but such customary charges are not conclusive at
fixing the compensation of the persons making such sale and such circumstances." Id. at
259, 101 P. at 67. See also 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 161 (1964); Morehouse v.
Shepard, 183 Mich. 472, 150 N.W. 112 (1914).
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In this interesting and somewhat unique article, four members
of the bench and bar exchange their thoughts on the subject of voir
dire. In general, the participants consider abuses which have crept
into the present voir dire procedure and discuss ways in which these
abuses can be curbed, focusing in particular upon the role of education
as a method for corrective change as against developing new state
and federal procedural rules.
INTRODUCTION
In a prize-winning article entitled "The Case of the Rebellious
Juror," Mr. Robert F. Maxwell brings to light some of the current
problems which exist with respect to the practice of voir dire. Using
the context of a hypothetical case brought before the United States
Supreme Court in 1979, Mr. Maxwell's article-which constitutes
the opinion of the Court - examines these problems and suggests ways
in which they can be resolved.
When this article came to the attention of the Denver Law
journal, the Journal Association thought that the issues raised by Mr.
Maxwell and the solutions which he suggested would lend themselves
to an interesting discussion. Therefore, the Journal contacted four very
respected members of the bench and bar and conducted a conversation
via telephone conference call on the subject of voir dire, using Mr.
Maxwell's article as a basis for discussion.
In order to give the reader some necessary background for the
edited conversation which follows, the Journal has condensed Mr.
Maxwell's essay. The following material is the core of that article
*Judge, United States District Court, Phoenix, Arizona; past President of the American
Bar Association; Member, House of Delegates, American Bar Association; appointed to
federal bench in 1964; B.A. 1931, LL.B. 1934, Stanford University.
**Attorney, Appointee to Colorado Supreme Court; B.S. 1947, Colorado School of Mines
(petroleum engineer); LL.B. 1950, University of Virginia.
tAttorney, Executive Director, Institute for Court Management, University of Denver Law
Center; B.A. 1950, University of Kansas; J.D. 1955, Columbia University Law School.
"tAttorney, General Counsel for the Eastern Territory of Sears, Roebuck and Co.; B.A.
1942, LL.B. 1948, University of Pennsylvania.
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and includes the specific portions to which the discussion participants
addressed themselves:




CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
No. 515 Argued October 15, 1979- Decided December 10, 1979.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a professor of political science at a community college,
was called as a juror in a state court prosecution for inciting to riot.
The defendants were students at a university in a distant section of
the state, a change of venue having been granted. On voir dire the
petitioner was asked a series of questions concerning his and his wife's
political activities. He refused to answer these questions on the grounds
that they violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The judge excused him from serving on the jury, but
held him in contempt and sentenced him to thirty days imprisonment.
After exhausting his state remedies, he petitioned the United
States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. That court denied
his petition on the ground that no constitutional rights had been vio-
lated. In its opinion, the court stated that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion in allowing an extended voir dire on points
which could possibly justify a challenge for cause and would certainly
elicit information which might make a peremptory challenge advisable.
In support of his appeal to the court of appeals, petitioner contended
that his case came within the protective doctrines of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire2 and N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama." The court of appeals agreed
with petitioner as to the holdings of these two cases yet decided the
case adversely to him. The court quoted the language of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Sweezy: "For a citizen to be made to forgo even a part
of so basic a liberty as his political autonomy" (i.e., the revelation of
1 This article, originally published in full in the September 1970 issue of the AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, won the 1970 Ross Essay contest that is conducted annually
by the American Bar Association. Appreciation is extended to the American Bar Associa-
tion for permission to reprint portions of this article. It should be noted that the citations,
which appeared in the text of the article as originally printed, have been made into
footnotes and run consecutively with the footnotes added to the comments of the discus-
sion participants.
2354 U.S. 234 (1957).
3 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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his political beliefs and associations), "the subordinating interest of
the State must be compelling. ' 4 The court of appeals held that the
interest of the state in securing an impartial jury was "compelling"
and that the disputed voir dire was essential in obtaining such a jury.
We granted certiorari not only because of the fine line between
the right to an impartial jury and the right of privacy vouchsafed to
the petitioner by the Constitution, but also because of the serious
problems concerning the propriety and value of voir dire, which have
become ever more pressing in our complex and fast moving society.
Originally, voir dire was principally the concern of federal and
state judges at the nisi prius level. It was our problem solely in the
exercise of our general supervisory responsibilities over the operations
of the federal court system.
Events, however, forced us to consider the adequacy of voir dire
in numerous state cases where substantial prejudicial publicity occurred.
Our general conclusion was that voir dire is a completely inefficacious
protection when such publicity exists.'
In three cases decided within a 2-week span in the spring of 1968,
however, we crossed the great divide between state and federal respon-
sibility in regard to jury trials. In Duncan v. Louisiana,' the Court held
that "the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which - were they to be tried in a federal court - would
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."' It is true, of course,
that this decision applies only to criminal trials. It proved, however,
to be extremely difficult, in fact, impossible, to uphold the argument
of the Court in Duncan, applying the criminal jury trial requirements
of the Sixth Amendment to the states, and to deny that argument ef-
ficacy in incorporating the civil jury requirements of the Seventh. Thus,
the extension of federal constitutional guarantees to jury trial, together
with the concomitant responsibilities and powers of this Court, has
been applied by this Court not only to criminal but to civil matters.
The caveat by Mr. Justice Fortas in Bloom v. Illinois,' is particu-
larly pertinent to our responsibility and power over voir dire. He states
that "[in]either logic nor history nor the intent of the draftsmen of the
Fourteenth Amendment can possibly be said to require that the Sixth
Amendment or its jury trial provision be applied to the States together
with the total gloss that this Court's decisions have supplied.... [The
Due Process Clause] does not command us rigidly and arbitrarily to
4 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957).
5 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
6 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
7 Id. at 149.
8391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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impose the exact pattern of federal proceedings upon the 50 States."9
The court of appeals quotes this very language in stating that federal
interference with the details of state procedure in jury trials was un-
warranted except in matters of the most vital and serious import.
We cannot, however, abjure the responsibility we assumed in
Witherspoon v. Illinois," to regulate the methods of voir dire insofar
as they impinge upon the constitutional guarantees. To disregard the
methods by which the jury was selected and the type of personnel who
are entitled to sit thereon would render meaningless our guarantee of
a jury trial.
The import of our decision in Witherspoon is of the widest possible
application. It commands precisely the opposite conclusion to that
reached by the court of appeals that we should interfere solely in
matters of the most substantial nature. It means that in order to dis-
charge our responsibility, we must closely examine all methods of
jury selection, including that of voir dire, to be certain that they meet
the requirements established by the Constitution.
The true basis of the denial of relief by the court of appeals is
its holding that the right to impanel an impartial jury overrode what-
ever right to privacy the petitioner may have possessed except, of
course, his right to avoid self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Implicit in the decision of the court of appeals are the assump-
tions that a fair trial is impossible without (1) the use of the voir dire
in general, and (2) the employment of an extended voir dire in the
situation here presented.
It is interesting to note that the extensive use of the voir dire as
allowed throughout most of the United States has been throughout
history and is now practically unique among all common law juris-
dictions. In England and Canada, for instance, no voir dire at all has
ever been allowed except where a particularized challenge for cause
has been levelled against a specific juror." The English practice was
general throughout this country at the time our Constitution and its
Bill of Rights were approved.' 2 The right to jury trial as constitutionally
guaranteed did not, therefore, include the right to voir dire except as
strictly limited under the English practice." We must, however, inquire
as to whether the widespread adoption of extended voir dire since its
inception in the early 19th century has in effect enshrined it as one of
the essential guarantees of our governmental system.
9 Id. at 213, 214 (concurring opinion).
10 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
1 MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURES OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 289-92
(1952).
121id. at 292.
13 MILLAR, Supra nOte 11.
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Even a cursory inspection of the countless cases interpreting the
scope of voir dire and the questions which may or may not be asked
reveals an utterly unmanageable diversity. 4 Neither a constitutional
guarantee nor a right essential to free men can be erected from a
meaningless assemblage of discordant cases. Obviously, voir dire is
merely one of the various procedural methods used or which might
be used to attain the ineluctable requirement of an impartial jury. It is
subject to modification and even to elimination as the dictates of
efficiency and justice require. It is our responsibility under our holdings
in Duncan, Bloom, and Witherspoon to determine what, if anything,
should be done in this regard, not only so far as the federal judicial
system is concerned, but also as to all the state courts throughout the
nation.
Undoubtedly, interference on our part with voir dire will generate
the accusation that a power-hungry urge has induced us to replace the
empirical flexibility of nisi prius judges with an iron rule imposed
from an ivory tower. We are considering this action, however, solely
to ensure that the universal right to jury trial granted by Duncan not
be impaired.
It has long been the policy of Congress and this Court that "all
litigants . . . shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross-section of the community ... that all citizens
shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and
petit juries ... .16
Voir dire must operate within the framework of this basic purpose.
It must not be used to render nugatory all of the other selection pro-
cedures which have been meticulously devised to ensure that the panel
be, so far as possible, a microcosm of the community. As de Tocqueville
stated long ago, the American jury is not solely a judicial institution,
"for, however great its influence may be upon ... the courts, it is still
greater on the destinies of society .... The jury is, above all, a political
institution, and it must be regarded in this light in order to be duly
appreciated. . . . The institution of the jury . . . invests the people
. . . with the direction of society. . . . It imbues all classes with a
respect for the thing judged and with the notion of right .... It makes
them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards
society, and the part which they take in its government.'1 6
De Tocqueville's tribute to the jury establishes the rationale for
Duncan, Bloom, and Witherspoon. Moreover, his argument justifies
the limitation which we now impose that voir dire must not distort the
14 1 BOSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 503 et seq. (1959); 1 GOLDSTEIN & LANE,
TRIAL TECHNIQUE (2d ed. 1969); 4 A.L.R. 2d 761 (1949); 54 A.L.R. 2d 1204 (1957);
72 A.L.R. 2d905 (1960); 67 A.L.R. 2d 560 (1959).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1861, as amended March 27, 1968, Pub. L. 90-274, 82 Stat. 54.
'ODE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127-28 (New American Library ed. 1956).
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achievements in panel selection accomplished through the projects of
the American Bar Association 17 and required by the Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968.18
We appreciate, as noted by Mr. Justice White in Swain v.
Alabama,'" that "[t]he persistence of peremptories and their extensive
use [in the United StatesJ demonstrate the long and widely held
belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury."2
We, therefore, do not at this time see any necessity for the elimination
of peremptory challenges, as such, except where proof can be educed
of a state's systematic use of this procedure to eliminate jurors of a
certain race or class. We cannot, however, ignore the fact that "voir
dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing .. .and the
process of selecting a jury protracted" because the questioning is used
as "a predicate for the exercise of peremptories.'
Many devastating attacks have been mounted against voir dire.
The average trial manual bows in passing to the use of voir dire in
obtaining a jury that is fair to both sides. Then it emphasizes that its
greatest use is, in the words of the notorious Irish comic, Mr. Dooley,
to get a jury that is "more fair to one side than the other.' 2 2 Much of
what purports to be serious literature on voir dire would be hilarious,
except that it indicates the depths to which the pursuit of victory
can descend.
The purpose of voir dire is to eliminate bias, not to create rapport
nor to discover its impossibility. The denial of the right to question in
order to establish grounds for a peremptory will go far, not only to
expedite voir dire and to eliminate most of the abuses described above,
but, what is much more vital, to focus it once again on what it was
created to accomplish. We shall not prohibit peremptory challenges
themselves since the litigants should have an arbitrary right to remove a
limited number of jurors whose appearance, demeanor or background
they dislike. We do, however, forbid inquiry to establish a basis for this
type of challenge.
The jury trial is weakest at its inception. The potential jurors,
having waited aimlessly, perhaps for days, are confronted by a cross-
examination which frequently probes into their private concerns. With
little explanation, they are either found wanting or are precipitated into
a proceeding in which the connection of one episode with another is
often difficult to perceive. Their precise relationship to what is trans-
17 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY (Approved Draft, 1968).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
19 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
20 Id. at 219.
21 Id. at 218, 219.
2Dunne, Mr. Dooley on Criminal Trials, in PROSSER, THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST (1952).
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piring is never explained until at the end the judge instructs them as to
their function. By then, a major portion of what they are to do is
already behind them: to listen intelligently to the evidence from the
standpoint of the duty they are to perform. No judge worthy to sit
upon the bench would deign to listen to a case unless, at the outset,
he knew the questions involved, the contentions of the parties, and
what his powers and responsibilities were in relation to the issues
before him, true he would not be expected to know every detail, but
his general knowledge should be of sufficient scope to ensure his
comprehension as the trial unfolded.
The juror is a partner in the judging process. As we have pre-
viously explained, such partnership is essential in these parlous times.
Is it fair to the juror or the litigant, is it sensible to expect the juror
to participate in adjudication without possessing at the outset the same
general knowledge that a judge should have? Obviously, the juror can
have neither the educational background nor the professional exper-
ience of the jurist. But should we impose upon him the frustrating
task of sailing a ship when he knows not the peculiarities of the vessel
nor the methods by which he is to navigate? The answer to the questions
propounded must obviously be "no."
Initially, the members of the jury panel should be instructed as
intensively as possible as to the jury's function in relation to the specific
case to be heard. The burdens of proof which must be sustained, the
relationship of the law to the facts to be elicited, the prejudices which
may be created in the story to be unfolded or in the identities of the
parties and witnesses should be emphasized at once. To summarize, the
judge should instruct the jurors at the start, just as the participants in
any other human project are briefed before they enter upon their tasks.
Vagaries may occur en route requiring alteration of the instructions,
but this would pose little problem. With the wide use of pretrial dis-
covery now in vogue, the likelihood of substantial changes would be
small.
Voir dire should be so coordinated with the instructions that it
flows naturally therefrom and complements their meaning. Potential
jurors, as part of their education in the problems they will meet
throughout the trial, will be answering questions related logically to
the instructions in an ambience of mutual trust and with a consciousness
that they are cooperating members of the judicial team. They will be
much more likely to probe intelligently the inner depths of thought
and feeling and determine sincerely whether they are qualified to
judge impartially. The first impressions, rated so important by the trial
manuals, will be imparted by an even-handed judge rather than by
caviling attorneys seeking personal advantage.
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There is no doubt that this will impose additional duties on
already burdened judges. We believe that this additional burden is
required if jury trials are to survive and possess the significance they
must have for all our citizens, dissident or not. The judges' burden
may be lightened by the preparation of general outline instructions and
accompanying specimen voir dires, adaptable to the various types of
litigation coming before the courts. We shall see to the appointment
of outstanding committees of federal and state trial judges and mem-
bers of the Bar for this purpose.
The extent of the preliminary instructions and the accompanying
voir dire must be established in each case by pretrial procedures similar
to those now used for discovery. We do not at this time determine
precisely how these procedures will operate since it will require the
promulgation of additional rules after proper detailed study. Once
proper general forms are prepared, it may be a relatively simple pro-
cedure.
Perhaps a pretrial conference should be held, at which the lawyers
and the judge, using the forms as a guide, would determine the scope of
the instructions and voir dire, the same to be incorporated in a pre-
trial order.
Perhaps the rules should provide that the scope established by the
forms will govern at the trial unless prior thereto one of the lawyers
serves upon his opponents specific and detailed proposals for alter-
ations or additions. Whether these proposals are opposed or not, the
petitioning attorney must establish their necessity and propriety to
the satisfaction of the trial court, which shall enter a pretrial order
explaining the reasons for any deviations. Either method, or others
which may be devised, will eliminate the present haphazard groping
before the panel, which results in loss of public respect and uncon-
scionable delay.
Above all, the procedures should be developed so that this pre-
liminary function becomes one of the most essential duties of the
judge. The opening of the trial must become a vital educational ex-
perience for the panel.
The questions, their scope determined before the trial, must be
propounded solely by the judge, be limited to establishing grounds to
challenge for cause, and this cause limited strictly to contemporaneous
and direct prejudice concerning the case itself, the parties, witnesses or
counsel. Questions calculated to discover general opinions, beliefs,
associations and experience of the juror must be disallowed. Inquiry to
determine whether the juror has some knowledge of the issue or some
thought in relation thereto must be forbidden unless directed spe-
cifically to events, persons or organizations involved in the trial or
incidents leading thereto. As Chief Justice Marshall said in the trial
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of Aaron Burr: "To say that any man who had formed an opinion
on any fact conducive to the final decision.., would.., be disquali-
fied ... would exclude intelligent and observing men.' '28 To permit
such questions is to transform the jury from a representative cross-
section into an instrument favoring the philosophy of the examining
advocate or the judge himself.
We have already discussed the inadequacy of voir dire in cases
of prejudicial publicity. There, after a brief explanation, tile court
should inquire as to whether any juror has read, witnessed or has
significant knowledge of the objectionable publicity. If so, he should
be excused. If this publicity has been widely disseminated throughout
the community, other methods than voir dire must be employed, as,
for instance, change of venue, empaneling jurors from another area
or postponement.
Obviously, the voir dire of the petitioner was too broad. Although
our ruling is not to be effective retroactively to other cases, we have
no choice but to reverse and remand with instructions to the district
court to order the conviction and sentence set aside.
It is so ordered.
THE DISCUSSION
journal: At the outset of this discussion, the Journal would first
like to extend its appreciation to each of you for taking the time to
engage in this project and, second, would like to set forth in general
terms the tenor of the conversation which is to follow. The Journal
hopes that each of you will try to direct your comments to the history,
scope, and purpose of voir dire; the abuses that exist within that
practice; some of the steps that have been taken to correct those abuses
by the Federal Rules and the ABA STANDARDS; and the suggestions
that Mr. Maxwell developed in his essay. Perhaps Mr. Erickson would
like to begin the discussion.
ERICKSON: Initially, I would like to address myself to abuses
of voir dire and the effect of Rule 24(a) .24 Specifically, the federal
court system with Rule 24 (a) certainly has shortened the voir dire proc-
ess in most instances. The only place that I find the Federal Rule lacking
is when the federal judge permits no additional questions or any
voir dire of any kind by opposing counsel. Even when the trial judge
restricts traditional voir dire, if he allows meaningful questions for
the purpose of exercising the voir dire in accordance with the new
standards relating to trial by jury (to determine whether grounds exist
23 1 ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 414 et seq. (Hopkins
& Earle, Philadelphia, 1808).
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
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for a challenge for cause or for meaningful exercise of a peremptory
challenge) I think that the Federal Rule is quite desirable and that
the standards spell out a means. I do, however, think that Mr. Max-
well's suggestion that a pretrial conference be held to spell out the
zone of inquiry is a worthwhile suggestion.
CRAIG: I was very much impressed with Mr. Maxwell's article.
I might say that for some time our [federal] courts have been fol-
lowing the practice under 24(a) and limit the voir dire to examination
by the judge. We have inadvertently incorporated to some degree Mr.
Maxwell's thought about pretrial on the subject of voir dire, but we
don't call it that. What we do is notify counsel that if they have any
areas that they would like to have covered in voir dire, the court will
go over them and cover them in the court's words if the court believes
they are pertinent to the voir dire inquiry and if counsel will submit
them before the case is called.
I think that Mr. Maxwell points out very well in his article that
the purpose of voir dire is simply to secure a fair and impartial panel.
It's not for the purpose of opening a rapport between counsel and
some prospective juror, although I know that in many instances it has
been used for that purpose; and I think that Mr. Maxwell's quote from
our friend Dooley25 was a very pertinent one, illustrating the situation
in which counsel tries to become friendly with the jury and be the
fair-haired boy. I think this practice should be restricted - as far as
rapport is concerned -to counsel's opening statement. I know that
Bill Erickson and I have sat on panels and have heard both sides of
that issue - whether, for example, defense counsel should make an
opening statement subsequent to the choosing of the jury. That's
another subject. But I think that is counsel's opportunity to at least
sell himself to the jury in representing his client. There are some
that disagree with that view, but I think it can be used appropriately
in the trial process. But on voir dire, I think abuses have crept in.
FRIESEN: I think, like my friends, that the essay is quite scholarly
and proposes a solution which should be adopted almost universally.
But to say that it should be adopted is a long way from getting the
people who are interested in these kinds of problems to adopt them.
The article really avoids the issue by assuming that the purpose of the
voir dire is to get an impartial jury. There is a substantial amount of
opinion and a substantial number of lawyers and judges who still
subscribe to the view that the adversary process requires each lawyer
to have an opportunity to assess the psyche, if you like, of the jurors
and to develop rapport with them. We can all assume -I think the
25 Dunne, supra note 22.
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four of us do- that that is not the purpose of voir dire. But I had
hoped that we might talk about this more crucial and fundamental
issue as a part of this discussion.
ERICKSON: I know that I heard one old lawyer say, "As soon as
I finish with the voir dire, it's time for the jury to retire and reach
their verdict."
CRAIG: [Laughter] I would hesitate to implement the philosophy
or return to the original philosophy of voir dire examinations by
creating too many rules. I think the Federal Rule is adequate the way
it is. I think that what we really need is a little more education of the
profession - maybe even through the law schools - as to the function
of voir dire and how it should be conducted. Then the bar can take
care of itself without having too many rules. What I am concerned
with is that if you develop a body of rules directed to voir dire, then
pretty soon some court is going to come along and say, "well, in this
case somebody failed to dot the 'i' on this particular segment of the
rule; therefore, it is reversible error, and we'll send it back for a new
trial." You get bogged down in the rule process instead of going back
to the purpose of it, i.e., was the jury drawn as a result of that voir dire
examination, so far as we can determine, a fair and impartial one? I
think Ernie Friesen's emphasis in that area is absolutely right.
ERICKSON: Of course, the well-publicized trial is one that the
federal courts have a difficult time coping with because of the manner
used to determine jury eligibility. The question whether or not a
challenge is going to be exercised, either peremptorily or for cause,
once you have a widely publicized case doesn't come to the forefront
as quickly as it does in state court practice where a wide-open voir dire
is permitted. It is often very difficult when a juror has been bombarded
with publicity for a period of six months to ask one question that will
go into the depth of his knowledge or the depth of his feelings about
a particular case. When you read the case of Sheppard v. Maxwell,"'
you can see that the panel was actually brainwashed; and then you look
at the Rideau 7 case and you see that it was impossible to effectively
select a jury after the televised confession of these rather atrocious
murders in Louisiana.
CRAIG: Of course I think a significant portion of the problem
in the Sheppard case, and in some of the others, results from the will-
ingness of the trial judge to allow counsel to explore every avenue
willynilly, whether it is meritorious or not, on the primary function
of fair and impartial juror selection. What is really required in those
26 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
27 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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circumstances is a little tighter rein from the bench; possibly a formal
pretrial conference in that type of situation would be advisable. While
I would not recommend such practice in every case, I think that in a
case like Sheppard it might be helpful. I am firmly of the belief that
it is ridiculous to take two or three weeks or longer to get a jury, and
I don't care what kind of a case it is. In six years on the bench, I've
experienced some pretty well-publicized cases and some pretty hoary
ones, and I have yet to spend over an hour and a half selecting a jury.
FRIESEN: I think Judge Craig has hit on the note that I would
emphasize and that is that we should not limit the discretion of the
judge by further imposing rules to try to control the problem of voir
dire. The image of the judge as a "patsy referee" is dying, I hope, and
the position of the judge as an active manager of the trial is the
emerging view. We should hopefully inculcate in lawyers and thereby
in judges what the purpose of voir dire is and emphasize that in the
exercise of sound discretion the judge should be able to rule out all
sorts of questions that go into areas that Mr. Maxwell would exclude.
But I think I agree with Judge Craig; this change in voir dire should
be left to judicial development and training and not to rules.
CRAIG: Another practice affecting voir dire that exists in federal
courts and in many state courts involves the selection of the panel from
the master wheel. Once the proposed candidates are drawn from the
wheel they receive a questionnaire. The questionnaire is a pretty
thorough one with respect to age, health, place of birth, residence, oc-
cupation, family, children, etc. Our counsel have become educated to
the fact that they can come into court the day before trial - sometimes
sooner - and examine that list of questionnaires. In addition, when
a panel reports for duty in any given courtroom, the clerk has available
those same questionnaires; and counsel, while the court is drawing the
panel, can be going through the answers to see just who the people are.
If counsel has been on the ball, he knows just where the people came
from, how long they've been there, how many children they have, what
their occupation is, and all the rest of it. Thus, he can know pretty
well who he has before the voir dire interrogation begins.
ERICKSON: I think every trial lawyer wants primarily to have a
basis on which he can intelligently exercise a peremptory challenge.
However, if the voir dire is conducted by the court and covers only very
restricted matters, the peremptory challenges can only be exercised
indiscriminately; this often happens when an overzealous trial judge
is involved.
CRAIG: In my opinion, the trial judge should make a pretty com-
plete voir dire examination; but when I say complete, I don't mean he
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should go into what the fellow had for breakfast and what his ideo-
logical fancies may or may not have been. I have 23 general questions
in my standard criminal case voir dire which are supplemented by
questions relating to the specific crime charged. For example, if it is
a Dyer Act case, 2 I ask anyone on the panel if they ever had a car
stolen; if it was returned and, if so, in what kind of condition; and
whether the fact that they had a car stolen would affect their judgment
in this case. So one can make succinct inquiries in each case without
delving into a person's religious background or philosophy or what
their mother taught them when they were six years old.
ERICKSON: I have no objection to that, but I had occasion to be
called upon in federal court to exercise peremptory challenge after
some 15 to 20 questions were asked. That hardly gives one an indication
of anything. As a matter of fact, I was once called upon to exercise
peremptory challenges in the federal court after some 10 or 12 questions
were asked; I was told to exercise challenges for cause and then per-
emptory challenges. I stood and I said, "If the court please, will the
court ask Question No. 38 ?" (I'd turned in a series of questions.) The
presiding judge said, "I've covered it." I replied, "Did you ask
Question No. 12?" He said, "Covered it." So finally I said, "Your
Honor, would you ask Juror No. 6 if she has any difficulty hearing?"
Whereupon he said, "I'll ask that," and said, "Mrs. Smith, do you have
any difficulty hearing?" She looked at him and she said, "Not as a
rule, Your Honor, but in your case I haven't heard a word you said,
you mumble so much." After that statement the judge said, "I'll honor
a challenge for cause."
CRAIG: [Laughter] Well, I guess those kinds of situations Erick-
son describes can be repeated many times. I think Ernie Friesen put his
finger on it pretty well: You have to educate the judges as well as the
lawyers. I don't think that's an impossible task. I think they are
generally receptive to recommendations and good viable criticism.
MAXWELL: Wouldn't this be an area in which something along
the line of a pretrial conference going into what the general questions
are to be in the voir dire might help? If such a device were employed,
the extent of the voir dire could be wrangled out before trial and,
at trial, the problem of whether or not enough questions were asked
would not exist. In other words, if there were some list of questions
which were going to be asked by the judge in the particular case, the
attorneys would have had the opportunity prior to the trial to suggest
other questions. This would have been determined before the trial
rather than at the trial itself. Wouldn't Mr. Erickson's story indicate
2
8 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
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that sometimes something more should be done prior to the trial rather
than at the trial?
CRAIG: As I said earlier, I think that is true in certain cases. I
guess it doesn't make much difference in violations of the law except
when the punishment is capital punishment. You can get a lot of
inflammatory facts arising out of the circumstances that brought about
the charge. But what one is confronted with in cases like Sheppard,
Sirhan, and others is not the facts and circumstances nor the quali-
fications of the average juror that comes in off the street; the real
problem is the effect of the publicity. As has been pointed out by the
Supreme Court and others, in some circumstances there is no way to
get a fair trial at a particular moment and in a particular locality
because the public in the locality has been so inflamed by the media
that their minds are made up. In those cases I think, as that Court has
suggested, that two things can be used: delay to dull the public's
memory or change of venue where the publicity is limited to a relatively
reasonable area.
MAXWELL: In the well-publicized type of case, the actual fact is
that voir dire really becomes useless. You can't do much with it if
that type of publicity has been widespread in a particular community.
CRAIG: That is true, but after you remove or delay, the voir dire
assumes its place again. All I contend is that it is not necessary to have
a pretrial on voir dire in every criminal action.
MAXWELL: I do not necessarily disagree. I think, however, that
the idea suggested by Mr. Friesen of educating the bar and state and
federal judges, as to the adversary process is a very long process; it
certainly cannot be coordinated very well throughout the country. The
thrust of my article, more or less, is not to advocate any particular
course of action but to attempt to call the attention of the bar and the
readers of the article to the fact that the situation is pretty critical at
this time in certain trials; that in certain states and areas where ex-
tended voir dire does occur, it somewhat damages the image of the
processes of justice; and that the situation is such that unless pretty
prompt action is taken generally to overcome this situation, there is a
risk that there will be doctrinaire and strict rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court or some central fountainhead.
This kind of approach may or may not be desirable, but I think the
educational process is perhaps too long. Something has to be done as
to the adversary process generally -and this is only one facet of it
- to bring trials and the court procedures within some general control
so that the processes of justice are expedited and still remain fair.
This process relates not only to voir dire but to many other elements of
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the trial. We are coming to the position in many courts where the
calendars are so delayed that something has to be done generally to
the trial processes. As Chief Justice Burger indicated, much of this
delay is caused by a horse-and-buggy-age approach to problems when
we have rocket ships on the moon. The whole trial system has to be
closely investigated, and there have to be some new rules and processes
developed almost immediately to handle these trials before the situation
gets more out of hand than it already is in many courts.
CRAIG: I agree with the major part of what you have just said
except that I think the suggestion for an educational process is a
sound one.
MAXWELL: I agree, but I am of the opinion that something
more direct and more positive has to be done now in cooperation with
the educational process.
CRAIG: I think we have already started to develop some new ap-
proaches, such as the new Federal Rules.
MAXWELL: I agree, but it is only a start.
FRIESEN: I don't really think you can handle the whole problem
of voir dire with new rules. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were new in 1938 and actually became effective in 1939. Yet if one
reads cases that were published in 1949 (and some as late as 1955), he
finds that the spirit of the rules was not in effect. It took an educational
process of judges and lawyers and an interaction of the two to get
anything done.
Rules alone don't accomplish this educative task because, as I
said earlier, I think rules tend to gloss over the fundamental problem.
Look at Mr. Maxwell's article for example; he says we should not pro-
hibit peremptory challenges themselves, since the litigants should have
an arbitrary right to remove a limited number of jurors whose appear-
ance, demeanor or background they dislike. We do, however, forbid in-
quiry to establish a basis for this type of challenge. Are you saying, Mr.
Maxwell, that we should allow counsel to exercise peremptories because
they don't like the way jurors smile or wear their hair and that we
should also permit them to exercise peremptories without any regard
to what these jurors think?
MAXWELL: Well, basically, in a state like Pennsylvania, we have
a questionnaire that is similar to the one that was mentioned before. The
voir dire is extremely limited in Pennsylvania, and in most cases -
except in a capital case where there would be an extended voir dire
at some times - the peremptory challenge is pretty well based on the
items that Mr. Friesen mentioned. In Pennsylvania the peremptory
1970
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
challenge really depends on the feeling of the lawyer for the party.
I think that if the questioning develops things of the nature we are
talking about and if there is some serious situation, then a challenge
for cause would lie; but a peremptory challenge, in my opinion,
depends largely on the idiosyncrasy, the whim, or the hunch of the
lawyer. I think this is true no matter how long questions are asked.
ERICKSON: Don't you think it is true, Mr. Maxwell, that the
challenges for cause, even under the new STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE relating to TRIAL BY JURY,29 are very restrictive? And isn't
it nearly impossible to bring a challenge within the cause requirements
of most statutes? If so, your only basis in selecting a jury is to intel-
ligently exercise your peremptory challenges; and if you limit the areas
of questioning that trial counsel is going to use, the defendant is going
to be deprived of the effective use of counsel.
I think that it is for the experienced advocate to determine what
use is going to be made of certain material; the trial judge is not in
many instances prepared to know just exactly what concerns trial
counsel, particularly in cases which receive wide publicity, such as
some heinous sex offense. In cases involving public officials, questions
that look wholly innocuous on their face may have really deep sig-
nificance.
MAXWELL: I think the difficulty you present goes to the question
of the extensiveness of voir dire and to the place of an extensive
voir dire in reference to the breakdown in many of the jurisdictions-
the populous jurisdictions - of the processes of justice and of the
expedition of justice. This is very serious in places like Philadelphia,
New York and Boston. Something must be done to expedite and still
be fair. When you argue against the limitation on the areas of question-
ing you have opened the door wide to the type of abuses that voir dire
is capable of allowing. Once you doubt that the trial judge understands
the significance of certain questions that counsel wants to ask and that
counsel cannot convince the court that a challenge for cause is war-
ranted, I think at that point you have destroyed the entire desire to
change or simplify voir dire. I don't think you can do that.
In regard to the statement by Mr. Friesen about the Federal Rules,
it is unquestionable that -except in very progressive courts such as
2 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING
To TRIAL BY JURY § 2.5 Challenges for Cause (Approved Draft, 1968):
If the judge after examination of any juror is of the opinion that grounds for
challenge for cause are present, the judge should excuse that juror from the
trial of the case. If the judge does not excuse the juror, any party may challenge
the juror for cause. A challenge to an individual juror should be made before he
is sworn to try the case, but the judge may permit it to be made after he is
sworn but before jeopardy has attached.
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania - after the promulgation of the
original Federal Rules, it took a long time before such a procedure as
discovery really came into the prominence that it enjoys today. It is
true that it took a long educational process; but my point is this: The
educational process is fine, but would the educational process have
developed if the new Rules had not actually been put in? Without the
new Federal Rules the educational process would not have taken the
line it did and would have accomplished nothing along the lines that
have been established. The two (educational process and rules) must
work together; and without the certain promulgation of new rules,
not only as to voir dire but as to other procedures, the educational
process cannot succeed. I think they must walk together as they did in
the promulgation of new Federal Rules 20 or 30 years ago.
ERICKSON: Don't the Federal Rules make voir dire discretionary
with the trial judge?
MAXWELL: What I am getting at is that a great deal of this
discretion as to length and so on must be dispensed with in many
procedures today because our courts are so bogged down. There are
too many differences between the judges, one judge doing one thing
and in the next courtroom another judge is doing another; it varies
from district to district, especially in the populous states. I think for
example, that courts in Delaware County in Philadelphia may vary
significantly on all types of procedures. This cannot go on. There has
to be discretion to a certain extent, of course; but I think that because
of the mounting crisis in courts in these populous places, something
has to be done to make things uniform and progressive. I am not talk-
ing about a Hitlerian dictatorship and I am not saying remove all dis-
cretion, but I think there have to be strong guidelines.
ERICKSON: Wally [Craig], have you ever known a federal judge
to abuse his voir dire by extending it beyond reason?
CRAIG: No, I can't say that I have; but I think what you and Mr.
Maxwell are referring to is the reverse of that. If a federal judge cuts
it too short, that is not good either. Again, it takes educational programs
like seminars of judges to go into these problems. In the 9th Circuit
there is now a Federal District Judges' Association which is under-
taking to put on seminars for the judges on procedures and methods
of operations that will move the calendar more rapidly. Ernie [Friesen]
was formerly Dean of the National College of State Trial Judges, and
they are conducting programs which can accomplish the same thing
with state judges. These are all very good. What I am afraid of is that
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if we start promulgating rules without giving the educational process
an opportunity we will hurt the system rather than help it. What has
happened with our great "new" Rules under the federal system which
Arizona adopted in 1939 as part of the state system (and we were
warned about this back in the days when they were discussing adoption
of the new Rules and in the discovery process particularly) is that
abuses have crept in and delayed rather than expedited litigation. This
happens and has been happening in our jurisdiction; boiler-plate inter-
rogatories are a good example of this problem.
MAXWELL: I agree. These boiler-plate interrogatories are not
strategically valuable in most cases. I think they are ridiculous, and
this type of practice is an abuse of the Rules. Obviously, no matter
what type of rules you put in, you are going to have abuses.
I certainly do not advocate prompt and immediate enactment of
a group of rules. I think the article indicates the promulgation of new
rules could only be done after thorough study; a lot of these studies are
going on at the present time. The article merely attempts to light up in
one small area of our trial procedure the crisis that exists and attempts
to show that there must be an educational process. There must be con-
tinuing thought given to revision of rules and to more ways in which
the trial process can be modernized. Much of what is said in the article
and much of what we have been talking about really relates to the abuses
of the adversary system that work into voir dire and make the process
seem ridiculous. The Judge [Craig] said that much of the solution to
these problems depends upon the rein a judge keeps on the lawyers - of
course there are tyrannical judges who keep too much of a rein; but
I don't think that this means that you should not seriously consider the
enactment and promulgation of new rules and also the investment of
the judge with the power to really control the trial.
FRIESEN: If the whole argument for rules to limit voir dire is
based upon the congestion and delay in the courts, it is a specious argu-
ment. By reducing voir dire to one-tenth of what it now is, we would
not increase the judge power of the United States by one percent. There
is misapprehension of the amount of time that judges spend in that
process.
We might also want to look at other solutions. For example, a
practice which has existed in New York and in parts of Pennsylvania
for a number of years allows the jury to be selected outside of the
hearing of the judge. Despite all the cries of anguish which have come
from outsiders who have never experienced it, it works rather well and
does not consume a lot of the lawyers' time. Los Angeles is now running
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an experiment on this procedure, and its documentation indicates,
or seems to indicate, that it is going to be effective.
I would, however, like to leave that comment on a more positive
note. I think Mr. Maxwell's suggestion that we work diligently at
educating juries about their role and explaining to them what the case
is about- connecting it with the instructions which they are going
to get with the case - is a very good one and something that we should
follow and work at as some judges have. Judge Grimes in New Hamp-
shire has for years given a half day indoctrination to a new jury panel;
he carefully explains these things just as Mr. Maxwell suggests. These
practices should certainly be emulated.
CRAIG: I don't take a half day; but after the full panel is qualified,
I take from half an hour to 45 minutes. With every new panel we give
sort of an eighth grade civics lesson on how the court works and what
the functions are of the various parties to the trial; we read the indict-
ment and the statute upon which the indictment is based, explain the
burden of proof and why the government opens and closes as distin-
guished from having rebuttal from both sides. It's a little difficult be-
cause you don't want to assume total ignorance; they've heard it some-
place in their educational process. They know generally what it is about;
but I get down to the nitty-gritty specifics as to what their function is and
as to what the functions of the various counsel are. I can do it within
30 to 45 minutes on a full panel. Then, with each case - whether they
have heard it before or not -I spend about 10 minutes with them
reviewing what their function is and what we are doing there. So I
think we are attempting, in my court at least, to carry out some of the
meritorious recommendations that were contained in Mr. Maxwell's
article.
I have had no objections from counsel or anybody else on that
approach to the problem, nor really have I had any objection to the
limitation on voir dire. As I said before, however, on the more difficult
cases - the ones that have had local publicity to some extent - I go
a little further on voir dire than I ordinarily would and am a little
more lenient with counsel on the questions they want to ask. But I
still hold it down; I don't let them go like they do in Los Angeles. I
have sat in Los Angeles, and I don't think Sirhan would have taken
as much time in a federal court even in Los Angeles.
ERICKSON: Mr. Maxwell, do you have any quarrel with the new
STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE relating to TRIAL BY JURY,8 0 partic-
ularly the voir dire examination concepts as they are set forth in
30 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY (Approved Draft, 1968).
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Sections 2.41 and 2.5" on challenges for cause and the method under
which the voir dire is carried out? It is really just an overgrowth of
Rule 24a of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
MAXWELL: I think basically that the Federal Rules are satisfac-
tory. Along the lines of the article, however, I would suggest certain
refinements and explanations. In particular, the principle points of the
case should be explained to the jury so that they will have a much
better picture of what they are going to be listening to. With certain
modifications, as outlined in the article, I would not seriously argue
with the Federal Rules.
Your question, Mr. Erickson, seems to also have reference to
what Mr. Friesen said a moment ago about the procedure in the State
of New York where the voir dire is held outside of the hearing of the
judge. I understand that this form of voir dire becomes extremely
extended, even in automobile accident cases, because counsel ask prac-
tically everything under the sun that has any remote relation to their
case. Consequently, I don't think this method will solve this problem
in federal courts. In metropolitan areas like New York City, there is
a serious problem not only with voir dire but with other dilatory pro-
cedures. These procedures make a show out of a trial, and I think
that's the gravamen of the article.
ERICKSON: Judge Craig, how do you read Williams v. Florida ?"B
What size jury should we use? To save time, should we cut the jury
down from 12 to six; should we say, for example, that in Dyer Act
cases we will have six jurors and that in misdemeanor cases we will have
a jury of three; but in cases involving capital punishment we will have a
jury of 12? Just where do we draw the line?
CRAIG: I don't think you have to lessen the size of the jury. We
have been been working under the 12-man system for a few centuries
slId. § 2.4 Voir Dire Examination:
A voir dire examination should be conducted for the purpose of discovering
basis for challenge for cause and for the purpose of gaining knowledge to enable
an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. The judge should initiate the
voir dire examination by identifying the parties and their respective counsel
and by briefly outlining the nature of the case. The judge should then put to
the prospective jurors any questions which he thinks necessary, touching their
qualifications to serve as jurors in the cause on trial. The judge should also
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the defendant or
his attorney and the prosecuting attorney as he deems proper.
3 Id. § 2.5 Challenges for Cause:
If the judge after examination of any juror is of the opinion that grounds for
challenge for cause are present, the judge should excuse that juror from the
trial of the case. If the judge does not excuse the juror, any party may challenge
the juror for cause. A challenge to an individual juror should be made before
he is sworn to try the case, but the judge may permit it to be made after he is
sworn but before jeopardy has attached.
33 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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now, and I think it has worked out pretty well. When I was engaged
in private practice, I must confess that I had some question in my
mind about the value of the jury system. The old adage was that if
you were guilty you would want to be tried by a jury, but if you were
innocent you would want to be tried by a judge. My faith, having sat
on the bench of 6 years now, has been thoroughly renewed in the
jury system. In those 6 years, in only two instances did the jury, in
my opinion, make a mistake; and on both occasions I took the decision
away from them and corrected it. Maybe I was wrong, I don't know;
but we'll never know because I found for the defendant in both in-
stances. I think the system under the Constitution and the practice that
we have had is a very good one. I see nothing wrong with a 12-man
jury, and I would not differentiate between one charge and another.
Any felony charged is a felony, and a fellow's liberty, and sometimes
his life, is at stake.
ERICKSON: I concur with you, Judge. A 12-man jury system is a
thing of historical signficance; but in addition, it has proven its worth
with the passage of time. I don't think the Williams case is going to
dictate that every legislature change the number of jurors to be used
in any particular case. I know the people that are striving to speed up
justice and think that reducing the number of jurors would reduce the
cost and the time spent in administering justice; but I think it is a
false premise. Basically, I think the Federal Rules that stand today,
when implemented by the STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, leave our
judicial system in a satisfactory state and one that can be developed
by new techniques that are employed by the judges under the discre-
tionary powers that they now have.
CRAIG: I thoroughly agree with that. I would, however, add a
footnote: Today the profession and the public generally are very much
concerned with the selection process of judges. There has been a lot
of comment about removal - that's all right - but I think the emphasis
should be on the selection. Then when you get - I say this with some
temerity - a well-qualified judge, I would hesitate to limit his dis-
cretionary prerogative. He's trying to do the job that was assigned to
him, and with the aid of the jury, he's trying to seek the truth within
the limits of the law. If you cut his discretionary authority to any
great extent, his hands are going to be pretty well tied so that when
he sees a situation developing, he can't control it. This would be, in
my opinion, an error in the administration of justice.
I have great faith in our system. Abuses have crept in, particularly
in metropolitan areas, and to some extent they are the result of the
lack of effort used in the selection of the man on the trial bench. These
are not difficult problems to correct. Ernie [Friesen] had experience
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with it, and I think he'll corroborate this approach. If you find a
reasonably alert, intelligent judge on the bench, he can expedite a
trial through the facilities that are presently available to him: the
preliminary pretrial conference; the pretrial conference; and the con-
ference with counsel on voir dire before the trial, and I would hesitate
to make a voir dire, as I said earlier, the subject of a formal pretrial
conference except in extraordinary cases. In the extraordinary case there
certainly is a place for it, but I would hate to put in a blanket rule
that says in all criminal cases involving a penalty of "x," there must
be a pretrial conference on voir dire examination. If this were done
the judge might say, "Well, I don't know about that," and then you
get an opportunity to have error creep in as a result of the pretrial
conference. We're trying to get to a point where we have less error,
not more error. When you get good, viable rules you can proceed on
that process. When you get a body of rules that is difficult for anyone
to interpret, then you're going to have error.
JOURNAL: Mr. Maxwell, would you make one final statement?
MAXWELL: I generally agree with what has just been said; the
only difference is really a matter of degree or emphasis. The sugges-
tions in the article are not to tie the judge's hands to any great extent,
but to give him the instruments by which he can proceed and properly
handle the trial using a pretrial procedure, instructing the jury in
advance, and so on. There are certain things that should be promul-
gated but none of them should to any great extent limit the discretion
of the trial judge. The only disagreement any of us seem to have is
on the question of the degree to which such rules should be promulgated
and how they should be handled. All I'm saying is that trial judges
should be given tools - more powerful tools at this time - to meet
the rising problems that are occurring, particularly in metropolitan
areas.
JOURNAL: It is rather clear that there are problems with the
practice of voir dire even with the promulgation of the Federal Rules
and the ABA STANDARDS. There are differences of opinion as to the
best way to solve these problems, but, as Mr. Maxwell pointed out,
the differences are more a matter of degree or emphasis than of sub-
stance. The choice between relying totally on rules or totally on the
education process would certainly be a difficult one to make, and
either one would not suffer from lack of criticism. The combination
of guidelines and gradual education would seem to be a likely com-
promise. It must be remembered that Mr. Maxwell's article was based
on a hypothetical Supreme Court decision nearly 10 years in the future.
It is conceivable that if nothing in the way of progress is made in this
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area over the next 10 years, a central "fountainhead" such as the
Supreme Court will decide a case similar to Mr. Maxwell's hypothetical
-a result that seems unanimously undesirable.
Mr. Freisen made a very interesting point when he discounted
the notion that clearing up of the "voir dire problem" would result in
an unclogging of our courts. While Mr. Maxwell was not basing his
entire argument on this notion, it appears that there is some disagree-
ment over the "clogging factor" of voir dire. If so, it would be well
to find out just how important a factor voir dire really is before it is
labeled as one of the chief culprits in our court congestion problem.
As a final thought, it might be worth mentioning the fact that
the participants as a group did at least recognize that there is a problem
with voir dire. Mr. Freisen did point out that this is not a feeling
shared by all lawyers and judges since some do feel that voir dire
should not be limited to securing an impartial jury but should also
serve the adversary function of allowing an attorney to establish a
rapport with the jurors. That view was not represented in this dis-
cussion, but it certainly cannot be discounted in speaking about the
voir dire problem.
This discussion, although not reaching any definitive conclusions,
has raised a number of issues and has presented a number of perspec-
tives and approaches. It is the Journal's hope that this kind of conver-
sation presented in this fashion will be of some benefit to lawmen,
who must contend with voir dire, and to laymen, who must face the
practice when called as jurors, and that the approaches outlined by
the principals will be the focus for further comment as the legal
profession seeks to improve the voir dire process.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO AN
EXPERIMENT IN LEARNING
0 NE of the maxims which is indelibly impressed upon the mind
of the American lawyer early during his professional career is
that "lawsuits are won on the facts, not on the law." As a consequence,
one of the first lessons which the fledgling lawyer must learn is to
get the facts. To the extent that this maxim is true or pervasive within
the legal profession today, it raises a curious dilemma and a seeming
contradiction for the enterprise of legal education.
Contrary to the maxim, the structure of legal education in law
schools tends to stress "getting the law" with seemingly little attention
being given to "getting the facts." Traditional legal methods courses,
which, insofar as course titles are concerned, constitute the attention
given in law schools to the methodology of law, more often focus upon
the mazes for finding the law within the four walls of a law library.
The idea of "the common law" with its emphasis upon the historical
development of law norms has influenced the design of the mechanics
by which this development can be traced. Thus, the law student in his
initial exposure to the task of lawyering must master the intricacies of
citators, digests, reporter systems, indices and the like - devices by
which the growth of the law can be charted step-by-step.
Yet, once the law library is no longer an obstacle to be overcome
and the budding lawyer moves comfortably into and through its several
resources, his systematic exposure and indoctrination into the meth-
odology of the law ceases. To be sure, he must master the techniques
of briefing a case; but this skill is learned or dismissed by the law
student within the first year of the law school experience, that period
of time within which legal methods courses are usually taught. Ac-
cordingly, the law student is too often left to his own devices to learn
the methods of getting the facts and of understanding and evaluating
those facts in relation to the law.
These introductory observations set the context for the following
three student notes. They are experiments in learning to "get the facts"
relative to a particular legal problem in order to gain understanding
of that problem and the processes related to it. Substantively the studies
deal with: (1) the functioning of the Colorado Judicial Qualifications
Commission pursuant to the constitutional amendment and rules of
INTRODUCTION
procedure which became effective in 1967; (2) the viability of the
legal system as a means for change by Negroes in Denver; and (3) an
analysis and comparison of the Colorado Commission on Civil Rights
and the Federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. No
comment need be made concerning the relevance of these matters for
the contemporary legal scene, these being matters to which considerable
attention is now being given from several quarters. But several facts
which have bearing upon these studies as experiments in learning
warrant particular mention so that the studies can be read in proper
perspective.
First, these studies were completed by students in their first year
of law study. In fact, at the time that these studies were undertaken,
their authors had completed an introductory course dealing with the
decision processes of the legal system and a course in the skills required
to use the law library. They had completed the first part of two-part
courses in contracts and torts and were beginning a course in basic
property law. According to the usual standards of legal education, these
students could be classified as neophytes with little grasp or equip-
ment needed to tackle the more difficult intricacies of the law - a
premise which may be questionable in view of their performances.
Second, these students were working under a very limited and
tight time schedule. During the first week of January, they received
assignments to conduct "an empirical study" of their own choosing as
one of the requirements for a course on the legal profession in which
they were enrolled. The completed reports of their research were due
in final manuscript form six weeks later! This factor affected to
varying extents the selection of social problems to be translated into
legal problems for study, the definition of the problem once selected,
the nonlibrary resources (including the expertise of the students them-
selves) which could be utilized, and the organization of the research
task once all preliminary questions had been resolved. The students
were required to match their resources with the bounds of time imposed
by the divisions of the legal academic year and to define the scope of
their studies accordingly. It may be, therefore, that some of the authors
would have preferred a more comprehensive treatment of their sub-
jects had they more freedom so to do.
Third, it should be noted that these studies were group efforts.
In addition to the strictures upon time (or perhaps as a result of
those time demands), these students were involved in the process of
melding an ad hoc assemblage of individuals, who up until that time
were relatively unknown to each other, into a working team. The
metamorphosis of a crowd to a group in itself presents interesting
problems. Yet, this change is essential to the educational process called
"professional socialization." One dimension of a "profession" is the
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sense of the group which the individual derives by being a member
of and identifying with his professional peers in a common occupational
calling. Further, although the image of the lawyer as the sole prac-
titioner who is the jack-of-all-legal-trades is still very pervasive within
the legal profession, the firm mode of law practice is becoming more
and more common as lawyers form "groups" for their professional
endeavors. However, the opportunities for group action in law schools
are limited, the editorial staff of the law journal being the prime, and
in many cases the sole, example for such group interaction. These
studies became one such opportunity to experiment in a group en-
deavor. The finished products of these efforts do not reveal on their
surfaces the tensions which oftentimes must be resolved to move people
to decisions and to produce a single work product. By these studies,
these students accomplished that goal.
There are other implications and ideas which can be derived from
the fact of these studies. Suffice it to suggest that thereby some of
our time honored assumptions about legal education stand in need of





A STUDY OF THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
N recent years, as the demand for more efficient administration of
justice has reached unprecedented proportions,1 the traditional meth-
ods of judicial selection and awards of tenure have fallen into sharp
disrepute. Initial reaction to this situation was expressed in the adoption
by several states of improved methods of selection designed to overcome
the defects of the traditional elective systems.2 However, it soon became
apparent that while new methods proved effective in elevating well-
qualified individuals to the bench, they were no guarantee that those
selected would remain competent throughout their tenure. Thus, atten-
tion was turned toward the development of methods by which judicial
officers who were found incompetent or guilty of misconduct could be
disciplined and/or removed from office without resort to the cumber-
some procedures of a bygone era.$
In 1959, a national conference on court administration was held
in Chicago for the purpose of discussing various proposals for the
reform of the judiciary. Out of that conference came the following
recommendations:
Disability should be determined by a standing commission on
which the judiciary is represented .... There is a need for a less
cumbersome method to bring about the discipline or removal of a
judge . . . whose conduct has subjected or is likely to subject the
court to public censure or reproach or is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice.
The ultimate responsibility for disciplinary action or removal
should rest in the highest court of the state [and] [pjrovisions should
be made for the initiation and investigation of complaints before
I Braithwaite, Removal and Retirement of Judges in Missouri: A Field Study, 68 WASH.
U.L.Q. 378 (1968); Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem,
49 A.B.A.J. 166 (1963); Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and
Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 149 (1966).
2 See generally Garwood, Judicial Selection and Tenure -the Model Article Provisions,
47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 21 (1963).
3 Colorado serves as a good example for illustrating some of the outmoded methods of
disciplining judges. The first of these methods - and one which is still available - is
recall of a judge as provided for in COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 1. This process involves
large amounts of time, extensive publicity, and numerous people; it can also overshadow
any real issue of competency. The second of these procedures (replaced by the commission
plan) was the old COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 31 provision which dealt with retirement
of judges. When questions of age and physical or mental infirmity or disability arose,
an investigation could be initiated only by a motion from the Colorado attorney general
to the Colorado Supreme Court. Thereafter, the court would appoint a referee to conduct
the investigation and submit his report thereon to the court. The court then decided
if mandatory retirement of the judge was fitting. It seems clear that both of these
procedures were difficult to work with effectively. Therefore, the need for more com-
petent and streamlined procedures was definitely felt in Colorado.
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presentment of formal charges, and precautions should be taken for
the protection of all persons involved.
4
In 1960, California adopted the essential features of this recommenda-
tion by constitutional amendment and became the first state to make use
of the "commission plan" for the retirement, removal, and discipline of
judges.'
The administrative and procedural advantages of the commission
plan over traditional methods of judicial discipline and removal and the
success of the California experiment prompted other states to follow
suit.6 In Colorado, the plan was adopted by constitutional amendment
in the fall of 1966 and became effective in April 1967.1 The purpose of
this article is to present the results of an in-depth study of the perform-
ance of the Colorado commission from its inception to the present.
More specifically, this article will set forth the statistical information
gathered from the study, describe the working procedures of the com-
mission, and evaluate its operational effectiveness.
I. METHODOLOGY
Anyone undertaking a study of the Colorado Judicial Qualifications
Commission will immediately find himself faced with what appears to
be an almost insurmountable obstacle: the constitutional requirement
that "[a]ll papers filed with and proceedings before the commission on
judicial qualifications . . . shall be confidential, and the filing of papers
with and the giving of testimony before the commission . . .shall be
privileged .... ,,8 In effect, this means that a researcher is constitution-
ally denied access to a rich source of information- the files of the
commission. As a result, the primary sources of information were inter-
views with the commission membership, the executive secretary of the
commission, and the president of the Colorado Bar Association.'
The interviews began with very general questions designed pri-
marily to put the respondent at ease and to give him some assurance
that the researchers' intent was purely academic. For example, the
respondent was usually asked to present his views concerning the
rationale of the commission plan and the factors accounting for its
445 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 12 (1959).
5 CALIF. CONST. art. 6, § 6.
6 For a state-by-state comparison of modem discipline and removal plans adopted in recent
years, see the report prepared for the National Conference of Judicial Retirement and
Disability Commission held at the University of Denver College of Law in August, 1969.
7 CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 23. For a complete text of the rules of procedure of the
Commission on Judicial Qualifications, adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court on
May 18, 1967, see the APPENDIX infra.
8 COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3) (d). See also Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Judicial Qualifications, Rule 4.
9 Inasmuch as the Bar Association was the primary instrumentality in securing the adoption




success. Thereafter, he was asked to evaluate the work of the Colorado
commission, always being assured that the study was not interested in,
nor concerned with, specific names. While this approach may seem a bit
too cautious, it was found that following this short exchange, the
respondent was usually more willing to entertain probing questions
concerning the commission's work."0
Once the necessary rapport had been established, it was easier to
probe for the substance of the commission's work; and inasmuch as the
bulk of the commission's work is accomplished without resort to formal
procedures," the primary concern was with the informal structures and
processes, which constitute the functional nucleus of the Colorado com-
mission plan. To facilitate the research in this area, questions were
directed to the various steps taken by the commission in its consideration
of an individual complaint. Hence, it was first necessary to consider
the procedure by which complaints are brought to the attention of the
commission; and the questions employed were designed to elicit infor-
mation on the number, source, and nature of the complaints as well
as the processes by which they are received and screened.
Once a complaint is received, the next step is to institute a pre-
liminary investigation to determine whether or not the complaint has
merit.1 Thus, the next line of questioning dealt with the mechanics
of this investigation as well as its effect on the subsequent disposition
of complaints.
If it is determined that a complaint has merit, the judge is notified
and an informal hearing is scheduled.'3 It is at this stage that the
commission has demonstrated its worth; and, for this reason, a major
part of the interview was devoted to this subject. Of particular interest
was the process by which a judge is informally disciplined and either
agrees to correct his conduct or is forced to retire. It was also thought
important to ascertain the extent of input into the informal hearing by
the respective groups that make up the commission: judges, lawyers, and
laymen; therefore, the researchers attempted to get an idea of the inter-
action among the members, including any manifest disagreement or
dissension.
All but one of the complaints brought before the commission have
been disposed of by informal hearings or in some manner other than
a formal hearing. Consequently, this stage of the commission's pro-
cedures was of somewhat less interest. However, inasmuch as the formal
10 In one instance, however, the respondent, a county judge, was so reluctant to talk about
the commission that only general answers were elicited from him in response to the
questions asked.
n1 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rules 6-20.
12Id. Rule 5.
1
3 Id. Rule 5(b).
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hearing does represent the ultimate weapon of the commission, some
attention was given to the procedures involved in its employment.
In addition to the structured approach outlined above, impromptu
questioning was also employed. This was often necessitated by the
introduction of unanticipated information into the interview by the
respondent. Needless to say, this type of questioning yielded extremely
useful data.
By employing the methods herein described, the constitutional
obstacle, which in the beginning appeared so threatening to the viability
of the study, was effectively bypassed. As a result, sufficient data was
obtained to permit a description in fairly precise terms of the functional
elements of the Colorado commission.
II. STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF THE COMMISSION: STATISTICAL
INFORMATION
The official title of the Colorado commission- the Commission
on Judicial Qualifications - is a misnomer, since the commission deals
not with qualifying judges to sit on the bench but with disciplining and
removing them. Five of the commission's nine members are judges
chosen by the supreme court: three from the district courts and two
from the county courts. 4 Of the four remaining members, two are
attorneys chosen by majority action of a committee consisting of the
Governor, the attorney general, and the chief justice of the Colorado
Supreme Court; 5 and two are laymen chosen by the Governor."6 All
members of the commission serve four-year terms.' 7 Once constituted,
the commission itself selects an executive secretary who handles the
administrative work of the commission.' 8 In addition, investigators are
hired to do the commission's "leg work."
On a purely conceptual level, the primary purpose of the commis-
sion is to recommend to the supreme court the removal or formal censure
of any judge found by the commission to be guilty of willful misconduct
in office, of willful or persistent failure to perform his duties, or of
intemperance. 19 Likewise, the commission is to recommend the retire-
ment of any judge having any disability which seriously interferes with
the performance of his duties."0 To effect this purpose, the commission
14 




18 Because of a low working budget, the commission has appointed as its acting executive
secretary the Colorado court administrator. Yet, the dual role played by the executive
secretary has had a significant impact on the development of commission procedures.
See § IV infra.




is empowered to investigate complaints,21 subpoena witnesses, 22 and
take evidence;2 8 and the commission's jurisdiction extends to all courts
in the state with the single exception of the county court of the City
and County of Denver.24
It should be emphasized that the formal powers outlined above are
almost never used. Instead, the real success of the commission has been
its ability to induce problem judges to resign or retire prior to formal
proceedings. It is for this reason that the primary concern in this study
is directed toward informal procedures which account for this result.
However, before turning to a consideration of those procedures, it will
be useful to review statistically the work of the commission during its
first 3 years of operation.25
As of January 1970, the commission had received 39 complaints
against the state's judges." Of these, 12 were disposed of as frivolous
on their face or as not within the jurisdiction of the commission. In
each of the 27 remaining cases, files were prepared and at least cursory
investigations made.
The vast majority of the complaints were from unhappy litigants
and represented what one respondent referred to as "cheap appeals."
However, at least two complaints have come from the bar association,
27
the highway patrol, the United States Attorney, and the executive
secretary; one has come from a juror; and a few have been initiated on
the commission's own motion.
The majority of complaints were concerned with the treatment of
litigants and lawyers and can be placed in the "cheap appeal" category.
Other complaints include three for excessive use of alcohol, two for
physical or mental disability, one for conflict of interest with a party to
a proceeding before the judge, and several for the mishandling of pro-
bate cases. Two additional complaints which involved felonious activities
21 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rule 5.
2ld. Rule 11.
2id. Rule 10.
NCOLO. CONST. art. VI, § 26. Discipline of Denver County Court judges is under the
jurisdiction of the Denver County Judicial Commission.
25 All of the statistical information herein referred to was acquired from the executive
secretary of the commission.
2 This figure represents the number of judges against whom complaints were received and
is somewhat lower than the actual number of complaints, since several complaints against
a particular judge are treated by the commission as one complaint. There are well over
100 judges in Colorado subject to the jurisdiction of the commission. This figure includes
seven supreme court justices; seven appeals court justices; 22 district court presiding
judges; 54 district court judges; one superior court judge; one probate judge and
two juvenile court judges for the second judicial district; and all county court judges,
except Denver County.
27 In talking with the president of the Colorado Bar Association, it was learned that
complainants often contact the Association for information on how to proceed with their
complaints. Of particular interest here is the fact that the president often advises the
complainant as to whether or not he has a valid complaint. Thus, to some extent the
Bar Association is an informal screening mechanism for the complaints against judges.
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and which were thus outside of the commission's jurisdiction2" were
filed pending the outcome of the criminal procedures against the judges
involved.
The vast majority of complaints were found to be unwarranted or
frivolous in the course of the preliminary investigation. However, in
several cases the charges were found to be substantial enough to warrant
the notification of the judge and the initiation of a formal investigation.
Of these, two cases were disposed of after the receipt of a satisfactory
explanation by the judge involved. In several of the more serious cases,
however, the judges were asked to appear before the commission for
an informal hearing;29 and in all but one instance this appearance
proved to be the final step in the proceedings. The single exception
went on to the formal hearing stage but was disposed of before recom-
mendations to the supreme court became necessary.
The final disposition of the rather serious complaints received by
the commission demonstrates the commission's value: Under commission
pressure three judges have retired and two have resigned."0 Of these
five, two were found physically incapable of carrying on with their
duties, and three were found guilty of some form of misconduct. In
two additional cases in which the behavior in question did not warrant
removal, the judges were subjected to an informal censure by the com-
mission.81
These figures represent the work of the commission as far as it
can be reflected in statistical data. Of course, the more important ques-
tion for the purposes of this study concerns the procedures which
produce the data.
III. PROCEDURAL ELEMENTS
In order to determine the extent to which the commission makes
use of the formal procedures and powers made available to it and the
extent to which it resorts to informal procedures of its own development,
it is necessary to pinpoint the precise procedural elements which the
commission uses in considering and disposing of a particular complaint.
Concurrently, it is important to consider the roles played in this process
by the various members of the commission and its staff.
A. Setting the Machinery into Motion
In order for a complaint to receive commission consideration it must
be in writing, and sufficient details must be included to permit a prima
28 COLO. CONST. art. VI § 23(2).
29 The informal hearing is a procedural step invented by the commission and is not specifi-
cally provided for either by the amendment or the rules of procedure.
30 In addition, two judges - who no doubt would have retired - died before they had a
chance to do so.
31 The informal censure is another procedural invention not provided for in the amendment.
It will be more fully discussed at a later point in the paper.
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facie evaluation of the allegations. Complaints that are received by
telephone never receive commission consideration, and in such cases the
complainant is advised to put the complaint in writing. 2 Further,
when an anonymous complaint is received, the commission may or may
not act upon it, depending upon the seriousness of the charge and upon
whether or not the complaint appears valid on its face; at least one
anonymous complaint has been acted upon by the commission.
A related problem involves those instances in which the com-
plainant wishes to remain anonymous. Attorneys, for instance, are often
reluctant to complain for fear of retribution from the judge against
whom the charge is made. Hence, the commission has honored requests
for anonymity by initiating the action on its own motion, recognizing
that to do otherwise might stifle valid complaints. Of course, this
protection can only extend up to the time of the formal hearing; for
at that point, the complainant must be identified in order to provide
the accused with the opportunity for rebuttal and cross-examination.
However, since a formal hearing is almost never held, this problem is
minimal.
In any event, not all complaints are of sufficient substance to
warrant commission consideration, and there appears to be a two-step
screening process designed to eliminate obviously frivolous or un-
32 REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF
A member of the judiciary of the State of Colorado
TO THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
1, , complain about the above-
named (justice) (judge) of the court in
a Colorado, and that, as set forth in the statement below: he has
committed acts of willful misconduct in office; or he has wilfully and persistently failed
to perform his duties; or he is, or has been, habitually intemperate; or his conduct is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, so as to bring the judicial office into dis-
repute; or he has a disability that seriously interferes with the performance of his duties
and such disability is or is likely to become permanent.
STATEMENT
I therefore request that such misconduct be investigated and that appropriate action





being duly sworn on oath deposes and
says that he has read the foregoing request for investigation, knows the contents thereof,
and that the same is true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
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founded complaints. First, the chairman of the commission, in con-
sultation with the executive secretary, reviews the complaint and
decides whether or not it should be docketed. The second step is the
presentation of all complaints - including those deemed to be frivolous
-to the entire commission for their determination as to disposition.3
This second step, however, is a mere formality, since the opinion of
the chairman is almost never challenged.
An interesting sidelight in this initiating process is the role of the
executive secretary who, in addition to being the executive secretary
of the commission, is also the Colorado court administrator. As such
he is kept apprised of the conditions in the state's courts and is in a
position to evaluate the competency of the judges. The indication that
he takes advantage of his dual role is evidenced by the fact that the
two judges who were forced to retire for ill health were brought to the
attenion of the commission by the executive secretary. Even more
important than his observation of the state courts is the contribution
he makes to the screening process of the commission; for there can
be little doubt that the chairman, in making his initial evaluation of
complaints, relies heavily on the executive secretary for information.
It should be noted that this contribution does not end with the evalua-
tion of complaints but is relevant throughout the proceedings.
B. The Investigation
Once a complaint is determined to be of sufficient substance on
its face to warrant some form of commission action, the investigative
procedures are set into motion. The first step is a preliminary investi-
gation which is usually conducted by a member of the commission and
which often involves no more than a phone call.34 The judge himself
is not notified, and, in order to protect his reputation, the persons
contacted are cautioned that the investigation is confidential. A signifi-
cant number of complaints are disposed of at this stage, particularly
those lodged by unhappy litigants.
If the results of the preliminary investigation do not negate the
assertions made in the complaint, a formal investigation is launched. 35
The first step in this process is notification of the offending judge."6
Notification may take the form of a mild, informal letter which recites
33 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rule 5(a). It should
be noted that this was not always the case. During the early months of the commission's
existence, obviously frivolous complaints were disposed of by the chairman and the
executive secretary without the consideration of the commission as a whole.
34 This stage of the investigation should not be confused with the "preliminary investiga-
tion" referred to in Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial
Qualifications. In practice the latter is better termed the formal investigation.
35 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rules 6(a)-(b).
36 d. Rule 6(c).
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the charges against the judge and invites an explanation.," However,
in some cases a formal, registered letter is used,88 the force of which
is calculated either to bring about the required change in the judge's
behavior or prompt him to begin thinking about resignation or retire-
ment.
After notifying the judges, the commission appoints an investigator
to ferret out the pertinent facts. In most states the executive secretary
heads up the investigation, but in Colorado special efforts are made
to keep the secretary out of the formal investigative procedures in order
to enable him to maintain the integrity of each of his two positions.3 9
In less serious cases, a member of the commission may be called upon to
conduct the investigation, especially if the member is from the same
area of the state as the judge against whom the complaint is filed. In
more serious cases, an investigator may be hired by the commission.
Often the formal investigation reveals the invalidity of the allega-
tions made in the complaint, and the matter is closed. However, when
the results of the investigation tend to confirm the charges, the com-
mission may choose one of two alternate courses of action depending on
the nature of the offense. First, if the offense is not particularly serious
- for example, a case involving mistreatment of counsel - a personal
contact may be in order. In such a situation the judge is asked by a
member of the commission, often one with whom he is acquainted, to
37 Id. Rule 5(b). Also presented here is a sample of such a letter:
STATE OF COLORADO
BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS NO.
INQUIRY CONCERNING NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
NOTICE is hereby given to you, , that the Commission
on Judicial Qualifications of the State of Colorado has decided to conduct a preliminary
investigation of your conduct as County Judge pursuant to Rule 5 of the Commission's
Rules of Procedure.
This investigation is on the Commission's own motion and is based upon unverified
information submitted to the Commission indicating willful misconduct in that:
The Commission has appointed to investigate the afore-
mentioned matters and report back to the Commission.
You are further notified that under the rules of the Commission you may present
such matters as you may choose to the Commission for its consideration. The next
meeting of the Commission will be on in Denver, at which time you
are welcome to appear and to be represented by counsel should you choose to be so
represented. If you elect to appear, please contact the undersigned Chairman for the
time and place.
Your attention is called to the fact that this is not a formal proceedings for
discipline or removal, but only a preliminary investigation to enable the Commission to
determine whether formal proceedings are warranted.
Dated this 1971.
Chairman
Commission on Judicial Qualifications
of the State of Colorado
323 State Capitol Building
38ld. Rule 5(b).
" Interestingly, however, the investigator who has done the bulk of the work for the
commission is a former court administrator.
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mend his ways. He is then kept under observation for a time in order
to assure compliance. If he fails to bring his behavior into line with
commission wishes, further action may be taken. The members of the
commission all seem satisfied that this is an effective means of bringing
about conformity in cases involving minor complaints. The second
alternative is utilized in the case of a more serious offense and involves
asking the judge to appear at an informal hearing which may be
scheduled for the same day as the commission's regular quarterly meet-
ing or, in the case of a more urgent matter, on any day of the commis-
sion's choosing.
C. The Informal Hearing
Technically, the informal hearing is part of the investigative pro-
cedures, but because of the importance it has assumed, it warrants
separate treatment. While no specific provision is made for an informal
hearing in the commission's rules of procedure, the commission's power
to employ it can certainly be implied from the provision of the rules that
the judge "shall be afforded reasonable opportunity in the course of
the preliminary investigation to present such matters as he may
choose .. "40
At the informal hearing the judge is confronted with the evidence
against him and is asked to present any facts tending to negate the
charges.4 ' The judge accused of physical or mental incompetence may
also be asked to submit the results of a medical examination. While
the commission does not have the power to compel a judge to submit
to such an examination, it can consider a refusal to do so as a factor
tending to prove the truth of the allegations.
42
While the ostensible purpose of the hearing is to weigh the evidence
and make a preliminary evaluation as to the guilt or innocence of the
judge, it appears that the real purpose is to overwhelm the judge with
the incriminating evidence collected during the course of the investiga-
tion and thereby induce him to resign or retire. By the very nature of
the screening and investigative procedures, if a hearing is held there is
little doubt that the commission believes the allegations against the
judge to be true. Furthermore, all of the respondents indicated that
they would do all they could to see the matter disposed of short of
formal proceedings. This attitude is clearly attributable to a desire to
protect the judge and the judiciary as a whole from the prying eye of
the public.
In matters which are not serious enough to warrant a judge step-
ping down from the bench, the commission may, on its own motion,
40 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications, Rule 5(b).
41 Id.
42 1d. Rule 9(b).
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censure the offender. While the power to informally censure a judge
is not provided for in either the amendment or the rules of procedure,.
it is a power assumed by the commission to fill a specific need. Just as
the commission, by applying informal pressure, has relieved the supreme
court of the burden of removing offending judges, so too has it devel-
oped a means of disciplining problem judges in a way comparable to
formal censure.
The informal censure has been used twice by the commission
once with success and once without. The case in which the procedure
has proved to be unsuccessful has been a particularly troublesome one
for the commission. It is a case which involves a judge whose obnoxious
behavior in the courtroom has prompted a great many complaints and
has resulted in several informal hearings. The difficulty appears to be
that despite commission pressure, the judge in question is unable to
alter his personality. This situation raises a question which has troubled
the commission since its inception: To what extent is the commission
to discipline judges who are guilty only of possessing a cranky disposi-
tion and a tendency to badger counsel and litigants? This problem of
"judicial temperament," as one commission member called it, appears
to be the only issue of discipline upon which the commission members
persistently disagree, and because of inconsistencies in some of the
interviewee's remarks, it was not possible to determine whether or not
the judges on the commission were more apt to excuse such behavior than
the other members. However, it appears that the disagreement does not
necessarily parallel the laymen, lawyer, judge division of commission
membership.
43
Despite the disagreement over the problem of judicial tempera-
ment, the commission membership is usually able to present a united
front at the informal hearing, and the results have been more than
satisfactory. However, whether or not the informal hearing results in a
retirement or censure depends entirely upon the judge's willingness to
force his right to a formal hearing. As has been noted, only one formal
hearing has been held, but this fact does not mean that other judges
will not pursue this course in the future. Nevertheless, it seems safe
to say that for the present the key element in the commission's proce-
dural arsenal is the informal hearing.
IV. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
If the performance of the Colorado commission during its first
3 years of operation is any indication of what can be expected in
the future, it seems safe to conclude that the commission plan is a viable
43 One of the laymen disagrees with this conclusion, charging that the judges often attempt
to whitewash the offensive behavior. Not surprisingly, this particular member considers
the role of layman on the commission to be that of a "watchdog" charged with keeping
the commission from becoming a vehicle for the unwarranted protection of the judiciary.
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solution to the problem of judicial discipline in Colorado. This is not
to say, however, that there is no room for improvement.
As has been noted, one of the major problems facing the com-
mission is that of determining the standards by which judicial behavior
can be evaluated. In the past, the other commission members have
looked to the judges for guidance in this regard. However, opinions
differ even among judges as to what constitutes judicial misconduct.
Furthermore, there appears to be a growing reluctance on the part of
some members to defer to the judges on the commission. For example,
in a recent meeting of the commission one of the laymen defied the
consensus and demanded that the commission look into a matter involv-
ing somewhat questionable behavior. It is clear that such dissension
over standards can only hamper the effectiveness of the commission's
work; therefore the commission, as a matter of top priority, should
establish for itself clear-cut guidelines as to what constitutes actionable
misconduct.
Another area in which improvement is needed involves the com-
mission's policy on publicity. Unlike its counterparts in other states, the
Colorado commission has not published yearly reports summarizing
its performance. As a result, very few people are aware of the commis-
sion's existence, and those who are aware of its existence are not sure
of its function. It is obvious that the commission's effectiveness will be
adversely affected if persons with valid complaints either fail to com-
plain or complain to the wrong officials who, out of ignorance of the
commission's existence, do not pass the complaint along. What is
needed then is an extensive publicity campaign designed to make the
commission's existence and effectiveness known to the lay public, the
practicing bar, and the public officials likely to receive complaints. Not
only would such a campaign tend to increase the number of valid
complaints, it would also enhance the commission's role as a forum
for the airing of frivolous complaints and thereby further protect the
judge from unwarranted publicity. Finally, public awareness of an
effective disciplinary mechanism would probably serve to increase public
confidence in the judiciary as a whole.
Another practice which could prove to be troublesome in the future
concerns the two hats worn by the present executive secretary. While
the fact that the secretary is also the court administrator has been a help
to the commission, commission members have come to depend on him
for information and have put considerable stock in his evaluation of
the validity of complaints. This could prove to be dangerously misplaced
reliance; for as the business of the courts increases, the two positions
will have to be severed, and the commission will be deprived of what
has come to be a significant functional input. It will then be forced to
fill the void with hastily contrived ad hoc measures which will impede
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its effectiveness. Furthermore, there is always the present danger that
the secretary will come to be looked upon as a bird dog for the commis-
sion, a contingency which could seriously undermine his effectiveness
as court administrator. In order to avoid these possibilities, it is sug-
gested that the two positions be severed and that a full-time executive
secretary be hired by the commission. If this severance is not feasible
for lack of funds, then someone whose full-time position is not in any
way related to the administration of the courts should fill the position.
A final criticism (and one which was suggested by a respondent
and seems to have some validity) is that the commission is not aggres-
sive enough in prosecuting complaints. From what has been delineated,
it is safe to conclude that the commission will seldom proceed with a
complaint unless the allegations contained therein are supported over-
whelmingly by the evidence. Consequently, those judges whose guilt
is subject only to a minimal degree of doubt are exonerated without any
attempt to actually weigh the evidence and come up with a true decision
on the merits. Of course, this hesitancy on the part of the commission
can be explained by reference to the facts that new ground is being
broken and that the members are reluctant to establish precedents which
may prove undesirable. For this reason, one cannot be too critical
of the commission for its past caution. However, failure of the commis-
sion to assume a more forceful stance in the future could be an
important factor in undermining its effectiveness.
Despite these few criticisms, it is beyond dispute that the Colorado
experience tends to support the widespread consensus regarding the
effectiveness of the commission plan.44 In its 3 short years, the
Colorado commission has established itself as a viable and credible
mechanism for effecting judicial discipline and removal and, in so
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THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT
MAY 18, 1967
L Definitions
In these rules, unless the context or subject matter otherwise
requires:
(a) "Commission" means the commission on judicial qualifications.
(b) "Judge" means a justice or judge of any court of record of this
state, except county judges of the city and county of Denver.
(c) "Chairman" includes the acting chairman.
(d) "Masters" means special masters appointed by the supreme
court upon request of the commission.
(e) "Presiding master" means the master so designated by the
supreme court or, in the absence of such designation, the judge first
named in the order appointing masters.
(f) "Examiner" means the counsel designated by the commission to
gather and present evidence before the masters or commission on the
charges against a judge.
(g) "Shall" is mandatory and "may" is permissive.
(h) "Mail" and "mailed" includes registered or certified mail.
(i) The masculine gender includes the feminine gender.
2. Interested Party
A judge who is a member of the commission or of the supreme court
may not participate as such in any proceedings involving his own
censure, removal, or retirement.
3. Confidentiality of Proceedings
All papers filed with and proceedings before the commission, or
before the masters appointed by the supreme court pursuant to rule 8,
shall be confidential.
4. Defamatory Material
The filing of papers with or the giving of testimony before the com-
mission, or before the masters appointed by the supreme court pur-
suant to rule 8, shall be privileged in any action for defamation. No
other publication of such papers or proceedings shall be so privileged,
except that the record filed by the commission in the supreme court
continues to be privileged.
5. Preliminary Investigation
(a) The commission, upon receiving a verified statement, not
obviously unfounded or frivolous, alleging facts indicating that a judge
is guilty of willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure
VOL. 47
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, or conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disre-
pute, or that he has a disability that seriously interferes with the
performance of his duties and is or is likely to become permanent,
shall make a preliminary investigation to determine whether formal
proceedings should be instituted and a hearing held. The commission,
without receiving a verified statement, may make such a preliminary
investigation on its own motion.
(b) The judge shall be notified of the investigation, the nature of
the charge, and the name of the person making the verified statement,
if any, or that the investigation is on the commission's own motion,
and shall be afforded reasonable opportunity in the course of the
preliminary investigation to present such matters as he may choose.
Such notice shall be given by prepaid registered or certified mail
addressed to the judge at his chambers and at his last known residence.
(c) If the preliminary investigation does not disclose sufficient
cause to warrant further proceedings, the judge shall be so notified.
6. Notice of Formal Proceedings
(a) After the preliminary investigation has been completed, if the
commission concludes that formal proceedings should be instituted,
the commission shall without delay issue a written notice to the judge
advising him of the institution of formal proceedings to inquire into
the charges against him. Such proceedings shall be entitled:
"BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. "
(b) The notice shall specify in ordinary and concise language the
charges against the judge and the alleged facts upon which such
charges are based, and shall advise the judge of his right to file a
written answer to the charges against him within fifteen days after
service of notice upon him.
(c) The notice shall be served by the personal service of a copy
thereof upon the judge, but if it appears to the chairman of the commis-
sion upon affidavit that, after reasonable effort for a period of ten days,
personal service could not be had, service may be made upon the judge
by mailing, by prepaid registered or certified mail, copies of the notice
addressed to the judge at his chambers and at his last known residence.
7. Answer
Within fifteen days after service of the notice of formal proceedings,
the judge may file with the commission a legible answer which shall
be verified.
8. Setting for Hearing before Commission or Masters
Upon the filing of an answer or upon expiration of the time for its
filing, the commission shall order a hearing to be held before it con-
cerning the censure, removal, or retirement of the judge, or the com-
mission may request the supreme court to appoint three special
masters, who shall be justices or judges of courts of record, to hear and
take evidence in such matter, and to report thereon to the commission.
The commission shall set a time and place for hearing before itself or
before the masters and shall give notice of such hearing by registered
or certified mail to the judge at least twenty days prior to the date set.
9. Hearing
(a) At the time and place set for hearing, the commission, or the
masters, when the hearing is before masters, shall proceed with the
hearing whether or not the judge has filed an answer or appears at
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the hearing. The examiner shall present the case in support of the
charges in the notice of formal proceedings.
(b) The failure of the judge to answer or to appear at the hearing
shall not, standing alone, be taken as evidence of the truth of the facts
alleged to constitute grounds for censure, removal, or retirement. The
failure of the judge to testify in his own behalf or to submit to a med-
ical examination requested by the commission or the masters may be
considered, unless it appears that such failure was due to circumstances
beyond his control.
(c) A verbatim record shall be kept of the proceedings of the hear-
ing.
(d) When the hearing is before the commission, not less than five
members shall be present when the evidence is produced.
10. Evidence
At a hearing before the commission or masters, legal evidence only
shall be received, and oral evidence shall be taken only on oath or
affirmation.
11. Procedural Rights of Judge
(a) In proceedings involving his censure, removal, or retirement, a
judge shall have the right and reasonable opportunity to defend against
the charges by the introduction of evidence, to be represented by coun-
sel, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. He shall also have the
right to the issuance of subpoenas for attendance of witnesses to testify
or produce books, papers, and other evidentiary matter.
(b) When a transcript of the testimony has been prepared at the
expense of the commission, a copy thereof shall, upon request, be
available for use by the judge and his counsel in connection with the
proceedings, or the judge may arrange to procure a copy at his expense.
The judge shall have the right, without any order or approval, to have
all or any portion of the testimony in the proceedings transcribed at
his expense.
(c) Except as herein otherwise provided, whenever these rules
provide for giving notice or sending any matter to the judge, such
notice or matter shall be sent to the judge at his residence unless he
requests otherwise, and a copy thereof shall be mailed to his counsel
of record.
(d) If the judge is adjudged insane or incompetent, or if it appears
to the commission at any time during the proceedings that he is not
competent to act for himself, the commission shall appoint a guardian
ad litem unless the judge has a guardian who will represent him. In
the appointment of such guardian ad litem, consideration may be given
to the wishes of the members of the judge's immediate family. The
guardian or guardian ad litem may claim and exercise any right and
privilege and make any defense for the judge with the same force and
effect as if claimed, exercised, or made by the judge, if competent; and,
whenever these rules provide for serving or giving notice or sending
any matter to the judge, such notice or matter shall be served, given, or
sent to the guardian or guardian ad litem.
12. Amendments to Notice or Answer
The masters, at any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing, or
the commission, at any time prior to its determination may allow or
require amendments to the notice of formal proceedings and may allow
amendments to the answer. The notice may be amended to conform to
proof or to set forth additional facts, whether occurring before or
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after the commencement of the hearing. In case such an amendment
is made, the judge shall be given reasonable time both to answer the
amendment and to prepare and present his defense against the matters
charged thereby.
13. Report of Masters
(a) After the conclusion of the hearing before masters, they shall
promptly prepare and transmit to the commission a report which shall
contain a brief statement of the proceedings had and their findings of
fact on the issues presented by the notice of formal proceedings and the
answer thereto, or if there be no answer, their findings of fact with
respect to the allegations in the notice of formal proceedings. When the
findings support the grounds alleged for censure, removal, or retire-
ment, the report shall be accompanied by an original and four copies
of a transcript of the proceedings before the masters.
(b) Upon receiving the report of the masters, the commission shall
promptly mail a copy to the judge.
14. Objections to Report of Masters
Within fifteen days after mailing of the copy of the masters' report
to the judge, the examiner or the judge may file with the commission a
statement of objections to the report of the masters, setting forth all
objections to the report and all reasons in opposition to the findings as
sufficient grounds for censure, removal, or retirement. A copy of such
statement, when filed by the examiner, shall be sent by registered or
certified mail to the judge.
15. Appearance before Commission
If no statement of objections to the report of the masters is filed
within the time provided, the commission may adopt the findings of
the masters without a hearing. If such statement is filed, or if the
commission in the absence of such statement proposes to modify or
reject the findings of the masters, the commission shall give the judge
and the examiner an opportunity to be heard orally before the commis-
sion, and written notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be
sent by registered or certified mail to the judge at least ten days prior
thereto.
16. Extension of Time
The chairman of the commission may extend for periods not to
exceed thirty days in the aggregate the time for filing an answer, for
the commencement of a hearing before the commission, and for filing
a statement of objections to the report of the masters, and the presiding
master may similarly extend the time for the commencement of a
hearing before masters.
17. Hearing Additional Evidence
(a) The commission may order a hearing for the taking of additional
evidence at any time while the matter is pending before it. The order
shall set the time and place of hearing and shall indicate the matters
on which the evidence is to be taken. A copy of such order shall be sent
by registered or certified mail to the judge at least ten days prior to
the date of hearing.
(b) In any case in which masters have been appointed, the hearing
of additional evidence shall be before such masters, and the proceed-





(a) If the commission finds good cause, it shall recommend to the
supreme court the censure, removal, or retirment of the judge. The
affirmative vote of five members of the commission who have con-
sidered the record, and at least three of whom where present when
the evidence was produced, is required for a recommendation of
censure, removal, or retirement of a judge or for dismissal of the
proceedings.
(b) The commission, with good cause, may also recommend to the
supreme court that a judge be temporarily suspended from performing
judicial duties without loss of compensation, pending final disposition
by the supreme court of a commission recommendation for censure,
removal, or retirement. A recommendation for temporary suspension
shall require the affirmative vote of five members of the commission
who have considered the record, at least three of whom were present
when the evidence was produced.
19. Record of Commission Proceedings
The commission shall keep a record of all proceedings concerning a
judge. The commission's determination shall be entered in the record
and notice thereof shall be sent by registered or certified mail to the
judge. In all proceedings resulting in a recommendation to the supreme
court for censure, removal, or retirement, the commission shall prepare
a transcript of the evidence and of all proceedings therein and shall
make written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to
the issues of fact and law in the proceedings.
20. Certification of Commission Recommendation to Supreme Court
Upon making a determination recommending the censure, removal,
or retirement of a judge, the commission shall promptly file a copy of
the recommendation, certified by the chairman or secretary of the
commission, together with the transcript and the findings and conclu-
sions, with the clerk of the supreme court and shall immediately send
by registered or certified mail to the judge notice of such filing together
with a copy of such recommendation, findings, and conclusions.
21. Review of Commission Proceedings
(a) A petition to the supreme court to modify or reject the recom-
mendation of the commission for censure, removal, or retirement of a
judge may be filed within thirty days after the filing with the clerk of
the supreme court of a certified copy of the recommendation com-
plained of. The petition shall be verified, shall be based on the record,
shall specify the grounds relied on, and shall be accompanied by
petitioner's brief and proof of service of three copies of the petition
and of the brief on the commission. Within twenty days after service
on the commission, the commission shall serve and file a respondent's
brief. Within fifteen days after service of such brief, the petitioner may
file a reply brief, of which three copies shall be served on the commis-
sion.
(b) Failure to file a petition within the time provided may be
deemed a consent to a determination on the merits based upon the
record filed by the commission.
(c) The Rules of Civil Procedure in appellate proceedings before
the supreme court shall apply to proceedings in the supreme court for
review of a recommendation of the commission, except where express
provision is made to the contrary or where the application of a par-
ticular rule would be clearly impracticable, inappropriate, or inconsis-
tent.
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THE LOST LETTER TECHNIQUE: A NEw
APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF
BLACK ATTITUDES IN DENVER
INTRODUCTION
A a result of the barriers of discrimination and hatred that have
restricted the black man in his attempt to better his standard of
living, several groups have arisen in the black community in an attempt
to free him. Two of these groups are the N.A.A.C.P. and the Black
Panthers. The N.A.A.C.P. is seen by most people as a moderate organ-
ization dedicated to bettering the economic and social conditions of the
black man by working within the framework of the American legal sys-
tem. Since its founding early in the Twentieth Century, the N.A.A.C.P.
has championed the cause of the American Negro and has brought about
significant changes in American society by helping to strike down racial
barriers. Through its peaceful methods, it has attained many of its goals
and has attracted widespread support among both Negroes and whites.
However, there are many blacks who feel that the N.A.A.C.P. is
moving too slowly. Many black action groups have been organized, the
best known of which is the Black Panthers. The Panthers are avowed
revolutionaries who will not wait out the slow evolution of society that
accompanies tremendous social change. From its humble beginnings in
the early 1960's in Oakland, California, the Panther party has grown
rapidly in membership to a few thousand blacks, mostly young. The
Panthers demand action now. They feel that their race has been trodden
upon too often and too long, and that the only way meaningful change
will be made is through violent destruction of the white power structure
in the United States.
The contrast between the two organizations has generated a great
deal of controversy in both black and white communities as to which
group has gained the most widespread acceptance by the Negro popula-
tion and, concomitantly, which approach to the black-white problem
is, therefore, likely to prevail. Because of the social and legal implica-
tions inherent in such a controversy, it was decided to conduct a study
to determine the attitudes of Denver's black community toward both
organizations. This article sets forth the results of that study and
suggests some conclusions which can be drawn therefrom.
I. THE LOST LETTER TECHNIQUE
When it was decided to study black attitudes in the metropolitan
Denver area towards the Black Panthers and the more moderate
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N.A.A.C.P., there was a conscious desire to avoid some of the problems
generally encountered by researchers. For example, a person confronted
with interviews and questionnaires is immediately aware that he is in a
special situation. He knows that he has been chosen as part of a study
and that his response will be intensively scrutinized and evaluated.
As a result, his statements do not always reflect his actual opinions.
The problem becomes more acute in research concerning politically
sensitive issues and is further increased when racial overtones exist, i.e.,
when white interviewers attempt an attitude survey among black respon-
dents. The significance of this latter problem is underscored by the
recent feelings of resentment toward constant study by governmental
and other institutional groups evidenced in black communities.
In an effort to minimize such difficulties, the technique adopted
for this study was one developed several years ago by Dr. Stanley
Milgram of the City University of New York.1 It utilizes the return of
"lost letters" to determine how people feel and, more importantly, how
they would act toward different political organizations. In essence, the
technique measures attitudes without peoples' knowledge through their
actions instead of their words.
2
The technique is a simple one. The investigators distribute or drop
a large number of letters, addressed and stamped, throughout the areas
of the city under study. A person who finds one of these "lost letters"
must decide what he is going to do with it - should he mail it, disregard
it, or destroy it? Dr. Milgram has found that, "there is a widespread
feeling among people that one ought to mail such a letter."' However,
when a person finds a letter addressed to a highly objectionable organ-
ization, he may not mail it at all. Thus, by varying the addresses on the
letters and later calculating the percentage returned for each address,
one can measure sentiment towards an organization. As Dr. Milgram
states:
The technique gets around certain problems inherent in the survey
interview - the usual method of assessing attitudes. When a research
team wants to test public sentiment on a social issue, it ordinarily
chooses a representative group of persons from the community, and
questions them. The methods for selecting a representative sample have
I Professor Milgram directs the doctoral program in social psychology at the university
and is also professor of psychology.
2 S. Milgram, The Lost Letter Technique, PSYCHOLOGY ToDAY June, 1969, at 30. Dr.
Milgram describes the technique as follows:
The technique was one that would measure attitudes without people's knowl-
edge, through their actions instead of their words. The lost-letter technique was
one solution. Lost letters have been used to inflame a populace and to study
personal honesty, but we were interested in using the returns as a clue to how
people felt and, more important, how they would act toward different political
organizations. The information we gathered would be sociological, not psycho-
logical. We could not know about the individuals who returned the letters,
but we would have a return rate specific to each organization, and thus useful
for certain purposes. The nature of the procedure guaranteed the anonymity
of those who took part. Id. at 32.
3 ld. at 30.
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been worked out in a very careful fashion, and are so effective that a
sample of only 1,200 persons can be used to predict national trends
with great accuracy. But it remains true that once the person is selected
for questioning, the information must come through a structured con-
versation. The resulting measurements measure only what the person
says. This exclusive focus on verbal accounts, though of great utility,
seems an unwise fixation in any scientific social psychology. It ought to
be possible to measure deeds on a large scale and in a way that permits
experimental variation. 4
Using the lost letter technique, the respondent is not asked to speak.
Rather his act or failure to act in response to an issue with social and
political connotations speaks for him. This overt behavior will then
reveal something about the manner in which he relates to a particular
organization. In a subtle way, he is, in effect, asked to either aid the
organization or to hinder it; and, thus, he will hopefully reveal his
actual feelings and attitudes toward the organization.
Dr. Milgram has employed the technique in several studies.
In the first, carried out in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1963, the mem-
bers of his research team addressed 100 envelopes to each of two
organizations that would doubtless prove unpopular with New Haven-
ites: Friends of the Nazi Party and Friends of the Communist Party.
As a control, they addressed 100 more envelopes to an organization
about which they expected people to feel positively - Medical Research
Associates - and 100 to a private person, Mr. Walter Carnap.
The envelopes were all addressed to the same Post Office box in
New Haven, and all contained identical letters. The letter was straight-
forward but was so designed as to interact suggestively with the four
organizations. The letters were distributed in ten pre-selected districts
in New Haven: along sidewalks, in outdoor phone booths, in shops, and
under automobile windshields (with a note attached saying "found
near your car"). Each letter had been unobstrusively coded for a section
of the city.
In a few days the letters came in and, as predicted, in unequal
numbers. Whereas 72 percent of the Medical Research letters and 71
percent of the personal letters came back, only 25 percent of the Nazi
and Communist letters were returned. "The initial results and the dis-
crepant return rates showed that the basic premise of the technique held
up: the probability of lost letters being returned depends on the political
and social attributes of the organization to which they are addressed."
The New Haven study showed the technique could work. Dr.
Milgram next wanted to see if it could be applied to a current social
issue. Therefore, in 1963, at the peak of racial tension in the South, a
research team armed with a batch of letters addressed to pro-civil rights
4Id.




groups and anti-civil rights groups went to South Carolina and dispersed
the letters in black and white neighborhoods in several tobacco towns.
In black neighborhoods, the pro-civil rights letters were returned in
greater numbers, while letters addressed to the Council for White
Neighborhoods came in more strongly from white residential areas.
"Thus the technique seemed applicable to a real social issue and was
also responsive to a demographic variable.""
However, the technique still had one serious shortcoming - there
was no real evidence of its validity. What was needed was an objective
criterion against which the results of a study could be measured, and
the 1964 Presidential election provided that opportunity.
To test the validity of the technique, letters were distributed in
several election wards in Boston addressed to the following: Committee
to Elect Goldwater, Committee to Defeat Goldwater, Committee to
Elect Johnson, and Committee to Defeat Johnson. The lost letter tech-
nique correctly predicted the outcome of the election in each of the
wards! But it seems the technique only identified the trend, for it badly
underestimated the strength of Johnson support. Overall, it only gave
Johnson a 10 percent lead over Goldwater, when the actual election
returns in these wards gave Johnson a margin closer to 60 percent.
This suggests that the difference in return rates of letters will
always be weaker than the extent of actual difference of community
opinion. Even if a person plans to vote for Johnson, he may still be a
good enough fellow to mail a pro-Goldwater letter. And some letters
are always picked up and mailed by children, illiterates and street
cleaners. There is a good deal of unwanted variance in the returns. 8
In short, while there is some question about the degree of validity,
the lost letter technique is a way in which social attitudes can be some-
what accurately measured without some of the problems inherent in
other research techniques. Since it was decided to use the lost letter
approach in comparing the attitudes of Denver blacks toward the Black
Panthers and the N.A.A.C.P., it only remained to apply the technique
to the study in question.
II. APPLICATION OF THE TECHNIQUE TO THE DENVER STUDY
In applying the lost letter technique to the purposes of the study, it
first became necessary to define the areas in which the study was to be
conducted. Using United States census tracts and areas surveyed by the
Denver Planning Office,9 specific segments of Denver County were
defined for use in the study. The total number of Negroes within the
7Id.
8 Id. at 66.
9 United States census tracts 16, 31.01, 36.01, 23, 24.01, 24.02, 25 and Park Hill areas
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, which included census tracts 41.02, 42.03, 42.01, 42.02, and
part of tract 41.01. Thus, a total of fifteen neighborhoods were used in the study.
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specific areas was estimated to be 34,349, approximately 49.6 percent
of the total black population of Denver County.10
The next step involved printing 400 envelopes and dividing them
into four groups of 100 envelopes each, according to their fictitious
addresses. The envelopes addressed to Louis Campbell and to Medical
Research Associates served as the control letters, and those addressed
to the Friends of the Black Panthers and Friends of the N.A.A.C.P.
were used to measure the opinion of the community toward the two
groups under study.
In order to get an even distribution of letters throughout the tracts,
the total number of letters was divided into the total number of blacks in
the areas surveyed, and a ratio of one letter to every 86 Negroes was de-
rived. This figure was then divided into the absolute number of Negroes
in each area," giving the number of letters to be dropped in each tract.
The letters were coded according to the areas in which they were
dropped in order to determine what percentage of letters were returned
by various income groups in the Negro community.
12
The actual distribution of the letters involved traveling through
the selected areas and placing the letters at various locations to give the
appearance that the letters had been lost. The letters were left face-up
on sidewalks and curbings, at cross walks and bus stops, and in telephone
booths. Similar to the Milgram studies, some letters were dropped in
stores and restaurants, and a few were placed under the windshield
wipers of cars with a note scribbled on them "found next to your car."
To aid in "losing" the letters, several black children were employed.
It was felt that in a black community, white people would obviously be
more noticeable and would bring greater attention to themselves walking
around dropping letters. In addition, by using people who were more
familiar with the neighborhoods, the letters were dropped near heavily
traveled streets and in facilities predominantly used by Negroes.
The letters were dropped in their respective neighborhoods between
six and eight o'clock on Sunday evening, February 8, 1970. By dropping
the letters at night, it was possible to put them in desired locations
without the study participants appearing too conspicuous.
10 Total black population estimated in 1970 to be 69,219. Estimate prepared by Denver
Planning Office.
11 It was necessary to find out the absolute number of Negroes in each census tract. Using
figures obtained from the Head Start study on percentage of Negroes in the tracts and
multiplying those percentages by the absolute number of people in the tracts, the absolute
number of blacks in each area was determined. In addition, the study by the Denver
Planning Office of Park Hill gave the absolute numbers of Negroes in areas 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, and 8 of the geographic analysis.
12 The United States census tracts used in the study were designated neighborhoods A-6
and were generally neighborhoods which reflected a low income level, according to the
1960 census which computed the median income of families in each census tract in




The next step in the study was the collection of the mailed letters.
Collections at the Post Office box were made on the afternoons of
February 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 16th. A total of 166 letters
were collected, and all data was compiled from this total.
III. RESULTS
The following series of tables and graphs and the explanatory
comments accompanying them constitute the net results obtained by
the study. Table No. 1 consists of a complete breakdown of the data
as to date of return, neighborhood, and type of letter returned. It should
also be noted that neighborhoods labeled A-G correspond to the United
States census tracts and the neighborhoods labeled H-O correspond to
the Park Hill areas.
TABLE NO. 1
NEIGHBORHOOD
Addressee Dte A B C D E F G H I i K L N O Total
2/9 1
2/10 5 1 2 8 3 2 2 4 2 1 2 2 1 1 36
2/11 1 1 6
Personal 2/12 1 1 1 1 11j 5
2/1311___ 1 J 1
2/161 0 lii li[11,9
2/9 11 1  _ _
2/10 5 3 2 6 3 1 1 1 1 4 211 2 3 35
Medical 2/11 2 2 3 2 1 1 11
Research 2/12 1 3 1 1 1 7
Associates 2/13 1





2/10 2 2 2 5 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 23
2/11 31 1 2 
I 1 7






Addrese Date A B C D E F G H I iJ K L M N O TotaAddresee rturne
2/911
2/10 2 2 2 2 1 2 11
Friendsof 2/11 4 1 1 1 7
the Black 2/12 f 0
Panthers 2/13 1 I 1
2/16I 0
20
Totals 13 2 L8 F913l17 3 71113 8 14 7 6 5 166
Table No. 2 shows the breakdown of the letters according to the
number received on each collection date. It should be noted that since
the letters were dropped on Sunday night, it was to be expected that
the largest return would be on Tuesday, February 10.
TABLE NO. 2
Collection Date No. Collected
Mon., Feb. 9 4
Tues., Feb. 10 105.
Wed., Feb. 11 31
Thurs., Feb. 12 17
Fri., Feb. 13 3
Mon., Feb. 16 6
Total 166
Table No. 3 analyzes the data with respect to neighborhood and
type of letter. After each neighborhood is the total number of letters
that were dropped in that area. By dividing this number by four, the
number of letters in each category dropped in a particular neighborhood
can be computed.13 This number is then used to figure the percentage
of return for each category in each neighborhood. For example, by
looking at the chart one can see that 86 percent of the personal letters
were returned from neighborhood A. The totals at the end of the table
show the total number and percentage of return for a particular neigh-
borhood. The average return rate for a neighborhood was 47 percent.
13 Since some numbers are not divisible by four, any area that contained a number of
Negroes not evenly divisible by four was given extra letters, but no area received more
than two extra letters having the same addressee.
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Total number PERSONAL MEDICAL FRIENDS OF FRIENDS OF TOTAL
of letters RESEARCH N.A.A.C.P. BLACK
in PANTHERS
Neighbor- neighbor- no. no. no. no. no.
hood hood returned %returrned % returned % returned %
A 25 5 86 5 86 3 50 0 0 13 58
B 40 2 20 6 60 2 20 2 20 12 30
C 38 4 40 6 60 6 60 2 20 18 47
D 98 8 32 10 40 7 28 4 16 29 29
E 35 5 56 4 44 2 22 2 22 13 37
F 35 3 33 6 67 4 44 4 44 17 49
G 5 1 100 1 100 1 100 0 0 3 60
H 8 2 100 1 50 2 100 2 100 7 88
I 21 5 100 4 80 1 20 1 20 11 53
. 22 3 60 4 80 6 60 3 60 13 59
K 18 2 40 3 60 3 60 0 0 8 44
L 15 2 50 1 25 1 25 0 0 4 27
M 16 3 75 3 75 1 25 0 0 7 44
N 13 2 67 3 100 1 33 0 0 6 46
0 11 2 67 3 100 0 0 0 0 5 45
TABLE NO. 3
The following two bar graphs are, perhaps, the most revealing.
Graph No. 1 shows the percentage of return for each group of addressed
letters and total percentage of return. These figures constitute the
essence of the results. Graph No. 2 shows the same information for
Dr. Milgram's New Haven study. In both studies, 400 letters (100 for
each group) were dropped. The slight difference in total return can be
attributed to the inherent differences between a New Haven, Connecticut
community and a black Denver community. This will become clearer
with the later comparison of the lower income and the higher income
black communities. This difference between communities can also be
traced to the use of two low response groups in the New Haven study
(Communists and Nazis) as compared to only one low response group
in this study (Panthers).
VOL, 47
LOST LETTER TECHNIQUE
Graph No. 1 Denver Study
Total Return = 48%
Graph No. 2 New Haven Study
Table No. 4 compares the computed return for a given neighbor-
hood with the actual return for that neighborhood and shows the
discrepancy, if any, between the two. The computed return was arrived
at by dividing the number of letters dropped in a neighborhood by the
total number of letters dropped (400) and multiplying that figure by
the total number of letters returned (166) .14
Computed Actual
Neighborhood Return Return Discrepancy
A 10 13 + 3
B 16 12 - 4
C 16 18 + 2
D 41 29 -12
E 14 13 - I
F 14 17 + 3
G 2 3 +1
H 4 7 +3
I 8 11 +3
1 8 13 + 5
K 8 8 0
L 6 4 -2
M 6 7 +1
N 5 6 +1
0 4 5 +1
TABLE NO. 4
14 For example, if 200 letters (or 1/2 of the total number of letters dropped) were dropped
in neighborhood X, one would expect that about 12 of the letters returned (1/2 of 166
or 83) would be from X. This comparison shows if there were any areas that seriously
strayed from the mark. As can be seen from the table, areas D (-12) and J (+5) are
the only two serious deviants. Area D's low response could be the result of over-satura-
tion of a small neighborhood that had a large population and consequently received a
large number of letters (98).
1970
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The final two tables (Table No. 5 and Table No. 6) are concerned
with the difference in results between the higher and the lower income
neighborhoods. The higher income neighborhoods (Table No. 5) in-
cluded areas H through 0 where the median family income is between
$6,000 and $8,000. Generally, this is the area near Stapleton Airport.
The lower income neighborhoods included areas A through G where the
median family income is between $2,000 and $4,000 (except for area B
which has a median family income between $4,000 and $6,000. This is
the area on the eastern fringe of downtown Denver.
The results show almost no difference whatsoever between the
Black Panther and the N.A.A.C.P. returns from the lower and higher
income groups. There is, however, a considerable difference in percent
of return of the control letters and in percent of total return with respect
to the two income levels. It should be noted how the returns of the
higher income group correspond to those in the New Haven study (see
Graph No. 2). There seems to be a greater similarity between the higher
income black community and the New Haven community as opposed
to the lower income black community and the New Haven community.
No. Total
Type of Letter Returned Dropped %
Personal 21 31 68
Medical Research 22 31 71
N.A.A.C.P. 12 31 39
Panthers 6 31 19
Totals = 61 124 49
No. ToteI
Type of Letter Returned Dropped %
Personal 28 69 41
Medical Research 38 69 55
N.A.A.C.P. 25 69 36
Panthers 14 69 20
Totals = 105 276 38
Table No. 5 Higher Income Table No. 6 Lower Income
CONCLUSION
The statistics from the survey indicate that the Negroes of Denver
are more likely to support the N.A.A.C.P. than the Black Panthers by
a ratio of almost two to one. Taken at face value, the statistics pose an
interesting question: Why do the results suggest that Negroes favor the
N.A.A.C.P. over the Black Panthers?
One rationale might be that Negroes in Denver have better living
conditions and lead somewhat better lives than blacks in other metro-
politan areas. At the 56th annual convention of the N.A.A.C.P. held
in Denver in July, 1965, information was introduced which tended to
show that Denver Negroes were "better off" than Negroes elsewhere:
Discussions with persons identified with racial problems in Denver
appeared to confirm the feelings of the Negro delegates. They said that
the city and the state of Colorado, whose political lives were domin-
ated by the Ku Klux Klan in the nineteen-twenties, had radically
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changed in their treatment of Negroes. In part, this change was attrib-
uted to the leadership of Mayor Tom Currigan and his administration.
Mr. Currigan and his top officials have been intimately identified
with the problems of race relations and have taken the initiative in the
organizing efforts to solve these problems.
The size of the Negro community, estimated at 47,000 in a pop-
ulation of a million in the metropolitan Denver area, was said to have
reduced the Negro problem to manageable proportions.
A third factor is that the many Federal agencies in Denver serve
as the principal employers of Negroes. The estimated rate of Negro
unemployment here is put at 8%, compared with rates as high as 20%
in other urban centers.
Although a Negro slum area exists in Denver, many Negroes live
in integrated sections, a situation that has been favored by the buyer's
market in real estate here in recent years. It was also said that public
accommodations were not a problem for Negroes here.
Defacto segregation in the schools follows the housing patterns,
but the Board of Education is credited with making a determined effort
to improve the quality of instruction in Negro schools.
Sebastian Owens, the Urban League's representative in Denver,
said today that the League had received strong support from businesses
and industry in testing Negro candidates for jobs.15
Because Denver Negroes are "better off," they would tend to be
satisfied with the status quo and would not be willing to give up easily
what has taken them so long to achieve. An indication of this feeling is
the unwillingness of Denver's Negroes to riot. Indeed, there have only
been two of what the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders
calls "minor" disturbances in Denver since 1964.16
Another factor which may have controlled the behavior pattern of
the Negro faced with the decision of whether or not to mail the lost
letter, is that of familiarity with the organizations involved. The
N.A.A.C.P. has been in existence for 60 years and has long been
depicted by the news media as a respectable organization which has won
many important battles for the Negro in the courts. In contrast, the
Black Panther Party is barely four years old and has yet to make any
decisive gains for blacks.
This general pattern of familiarity is reflected by the two organiza-
tions in Denver. The Denver chapter of the Black Panther Party has a
very small membership and has received little publicity or notoriety.
To the average Denver citizen, Black Panthers do not actively exist in
the city. Contradistinctively, the N.A.A.C.P. has increased its promin-
ence through local activity and by holding its national convention in
Denver in 1965. Further, the Association continues to bring suits against
local discriminatory business practices and exploitive merchants, attempt-
ing to make additional gains for black citizens.
15 J. FRANKLIN & I. STARR, THE NEGRO IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 422 (1967).




Still another possible explanation for the result obtained by the
study is the attitude of Denver Negroes toward violence and riots.
When asked their views, 6 percent said they were pleased with violence
whereas 77 percent were upset by it."7 Another Denver survey conducted
in 1966 concluded that 59 percent of the Negro population would tell
their children not to become involved with the police."i Clearly those
who favor violence are in the minority.
Hence, at the present time most blacks in Denver prefer to work
within the legal system in order to achieve desired change. However, as
frustration within the community increases, other means of effecting
change may become more acceptable. It is the challenge of the legal
system to provide and maintain adequate channels of communication
and to provide legal accessibility in order to prevent the black community











LEGISLATION: A STUDY OF A
RESPONSE TO A SOCIAL NEED
INTRODUCTION
A sthe spontaneity of the 1960's fades, the 1970's will most likely
evidence an institutionalization of social programs aimed at racial
equality in all areas of American society. More particularly, as the
excitement surrounding the "Philadelphia Plan"1 dims, equal employ-
ment opportunity will become an accepted reality enforced by govern-
mental sanction. Yet at the moment, the methods by which equal
employment opportunity is brought about are still very much in flux;
hence, it is the purpose of this article to set forth the current state of
the law with respect to job discrimination in Colorado and to describe
and evaluate the responses of a sample group of employers and em-
ployees who are affected by the implementation of such laws.
The article is based on a study which incorporated two levels of
investigation: first, a comparison of the performance and operational
techniques of two related governmental commissions-the Colorado
Commission on Civil Right (C.C.R.C. - a state body) and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C. - a federal organi-
zation); and second, an evaluation of public confidence in these
commissions and their accomplishments. In order to compare the work
of the state and federal bodies, information was gathered from staff
members of the C.C.R.C. and the E.E.O.C. (which has a regional office
in Albuquerque, New Mexico2) in a series of meetings. Of particular
importance were the methods employed by each of these commissions
in executing their respective legislative mandates; emphasis was placed
on how the commissions attempted to control behavior patterns in
the business community.
In order to evaluate public confidence in the work of the com-
missions, questionnaires were sent to the two groups affected by the
legislation: employers and minority employees. More specifically, one
questionnaire was mailed to 100 employers against whom complaints
1 Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 167 (Supp. 1965); See also Memorandum on Order
Amending Philadelphia Plan Relating to Minority Group Employment Goals, June 27,
1969.
2The Albuquerque office of the E.E.O.C. administers a five state area encompassing
Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming.
3 The names and addresses were obtained through the cooperation of James F. Reynolds,
Director of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. At no time, however, were the
authors allowed to examine the contents of any completed case file nor were they allowed
to see any other confidential data.
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had been filed under the equal employment provisions of the statutes.
A second questionnaire was mailed to 100 persons who had filed
complaints of discrimination with the C.C.R.C. While the response
to the questionnaires was inadequate to develop definite conclusions,'
the study did help to clarify the manner in which equal opportunity
legislation has been implemented and the procedures which have
resulted therefrom.
I. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
In analysing the function of the two commissions, the most
obvious place to begin is with the authorizing legislation. While this
legislation is somewhat similar, important differences between the
two can be noted, especially since the Colorado statute is regarded
as stronger than its federal counterpart. It is also important to examine
the manner in which the legislation has been implemented; hence, this
section concludes with a comparison of the procedural aspects of the
C.C.R.C. and the E.E.O.C.
A. State and Federal Legislation
1. The Colorado Commission
The creation of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission dates to
the passage of the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act of 1957. 5 The
Act provides for the establishment of a commission 6 which consists
of seven members who are appointed by the Governor with the advice
and consent of the Senate.7 The Act also provides for a Civil Rights
division which has, as its head, a coordinator of fair employment
practices."
The powers granted to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
are fairly broad and, in outlining these powers, the purpose of the
legislation is made clear. The legislature has given the commission
the power "[T]o receive, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleg-
ing discrimination in employment . . . or the existence of a discrimina-
tory or unfair employment practice by a person, an employer, an
employment agency, a labor organization, or the employees or members
thereof .... ."' Discriminatory and unfair employment practices with
respect to employers are defined as "[refusing] to hire, to discharge,
to promote or demote, or [discriminating] in matters of compensation
4 Only 38 percent of the employers in the sample responded; only 20 percent of minority
employees returned the questionnaire.
5 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-1 to- 8 (1963).
6 1d. § 80-21-2 (8).
7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-4 (Supp. 1969).
8
1d. § 80-21-3.
9 Id. § 80-21-5 (4).
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against any person otherwise qualified, because of race, creed, color,
sex, national origin or ancestry." 10
The sanctions to be exercised by the commission are also broad
in scope. For example, if, upon the investigation of a complaint of
discrimination, the coordinator, a commissioner, or an investigating
staff member determines that there is probable cause to believe that
a discrimination charge is true, the legislation authorizes the com-
mission to take steps to eliminate the probable discrimination by three
means: conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 1 If these basically
informal procedures do not prove adequate, then the commission is
authorized to conduct a formal hearing on the complaint at which
time evidence is reviewed and further testimony can be taken. 12 If,
following the hearing, the commission finds that the respondent-
the accused employer, union or employment agency - has engaged
in or is engaged in discriminatory practices, then the commission can
issue an order to the respondent to cease and desist from this action
and to take the affirmative action as the commission deems necessary. 3
2. The Federal Commission
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 14 is a creation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and is charged with the enforcement
of the provisions of Title VII,' 6 the express purposes of which prevent
unlawful employment practices by employers, labor unions, and em-
ployment agencies."7 The Commission itself is composed of five com-
missioners appointed by the President and headed by a Chairman who
is also appointed by the President .'8 While the Commission is located
in the District of Columbia, it is expressly permitted to set up state or
regional offices to assist it in the implementation of the law. 9
Similar to the C.C.R.C., the E.E.O.C. is empowered to investigate
complaints of employment discrimination by acting in response to
written complaints.2 ° The complaints are investigated, and a finding
is made as to whether there is probable cause to believe that a violation
of Title VII has occurred. 2' If there is such probable cause, then "the
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
' 0CoLo. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-6(2) (Supp. 1969).
11Id. § 80-21-7 (3).
12 1d. § 80-21-7 (5).
131d. § 80-21-7 (12).
1442 U.S.C. § 2000 e-4 (1964).
15 Id. § 2000 e.
1
6 Id. § 2000 e-5.
17Id. § 2000 e-2(a)-(c).
18 Id. § 2000 e-4(a).
191d. § 2000 e-4(f).




employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation
and persuasion.''22 If these methods fail, Title VII provides that a
civil action may be brought by the charging party23 or by the E.E.O.C.
itself (if charges were filed by a Commissioner) in a federal district
court.24 If the court then finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the court may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such practice and may order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate.
25
B. Major Differences in the State and Federal Legislation
It is immediately apparent that the Colorado legislation is stronger
than its federal counterpart. Instead of having to resort to court pro-
cedures, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission can, after a hearing has
been held, issue a cease-and-desist order to the respondent who has
been found guilty of discriminatory or unfair employment practices.26
The commission can also order the errant employer to take affirmative
action, including the hiring or rehiring of the charging party and the
upgrading of employees with or without back pay to the date of the
violation of the law.
27
At first glance, it seems that the E.E.O.C. has similar powers,
albeit through the vehicle of the federal courts. It was found, however,
that it is only when one of the Commissioners charges a respondent with
a violation of Title VII that the case can be brought before a federal
court. In the vast majority of cases when the Commission's limited
powers of conciliation or persuasion fail, the charging party himself
must seek counsel and bring suit as an individual. Since many of the
charging parties are probably not indigent, they are ineligible for legal
aid. And, since most of the suits involve small sums of money, the
issue usually dies if the respondent becomes uncooperative.
A seemingly easy solution would be to have one of the E.E.O.C.
Commissioners file a charge alleging the veracity of the complaint.
Since the evidence brought out in the first investigation presumably is
true, the Commission could bring the case to court and win easily.
However, this solution ignores three factors. First, Title VII provides
that the charge must be filed 90 days after the alleged violation.28
In most cases, by the time the initial complaint is filed, investigated,
and decided, the 90 day limit has been exceeded. Second, the Com-
2 Id.
23 id. § 2000 e-5(e).
24 Id.
25 Id. § 2000 e-5(g).
26 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-7(12) (1963).
27 Id.
2842 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5 (d) (1964).
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mission itself has limited legal resources; and with a case load ex-
ceeding 11,000 complaints annually, 2 the Commission simply lacks
the legal staff to bring cases to court, even if it were possible. Third,
it is impossible to bring the cases to court since Title VII makes no
provision for government lawyers to plead such cases unless the case
is of general public importance and the Attorney General decides to
intervene. 0
There are other differences between these two legislative enact-
ments. For example, there are mechanical differences, such as the
limitations on filing complaints - six months for Colorado"1 and 90
days under Title VI1 - as well as major substantive differences.
Further, under Title VII the Commissioners themselves must decide
on the merits of a complaint,33 whereas under the Colorado statute the
coordinator can conduct a hearing and decide upon the complaint's
validity. 4 Commissioners serve the State of Colorado without compen-
sation and do not work on a full-time basis.35 Under Title VII, the five
Commisisoners are salaried and work full-time in the pursuance of
their duties."'
The scope of the Colorado statute is also somewhat broader than
is that of Title VII. In Colorado, all employers are covered by the
statute save religious organizations; 7 Title VII is limited to em-
ployers who employ more than 25 persons for more than 20 calendar
weeks and who are engaged in industries affecting interstate com-
merce.3" Title VII specifically excludes smaller employers, state and
federal employers, corporations wholly owned by the United States
Government, religious corporations, and several other residual groups."
There are many other dissimilarities between these two pieces of leg-
islation; some of these become apparent when the implementation of
the statutes is considered.
C. Implementation: the E.E.O.C.
The E.E.O.C.'s regional office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, is
charged with the implementation of Title VII in the State of Colorado.
29 Based on information received from the E.E.O.C.'s Regional Office in Albuquerque, New
Mexico.
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(e).
3 1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-7 (15) (1963).
3242 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(d) (1964).
33 Id. § 2000 e-5(a).
34 
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-7(5) (1963).
35 
Id. § 80-21-4.
3642 U.S.C. § 2000 e-4(a) (1964).
3 7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-2(15) (1963).




The procedures which have been developed for handling complaints
are described as follows.
First, Title VII provides that the complaint shall be deferred to
the state for 60 days if the state has adequate machinery for handling
discriminatory charges. This is not a hard and fast rule, however, and
many exceptions are allowed.40 The E.E.O.C. itself determines whether
the rule is to be followed. In the Albuquerque office, for example, the
deferral rule is followed with respect to Colorado, but complaints
emanating from Arizona are not deferred. The reasons for this practice
are not publicized but are grounded in both common sense and the
spirit of the law. If the Commission feels that the state legislation is
strong enough to be effective and that the state organization is per-
forming its legislative mandate, then the E.E.O.C. is willing to defer.
But if, as in some states, these requisites are thought to be lacking, then
the Commission will refuse to defer investigation and will commence
its own examination of the matter.
Assuming that the complaint is not deferred to the state, it will
be assigned to one of the E.E.O.C.'s investigators. A letter will be sent
to the respondent named in the complaint, informing him only that a
charge has been filed against him and that a particular staff member
of the Commission will contact him in the near future. The name of
the person filing the charge and the specifications of the complaint
are not revealed to protect the charging party against the alteration of
records and against any rehearsal on the part of the respondent or his
employees which might tend to destroy the objectivity of the pro-
ceedings.
The Albuquerque investigator then telephones both the respondent
and the charging party to arrange for appointments. The charging
party is almost invariably contacted first and meets with the investigator.
The investigators talk freely and without great formality so that the
problem will be thoroughly understood. After the investigator is fully
advised of the situation, he prepares an affidavit for the charging party
to sign, places the charging party under oath, and witnesses his sig-
nature. At this time the investigator asks for the names and addresses
of any persons who can support the charging party's allegations (us-
ually co-workers) and attempts to apprise himself of the attitudes
he might expect to find at the respondent's place of business. On the
average, this initial contact lasts two or three hours.
In order to gain the necessary information, the E.E.O.C. investi-
gator has full and immediate powers of supoena.4' Although the em-
ployer is not required to allow the investigator to interview employees
during normal working hours, most are cooperative in this respect and
40Id. § 2000 e-8(b).
41-42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-9(a) (1964).
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will allow, at the investigator's request, the employee to be interviewed
in a separate room. Affidavits are taken from employees who have
something to offer which will help the investigation but the employer
is not permitted to see these affidavits. After contacting those witnesses
who might support the charging party's allegations and taking affi-
davits from them, the investigator proceeds to the respondent's office
to officially serve the formal charge and to conduct the investigation.
While interviews are important, the E.E.O.C. seems to rely heavily
on the respondent's records. Records most commonly examined and
copied are the personnel file of the charging party, pay records, em-
ployment applications, job descriptions and personnel rosters which
indicate racial distribution within plants or departments.
The investigator is usually looking for evidence of discriminatory
treatment. As one investigator remarked, "The fact that a charging
party has been treated badly by his employer is not enough. What must
be determined is whether the employer has treated only one group
badly, as opposed to his treatment of the majority. If he treats everyone
badly it is regretable but not a violation of Title VII." Hence records
are very revealing. If a Negro has filed a charge against an employer
because he was not hired, all the investigator need do is obtain the
employer's reason for failure to hire. If the reason is that the Negro
does not have a high school diploma and if a random examination of
the personnel files reveals that many people are employed who do not
have high school diplomas, then the employer's reason lacks validity.
Or if the Negro was turned away because there were "no openings"
and if the employer's records reveal that three whites were hired on
the same day and after the Negro had applied, the conclusion is ap-
parent. (The E.E.O.C. also requires that applications are to be kept
on file for six months after submission and that job vacancies are to
be filled with consideration given to all applications on file.) Further,
if the records show, for example, that Chicanos are dismissed for
fighting on the employer's premises while Anglos are only given
reprimands, then, again, the conclusion of "probable cause" is easily
reached.
Once the investigator has obtained the necessary information, he
assembles all the data in a bureaucratically pre-determined order and
writes a narrative explaining the data and relevancy of documents,
including a short recommendation as to whether there should be a
finding of probable cause.
4 2
42 As of February 2, 1970, this is no longer strictly true. Under a new system, the investiga-
tor writes a "statement of facts" which is mailed to the charging party and the respondent,
each of whom has ten days in which to contest the facts. If no reply is forthcoming,
the statement of facts is given to the decision-writing branch without a recommendation
as to a finding of cause or no cause. The decision is then written in Albuquerque and
forwarded to the Commissioners in Washington.
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Prior to February 2, 1970,4 3 these reports were all checked by the
Albuquerque office Director, who would concur or not concur in the
recommendation. They would then be sent to Washington where the
decision was reviewed by one or more Commissioners. A final de-
cision having been reached, letters would be posted from Washington
to the charging party, the employer, and the Albuquerque regional
office, informing all parties of the decision. This process was cumber-
some, however, with a lag of some 18 months between transmittal of
the file from Albuquerque and the decision in Washington. At one
point, approximately 4,000 cases were piled in the hallways and offices
of the E.E.O.C., awaiting decision."
In Autumn, 1969, the decision-writing process was transferred to
the field, and the Albuquerque office was divided into three branches:
investigations, decision-writing, and conciliations. As a result of this
restructuring, two alternatives are now possible. If the decision writer
finds that there is no probable cause to believe a violation of Title VII
has occurred, the charging party and employer are so notified im-
mediately, and the case is closed. If, on the contrary, probable cause
is found, then a meeting is arranged between a conciliator (rarely the
same person who conducted the investigation) and the charging party
to determine what the latter wants in the way of restitution. Acting as
the charging party's agent, the conciliator prepares an agreement.
Notably, one of the standard provisions in the agreement specifically
states that the respondent denies having violated Title VII. Apparently
this clause is inserted merely to assuage the feelings of the respondent,
since all other clauses are predicated on the assumption that there is
a wrong to be righted. Nevertheless, the proposed agreement is pre-
sented to the respondent at a place of the E.E.O.C.'s choosing. The
respondent is shown the proposed agreement which often suggests
affirmative action to be taken by the respondent which will affect the
status of minorities as a group and which will usually contain specific
redress for the particular charging party. The matter is then discussed
with the E.E.O.C. representative, and specific terms in the agreement
are negotiated on an individual and particularized basis.
If the two parties to the conciliation negotiations reach an agree-
ment, the document is signed by both the respondent and the con-
ciliator and is then presented to the charging party for his approval
and signature. If the charging party is not satisfied with the resulting
3 See note 42 supra.
4In an effort to speed up this process, on February 2, 1970, the E.E.O.C. initiated a "pre-
decision settlement" technique which offers the respondent an opportunity to settle the
matter without a formal finding of "probable cause." This technique will be used wheft
it is felt the "Statement of Facts" is so conclusive it lends itself to only one possible
decision, i.e., against the respondent. If the respondent settles in this manner, he is




agreement, he may refuse to sign. Until he does sign, there is no agree-
ment, and further negotiations must then be undertaken in an attempt
to bring the parties to accord.
In the alternative, the respondent once having met with the repre-
sentative of the E.E.O.C. is under no obligation to accept any agree-
ment whatsoever. He may simply refuse to negotiate any settlement
without the attachment of any administrative liability, although as
mentioned above,45 the charging party himself may bring civil action.
To ascertain the success of these measures, one can look at the
E.E.O.C statistics for fiscal year 1968 to see that of a total of 3,510
completed investigations,46 640 were brought to the conciliation stage.
This figure presumably means that 2,770, or 82 percent, of the com-
pleted investigations resulted in a no probable cause decision. Of the
640 completed conciliations in 1968, 253 cases were regarded as fully
successful, 53 were partially successful, and 334 were unsuccessful.
Thus only 39 percent of the conciliations were optimally settled. Hence,
of the total number of complaints investigated, only 0.9 percent re-
sulted in a successful conciliation.47
D. Implementation: C.C.R.C.
Since the functions and procedures of the E.E.O.C. have been
outlined at some length, the same is not necessary for the state com-
mission. Their procedures are essentially the same although the simi-
larity has only recently been achieved. The story behind the C.C.R.C.'s
adoption of the E.E.O.C.'s methods helps to indicate another informal
method by which these laws function.
Until August, 1969, the C.C.R.C. methods of investigation were
rather loose. The investigator would be assigned to a complaint, and
then he would be left to his own devices as to the form of investigation.
The result was that the Colorado investigator would "drop in" on the
respondent, ask a number of questions, talk to possible witnesses, per-
haps look at some documents, and then return to the office to write
his report. This report would be rather unstructured and generally
based on hearsay evidence. Very few records were copied. Indeed,
frequently no mention of records was made at all.
After the report was compiled, recommendation was made to the
C.C.R.C. coordinator as to whether a finding of probable cause should
be reached; and after the coordinator and the investigator had talked
45 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
46 Of charges falling within the jurisdiction of the Albuquerque office of the E.E.O.C. in
fiscal year 1968, 329 were from Colorado. Other states contributed the following
amounts: Arizona, 62; New Mexico, 114; Utah, 10; Wyoming, 3. Based on information
received from the E.E.O.C.'s regional office in Albuquerque.




things over, a decision was made. The conciliation, conference, hearing
or dismissal process was then set in motion.
If all of this sounds somewhat slipshod, it was. Often after a
dismissal by the C.C.R.C., the E.E.O.C. would assume jurisdiction of
the case and would find clear evidence of discrimination. Further, in
cases where there was no discrimination, the E.E.O.C. was unable to
determine this from a review of the Colorado file and thus had to
duplicate the investigation to reach the same result.
An ideal solution to this problem was proposed and adopted in
the spring of 1969. A University of New Mexico law school graduate
who had been working for the Albuquerque office of the E.E.O.C.
on a part-time basis was selected to coordinate a cooperative effort
between the state and federal governments. A budget was set up with
E.E.O.C. funds, and the Colorado staff was instructed in the format
and techniques that the E.E.O.C. had found useful in the past. Members
of the Washington staff were flown into Denver to teach some of
these methods, while members of the Albuquerque staff were assigned
to accompany the Colorado investigators on actual investigations. Sub-
sequent to these investigations, an informal meeting was held during
which E.E.O.C. personnel would make suggestions as to technique and
possible areas of improvement.
The end product of this effort has been beneficial to both com-
missions. Since Colorado now keeps files, complete with documentation,
duplicate efforts by the E.E.O.C. are kept to a minimum. On the other
hand, through the agreement mentioned above, Colorado now often
redefers complaints to the E.E.O.C. for purposes of investigation. Thus,
without any cost to the state, the C.C.R.C. has, in effect, more than
doubled its staff and freed its own personnel to operate in other areas.
The impression received was that the system was working quite well
from all points of view, although this procedure was hardly envisioned
in either authorizing statute.
E. Some Conclusions
It is difficult to reach a conclusion without a hypothesis. None-
theless, an understanding of the implementation of the laws seeking
to achieve equal employment opportunity in the state of Colorado has
been achieved from this study. The legislation itself provides a mere
skeleton, the bones of which must be covered and given shape by a
great number of people. And while the skeleton remains unchanged,
the flesh has often been altered and the body has received many trans-
fusions along the way.
What has been attempted is a documentation of the response of
two systems of government to a pressing social need. As has been shown,
the need has been met thus far by means of a negative response, i.e.,
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a response to complaints of discrimination after the fact. Nevertheless,
it is a start.
Having come to an understanding of the situational context of the
legislation and its implementation, the next section of this article studies
the reaction to the legislation and its implementation by the two groups
affected by it: employers and minority employees. While the results
of the questionnaires are certainly not a basis for final conclusions,
nonetheless the responses do indicate the difference in perspectives be-
tween those who enforce the legislation and those affected by it.48
II. RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRES
The information contained herein analyzes the results of two
questionnaires49 which were mailed to 100 employers and 100 charging
parties in Colorado. The necessary names and addresses were obtained
through the courtesy of Mr. James Reynolds, Director of the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission. The respondents were selected on a random
basis from among those names in the C.C.R.C. files for the fiscal year
1969 since many of those persons filing or filed against in the state
of Colorado were also involved with the E.E.O.C. in the same action.
Further, due to the fact that the E.E.O.C. has traditionally been slow
to render decisions,50 it was felt that an older sample would lend
itself to a more useful comparison than a recent sample.
The questionnaires were designed to provide a maximum op-
portunity for both charging parties and employers to indicate their
satisfaction or displeasure with the present legislation and methods
of implementation. It was suspected that the responses would be con-
ditioned by the amount of success the respondents had had with their
experience.
A. The Response of Employers
51
The results of the questionnaire survey sent to respondent em-
ployers elucidated many trends and indications as to the perceived effects
of equal employment laws. First, it appeared from the results of the
survey that the larger the firm or company, the greater the probability
of knowledge concerning equal employment laws. Second, the results
indicated that the use by the E.E.O.C. and the C.C.R.C. of a method
of surprise inspections to review records and observe company operations
was greatly disfavored by employers. The responses indicated that this
type of visit was instrumental in creating alienation among the em-
ployers toward the governmental commissions. No one wanted nor
48 See note 4 supra.
49 The two questionnaires are set out in the APPENDIX infra.
50 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
51 The data for this section is based on 38 responses. The percentages are based on the
total number of responses per question.
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liked the idea of a surprise visit; all the companies responding to the
survey preferred to be contacted by letter or at least by phone.
A third and most important trend noted was the overwhelming
feeling among employers that the investigators and investigations were
biased against them. 2 Some respondents felt that they had been placed
in a situation where one is guilty until proven innocent;5" and the
survey responses showed that winning or losing a claim with the
commissions had no effect on the respondents' feelings with respect
to a biased investigation.
A partial explanation of the feeling by employers that the investi-
gations were biased stems from the fact that many of the investigators
allegedly went beyond the scope of investigation for a particular com-
plaint, i.e., they "fished around." The employers felt that these
activities went outside of the boundaries established by the equal em-
ployment laws. The following statement from one employer-respondent
summarizes the impressions of most employers: "It was assumed by
the investigators that if a complaint was filed, a violation must have
occurred even though the company's ethnic balance from laborer
through the supervisory level made this a remote possibility."
In addition to feeling that investigations were biased, a number
of employers responding to the survey indicated that they were generally
not happy with the present legislation and its implementation by the
commissioners. 54 Some employers felt that they were doing an adequate
job in the area of equal employment, but that other employers were
not. A typical reaction from an employer who took this perspective
was as follows:
in our operation we employ all colors including green and purple.
The labor supply available to us is guilty of using discrimination as
a crutch to not do a satisfactory job, come to work regularly or com-
plete an assigned work load. Our oldest employees are 50% Negroes
and we feel that if these people can remain good employees, new
employees cannot use discrimination as an excuse for not doing satis-
factory work. There are many Denver firms who have no minority
type employees at this date and we feel that any campaign should
be directed at these persons.
52 One employer stated:
The laws appear to be presumptive in labeling employers' en masse as dis-
criminatory and apathetic. The implementation of bits and pieces of legislation
engenders little but negative reaction on the part of employers. The mechanics
are vague and emotional, and the structure populated by the inept and biased,
generally with no training or professional background, resulting in a gross mis-
carriage of the intent of the laws.
53 One employer responded: "I felt the investigators were prejudiced as they were of the
same race [as that of the charging party) and because of their questions and general
attitudes."
5 An employer answering the questionnaire replied that:
There is little or no recognition of good practices or accomplishments with
individuals. The present program accentuates the negative, i.e., complaints.
There is a great need for good educational programs within this area. Dealing
almost wholly with individual problems does not result in examining the whole
matter of remedies in depth.
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Another point of view expressed by the employers was that while
the legislation was acceptable, its implementation was insufficient.
Indeed, a majority of employer-respondents felt that the investigations
were a waste of time and questioned the usefulness of the whole in-
vestigative process. As one respondent indicated: "The basic laws are
good but the time factor involved for completing cases and arriving
at decisions is too lengthy and very time consuming." As an alternative
to the investigation, the employers generally felt that they could ac-
complish the same results as the commissions by themselves without
governmental interference or intrusion. One employer stated that "we
feel we are not only working within the meaning and intent of the law
but also doing additional things not required by law."
With respect to change or reform of the laws, when the responses
of those in favor of abolishing the laws and those in favor of weakening
the laws are combined,55 the trend suggests that a large number of
respondents (60 percent) want the present laws changed. Here again,
one might speculate that respondent employers either do not under-
stand the problem, do not recognize the problem, or possibly recognize
and understand the problem of discrimination but still discriminate.
In any event, based upon the survey responses, many employers find
the laws acceptable but would prefer to have them weakened or
abolished.
Further, the laws and concomitant implementation have generally
had little effect on hiring policies of employers and attitudes toward
minority groups. Even after C.C.R.C. or E.E.O.C. investigations, a
majority of respondents (68 percent) indicated that they made no
change in hiring policies. Perhaps the most significant response was
that 26 percent of the replying employers said that they would not
hire any minority group members, although it should be noted that 47
percent said that they would be willing to hire additional minority
workers.
B. The Response of Minorities5"
As previously indicated, no conclusive results with so few minority
employee responses can be stated. Nevertheless, it is worthy to note
several high percentages in response to some of the questions, indi-
cating, perhaps, that a larger sample would verify the inferences sug-
gested.
5 Twenty-five percent of the respondents suggested abolishing the laws. Another 35 percent
advocated weakening of the laws. Only 25 percent suggested that the laws be strength-
ened.
56 The data for this section is based on 38 responses. The percentages are based on the total
number of responses per question.
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For example, 88 percent of those who filed complaints knew of
the existence of agencies that dealt with job discrimination before
their problem developed. Most of the complainants became aware of
the governmental commissions through their friends, although it should
be noted that the media also seemed to play an important part in
informing the minorities of their rights.5 7 Since a knowledge of the
commissions' existence seemed to be directly related to the filing of
complaints by minority workers, the inference suggested is that more
publicity with respect to the work of the commissions would encourage
wider recognition of job discrimination by minority employees and a
greater awareness of grievance mechanisms.
Another objective of the questionnaire was to test the differences,
if any, in the way minority employees who filed charges were treated
by their employers or co-workers after filing complaints. Two-thirds
of the sample said that their filing did make a difference; but only
in one-third of the cases was the difference in treatment unfavorable.
Conversely, two-thirds of those who were treated differently seemed to
have received generally better treatment from employers and co-workers.
The questionnaire also attempted to measure the attitude of
minority employees toward the commissions. The results of this survey
indicate that while a majority of those filing complaints with the
E.E.O.C. or the C.C.R.C. felt that their problems were understood by
those taking the complaints, a significant number of respondents felt
that the amount of time necessary for the investigation of complaints
was excessive. When asked how long the investigation-decision process
should take, the majority indicated that it should take about one
month. A lesser number opted for one or two weeks. Significantly,
none of those answering felt that the process should take longer than
one month. Since not infrequently these proceedings take significantly
longer,"8 perhaps the investigator should make clear to the charging
party the amount of time which might elapse before a decision is made.
Even though some dissatisfaction existed among respondents due
to the lengthy investigative process, there were indications that the
work of the commissions received support from minority employees.
Specifically, none of the persons replying to the questionnaire felt
that the present laws did not work at all; all respondents thought that
the laws worked well or that the laws worked "sometimes." Further,
70 percent of the minority employees responding indicated that they
would not hesitate to file another complaint if they were discriminated
against in the future.
5 The media given as choices to the respondents encluded television, newspapers and the
G.I. Forum. Friends and relatives made up roughly 50 percent of the group making
complainants aware of the commissions' existence.




While the results of this study are inconclusive, there are
certain inferences suggested by the frequency of responses to par-
ticular questions which may be valid. For example, a large number
of employers have little or no confidence in the objectivity of the in-
vestigative process undertaken by the C.C.R.C. and the E.E.O.C. Many
feel that the investigators are biased against employers, a factor which
perhaps causes employers to label as invalid the work of the com-
missions. Further, the results indicate that the majority of the respon-
dent employers want to either weaken or abolish the current laws.
In contrast, most of the minority employees want stronger laws.
Yet this attitude does not cause minority workers to negate the work
of the commissions; for employees generally have a more supportive
attitude toward the present work of the E.E.O.C. and the C.C.R.C.
than do the employers, although it should be noted that both em-
ployers and employees feel that the present investigation-decision
process is too lengthy.
Hence, both employers and employees agree that improvements
must be made in the present law although the definition of "improve-
ment" depends upon the point of view, employers viewing "improve-
ment" as a weakening of the laws and employees seeing it as a
strengthening of the laws. Therefore, a great deal of the "self-interest"
demonstrated by both groups must be overcome if the commissions are
to be effective in their efforts to project an objective perspective. Per-
haps as the commissions continue their efforts - trying new approaches,
techniques, and procedures - a balance can be achieved which will
gain at least a modicum of approval from both employers and em-
ployees and which will, at the same time, insure that equal employment
becomes an accepted reality.
APPENDIX
EMPLOYERS' QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What is the size of your workforce? Over 50 Under 50____-
2. How many complaints, whether justified or not, were filed against
you in 1968-1969?-
3. In answering the complaint(s) or in the investigation thereof, did
you use the services of an attorney?
Yes__ No
If yes: House counsel_ Firm_ Other_____
4. Before your first contact with the Federal or State of Colorado
agencies did you have a working knowledge of the equal employ-
ment opportunity laws? Yes__ No__
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5. How were you initially contacted by the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission about the complaint(s) ?
Phone call- Appointment
Letter- Suprise visit_____
6. How were you initially contacted by the E.E.O.C.?
7. How would you wish to be contacted?
8. Do you feel that the investigator from the State Commission
was biased in favor of the person who filed the complaint?
Yes_ No___
9. Do you feel that the investigator from the E.E.O.C. was biased in
favor of the person filing the complaint? Yes_ No_
10. Do you feel that the investigator from either the State or Federal
government confined himself to the subject matter of the com-
plaint? State: Yes- No_ E.E.O.C.: Yes_ No_
11. Do you feel that the investigations were objective?
State: Yes_ No____ E.E.O.C.: Yes__ No_
12. Did the investigators confine themselves to asking questions or
did they look at company records as well?
State: E.E.O.C.:
Only asked questions- Only asked questions-
Looked at records__ Looked at records__
Both_ Both_
13. If an employee feels that he has been discriminated against, do
you maintain a place, office or person where he can file an in-
house, non-union, complaint? Yes__ No____
14. Could you estimate how much money these investigations cost you
or your company in terms of lost man/hours, attorney's fees, or
other services?
Negligible____ More than $100____
More than $50_ More than $500_
Unable to estimate_ Other____
15. Do you believe that the decisions resulting from these investiga-
tions were fair?
E.E.O.C.: Yes- No_ State: Yes -No-
No decision___
16. Did the person filing a complaint approach any of his supervisors
with his problem before filing a complaint with the governmental
agencies? Yes__ No_ Don't know__
17. If this person had approached a supervisor, do you think that the
matter could have been resolved without government action?
Yes__ No_ Don't know__
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18. Do you think that a worthwhile purpose has been served in the
investigation of the complaint?
A worthwhile purpose was served____
Not sure__
The process was a waste of time
19. Do you think that the present Civil Rights legislation is accom-
plishing its purpose in this area (to ensure equal employment
opportunities regardless of race, color, etc.)?
Definitely- Sometimes-
Not at all_ Don't know__
20. Do you feel that there is a need for this type of legislation in Colo-
rado in the 1970's? Yes__ No____ Don't know.__
21. Are the present laws fair to both the employers and to the minority-
group employees? Yes__ No_ If no, would you care
to explain?
22. If you had the power, would you
Abolish the present laws__
Strengthen the laws__
Weaken the laws-
Leave the laws as they are____
Would you care to explain?
23. As a result of the investigation (s) have you made any changes




Would you care to elaborate?
24. Has your experience with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
or the E.E.O.C. changed your attitudes towards the problems of
your minority-group employees?
25. Has your experience with the present equal employment oppor-
tunity laws changed your attitudes towards the hiring of minority-
group employees?
Wish we could hire more_
Indifferent-
Rather not hire any-
26. Thank you for your cooperation. If there is anything you wish
to add concerning the existing federal or state legislation or the





1. Sex: Male__ Female___
2. Age: Under 25- 25-35- 36-50- Over 50.-___





4. Were you encouraged by someone to file a complaint? If so, by
whom?
5. How did you learn about the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission?
6. Did you know about these government agencies before you were
discriminated against? Yes____ No_
7. How long was it before your problem developed and the time you
filed a complaint?
8. About how long was it between the time you filed your complaint
and the time you were informed about the decision?
9. Since filing your complaint, have you been treated differently by
your co-workers? Yes__ No_
your employer? Yes____ No____
10. If yo uanswered yes to question 9, in what way have you been
treated differently?
Better treatment Hostile treatment
Cold shoulder___ Other-_
11. During the investigation of your complaint, did your employer or
supervisor contact you about your complaint? Yes__ No_____
12. Did your employer or supervisor contact you about your complaint
after the investigation? Yes__ No__ If you answered yes,
what did they contact you about?
13. Do you feel that the person who talked to you at the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission understood your problem?
Understood my problem . Didn't understand_
Partially understood__
14. Do you feel that the investigator from the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission understood the problem? Understood my problem-




15. Do you think that the investigator from the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission understood your problem?
Understood my problem - Didn't understand-
Partially understood-L Not contacted_____
16. Do you think that the investigation of your complaint took too
long? Yes____ No____
17. How long do you think it should take to investigate a complaint
of discrimination and make a decision on it?
One week___ One month_
Two weeks- Longer___
18. Do you think that the filing of a complaint helped you in any
way? Yes____ No_ If yes, then how?
19. Do you think that the filing of a complaint has made any differ-
ence in the way other minority-group employees are treated where
you work?
Made things better Made no difference
Made things worse____ Better and worse_____
Could you be specific?
20. Do you think the present anti-discrimination laws work?
Work well_ Don't work at all_ Work sometimes____
21. If your employer discriminates against you in the future will you
file a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission?
Yes_ No____ If no, why not?
22. If you had the power to do anything about the present anti-
discrimination laws would you
Strengthen the present laws__
Weaken the present laws
Leave them alone__
Other (Specific)
23. If there is anything you want to add to this sheet please feel free
to do so. When you are through, please return this questionnaire







CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - GUILTY PLEAS - Voluntariness Where
Motivated by Desire to Escape Death Penalty Under Unconstitutional
Statutory Scheme. -Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970);
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
E ARLY in 1959 Robert Brady was indicted in federal court for kid-
napping and for failing to release the victim unharmed in violation
of the Federal Kidnapping Act.1 He faced a maximum penalty of death
if the verdict of the jury should so recommend.2 After his codefendant
had confessed and on advice of counsel, Brady entered a plea of guilty.
The plea was accepted, but only after the trial judge had twice ques-
tioned Brady concerning its voluntariness.3 Brady was sentenced to 50
years (later reduced to 30 years) imprisonment.
Five years after Brady's conviction, 15 year old Charles Lee Parker
was arrested in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, for suspicion of bur-
glary. After being questioned, he was placed in a jail cell where he spent
the night. The following morning after a short period of questioning,
Parker confessed to burglary and rape. He was subsequently indicted
for first degree burglary, an offense which carries a mandatory death
sentence4 unless the defendant pleads guilty or the jury recommends
mercy.5 On advice of counsel Parker pled guilty; and, following a series
of questions by the trial judge as to its voluntariness, 6 the plea was
accepted. Parker was thereupon sentenced to life imprisonment.
7
1 1 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (1964).
2
Id. § 1201 (a)(1) to (2) (1964), provides that:
(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce,
any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kid-
napped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise,
except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by
death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the
verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term
of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
3 For a verbatim account of the exchange between Brady and the trial judge, see 397 U.S. at
743-44 n.2.
4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1969).
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-162.1 (1965):
In the event [a guilty] plea is accepted, the tender and acceptance thereof shall
have the effect of a jury verdict of guilty of the crime charged with recom-
mendation by the jury in open court that the punishment shall be imprisonment
for life in the State's prison; and thereupon, the court shall pronounce judge-
ment that the defendant be imprisoned for life in the State's prison.
6 For a verbatim account of the exchange see Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 793
n.3 (1970).
71d. at 793.
In 1968, doubt was cast on the validity of the guilty pleas of Brady
and Parker by the decision in the case of United States v. Jackson,8 in
which the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty provision of
the Federal Kidnapping Act on the ground that it imposed an imper-
missible burden upon the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury and the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty. The
precise infirmity of the statutory provision considered in Jackson was
that it immunized from the death sentence those willing to enter a guilty
plea and, therefore, "needlessly" encouraged guilty pleas and jury
waivers.9 Relying on only the implications of Jackson,'0 Brady and
Parker filed petitions in their respective forums seeking post-conviction
relief on the ground that their guilty pleas were motivated by a desire
to escape the death penalty, a motivation supplied by an impermissible,
unconstitutional statutory scheme.1 Both petitions were denied, Brady's
by the lower federal courts12 and Parker's by the North Carolina state
courts.' 3 On review, the Supreme Court held that neither the record in
Brady nor in Parker revealed any basis for disturbing the judgments of
the respective courts below, i.e., that the petitioners' guilty pleas were
tendered voluntarily and knowingly and were therefore valid.' 4
I. GUILTY PLEAS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE STATE OF THE
LAW PRIOR TO BRADY AND PARKER.
It has long been established that a plea of guilty constitutes a
waiver of several fundamental constitutional rights' 5 and is therefore
subject to stringent safeguards.' 6 A constitutionally valid guilty plea
0390 U.S. 570 (1968).
9 ld. at 583.
10 It should be noted that the Court in Jackson was faced only with the question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act. The
Court did not have before it a guilty plea tendered under that act because the defendant's
motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional
had been granted by the district court; no plea was ever entered. Thus, the assumption
by Brady and Parker that their guilty pleas were invalid for having been entered under
constitutionally infirm statutory schemes was pure speculation and was not directly
supported in Jackson.
1* While the North Carolina statute under which Parker had been convicted was not
directly affected by the decision in Jackson, the effect of the North Carolina statute was
the same; and Parker was safe in assuming that it would be invalidated under the
principle announced in Jackson. Indeed, the statute was invalidated on the basis of
Jackson in Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340, 345 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1970).
12 Brady v. United States, 404 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1968).
13 Parker v. State, 2 N.C. App. 27, 162 S.E.2d 526 (1968).
14 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790, 796 (1970).
15 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969): Expressly the right against self-
incrimination, trial by jury, and confrontation of witnesses.
'eSee Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
487 (1962); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Kercheval v. United States,
274 U.S. 220 (1927).
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must be knowingly and voluntarily tendered.17 Although often dis-
cussed under the single generic heading of "voluntariness," ' these two
requirements are separate and distinct elements, and an infirmity in
either serves to vitiate a particular guilty plea. 19
In order to constitute a "knowing" guilty plea, the defendant must
be fully apprised "of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses
included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder,
possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof,
and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole
matter .... Implicit in such a test is the requirement that the infor-
mation upon which the defendant relies must not be false or mis-
leading.
21
The requirement that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily is a more
illusive concept. From a philosophical point of view, the concept of
voluntariness connotes the free exercise of a person's will; but what
constitutes "free will" is open to alternative interpretations. On the
one hand, it is possible to proceed from the premise that the mere
existence of an extraneous inducement will be sufficient to deprive
an act of its voluntariness. Under this view, a guilty plea would be
involuntary unless motivated solely by the defendant's sense of guilt
and remorse. On the other hand, "free will" can be defined in terms
of a rational choice between genuine alternatives.23 With this inter-
pretation, a guilty plea would be involuntary only when the impact of
extraneous inducements is sufficient to cause thfe defendant to make an
17 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
488, 493 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
1s Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900 (4th Cir. 1970).
19 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1962).
2Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
211d. at 720. See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Pursuant to such
reasoning it has been held that a prosecutor's threat to bring charges not permitted by
law or warranted by the evidence is tantamount to presenting a defendant with false and
misleading information and a guilty plea tendered in reliance thereon is invalid. Lassiter
v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900 (4th Cir. 1970). Likewise where a prosecutor fails to keep
a promise of leniency upon which the defendant relied in tendering his plea, the plea
will not be allowed to stand. Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1962).
This latter proposition probably has more to do with ethical due process than with the
"knowing" requirement, but it is possible to argue that the element of deceit implicit in
the broken promise is but another form of false and misleading information.
22 Fortunately for the administration of justice in the United States, the courts have not
embraced this argument; for roughly 90 percent of all convictions in the United States
result from guilty pleas (D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT
OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 8 (1966)), and most of these pleas are induced by
permissible plea bargaining. Thus if the premise that "free will" is negated by the exist-
ence of of any extraneous inducement were adopted by the courts, plea bargaining would
be inherently coercive, and the administration of justice in the United States would be
greatly impaired; but see Chalker, Judicial Myopia, Differential Sentencing and the
Guilty Plea - A Constitutional Examination, 6 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 187 (1968).
22 See Gilmore v. California, 364 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1966); Godlock v. Ross, 259 F. Supp.
659 (E.D.N.C. 1966); United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
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irrational choice.24 This second view would require coercion-in-fact to
render a guilty plea involuntary.
Judicial practice has drawn upon elements of both theories of
voluntariness. For example, courts are often heard to say that it is
necessary to look to all the relevant circumstances, i.e., the "totality of
factors," to determine whether or not the defendant was in fact
coerced.25 However, the inherent impropriety of a given inducement
may compel the conclusion that, irrespective of its actual impact on the
defendant's will, the mere presence of the inducement within his
decision making milieu is sufficient to render a guilty plea invalid. 6
In other words, such an inducement is deemed to be coercive per se.
This dual approach to the problem of voluntariness is illustrated
by the response of the lower courts to the decision in United States v.
Jackson.7 Prior to Jackson, the mere fact that a defendant's decision
to plead guilty was motivated by his fear of the death penalty was
generally held to be insufficient to render his plea invalid." In the
aftermath of Jackson, however, the courts were faced with the problem
of deciding what effect an unconstitutional death penalty provision
should have on the validity of a guilty plea made in fear thereof. Given
the attitude of the courts toward improper inducements, 29 it might
have been expected that the courts would conclude that statutory
schemes such as that condemned in Jackson are inherently coercive
and that all guilty pleas tendered thereunder should be declared invalid.
However, inasmuch as express language in Jackson forbade such an
interpretation,o the courts were forced to adopt alternative positions.
From the quandary there emerged two distinct patterns.
The Fourth Circuit in the case of Alford v. North Carolina3' opted
for a "principal factor" test and held that a prisoner is entitled to relief
if he can demonstrate that his plea was primarily the product of the
24 Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 1387, 1398 (1970).
2Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558
(1954); United States ex rel. Brock v. La Vallee, 306 F. Supp. 159, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); McFarland v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 969, 977 (D. Md. 1968); United
States v. Colson, 230 F. Supp. 953, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Tateo, 214
F. Supp. 560, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28 Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 194-95 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Tateo,
214 F. Supp. 560, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) [Promises of leniency or threats of harsher
punishment by trial judge held to be coercive per se.]
27390 U.S. 570 (1968).
2 Gilmore v. California, 364 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1966); Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F.
Supp. 581, 584 (D.N.J. 1967).
2See cases cited notes 21 & 26 supra.
30 According to the Court "the fact that the Federal Kidnapping Act tends to discourage
defendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly
implies that every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so
involuntarily." 390 U.S. at 583.
31405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968), ret'd, 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1970).
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burdens placed upon him by the unconstitutional statutory scheme.3
According to the court in Alford, when fear of an unconstitutional
death penalty provision was the principal motivating factor in the
defendant's decision to plead guilty, there is no need for a subjective
inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea-the plea is invalid irre-
spective of whether or not the defendant was capable of making a
rational choice."3
Other federal courts have refused to assign any special status to
the constitutionally infirm death penalty and have continued to apply
the subjective "totality of factors" test 4 in an effort to determine
whether the defendant's will was actually overborne.35 This position
appears to be more in keeping with the underlying purpose of the
Jackson rationale which was not to identify inherently coercive induce-
ments and render guilty pleas entered in response thereto invalid, but
rather to remove from the defendant's decisionmaking process induce-
ments which needlessly penalize the assertion of constitutional rights."'
It is this position which is endorsed by the Supreme Court in the instant
cases.
II. BRADY AND PARKER: A CLARIFICATION
The Supreme Court's decision in the instant cases3 7 essentially
reaffirms the traditional "totality of factors" test and, at the same time,
redefines in more precise terms what constitutes an involuntary guilty
plea.8 In arriving at its decision, the Court begins by reiterating what
it said in Jackson concerning the effect of statutory schemes, such as
those condemned, on a guilty plea made thereunder. According to the
Court in Brady: "Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encour-
aged by the fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor
that such encouraged pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not.''89
Thus the Court rejects out of hand the assertion that unconstitutional
321d. at 347. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reaction to the test devised by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, see text accompanying notes 47 & 48, infra.
33 Two district court cases which have applied the Alford test are Quillien v. Leeke, 303 F.
Supp. 698 (D.S.C. 1969); Shaw v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
4 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
3 United States ex rel. Brock v. La Vallee, 306 F. Supp. 159, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Pindell v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Conn. 1969); Wilson v. United
States, 303 F. Supp. 1139, 1143 (W.D. Va. 1969); McFarland v. United States, 284 F.
Supp. 969, 977 (D. Md. 1968).
36390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
37 Since the Court's views on the issue under consideration are more complete in Brady
than in Parker, for purposes of analysis the Brady opinion will be used more extensively.
3 8 A third case, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), decided on the same day
as Brady and Parker also sheds light on the question of when a guilty plea is valid and
when it is not; but inasmuch as it deals with the effect of an allegdly coerced confession
on the validity of a guilty plea, it is beyond the scope of this comment.
39397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970).
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death penalty provisions are inherently coercive. 40 In so doing, the
Court appears to be endorsing a concept of voluntariness which is based
entirely on the impact of the inducement in question on the defendant's
ability to make a rational choice. 4 ' In other words, the nature of the
inducement has no bearing on the question of voluntariness.42
In many respects the Court's holding in these two cases was in-
evitable. In Jackson the Court had invalidated a statutory scheme which
was said to encourage, as opposed to coerce, guilty pleas. Because the
infirmity was said to be a tendency to encourage, the Jackson decision
cast grave constitutional doubts on any and all inducements which are
calculated to encourage guilty pleas, including the time-honored prac-
tice of plea bargaining.4 s If an unconstitutional death penalty provision
and the practice of plea bargaining can be said to suffer from the same
infirmity, it is clear that if the Court had held that all guilty pleas made
in response to the encouragement offered by the unconstitutional statu-
tory scheme are invalid, logic would compel the conclusion that guilty
pleas made in response to like encouragement offered by plea bargain-
ing would be equally invalid.
Of course at first glance the Court could have avoided this un-
desirable result by holding that the statute condemned in Jackson was
infirm not only because it needlessly encouraged guilty pleas but also
because the encouragement involved was the threat of death - a threat
which, by its nature, is coercive. By emphasizing the gravity of the
threat, the Court could have resolved most of the doubts concerning
the constitutionality of plea bargaining without doing violence to its
holding in Jackson. It would then have been free to invalidate the guilty
pleas of Brady and Parker without the fear that its holding would be
cited as justification for invalidating guilty pleas made in response to
less offensive methods of encouragement. However, the Court would
40 As support for this proposition, the Court in Brady cites the case of Laboy v. New Jersey,
266 F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J. 1967), where a plea of non vult under a similar statute was
held voluntary even though the defendant was obsessed by the fear of death to the extent
of suffering a temporary breakdown. Id. at 747.
41 That this indeed represents the Court's view is illustrated by a revealing passage in the
text of the opinion. In rejecting Brady's contention that his plea was involuntary, the
Court notes that there was no evidence "that Brady was so gripped by fear of the death
penalty or hope of leniency that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel,
rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantage of pleading
guilty." 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
42Mr. Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, attacks the Court's position in Brady and
Parker on the ground that it is "totally without precedent." 397 U.S. 790, 800 n.2
(1970). However, as has been previously noted, courts have often considered the impact
on the defendant's ability to make rational choices to be the controlling factor in the
issue of voluntariness. See cases cited in note 23 supra. Where the Court's position docs
differ from that of other courts is in its reluctance to hold that an improper or illicit
inducement is inherently coercive.
43 See Note, supra note 23 at 1387.
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still have been faced with the difficult task of showing how a statutory
threat of the death penalty differs in its coercive effect from the plea
bargaining situation in which the charges are reduced from first to
second degree murder in return for a plea of guilty. Both inducements
threaten the death penalty if the defendant goes to trial, and both offer
a promise of leniency if he does not. Again logic would compel that
if the death penalty provision is inherently coercive, so must be the
plea bargaining situation when the threat of the death penalty is
involved.
Thus no matter which way the court turned, a holding that a
guilty plea is invalid if made within the context of the statutory scheme
condemned in Jackson would have provided serious grounds for attack-
ing other guilty pleas entered in response to a threat of greater punish-
ment or an offer of leniency. The response of the Court to this dilemma
was to revert to the "totality of factors" test 44 and to determine the
question of voluntariness on the record.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BRADY AND PARKER
The Court's clear emphasis on the impact (as opposed to the na-
ture) of inducements on the rationality of choice in determining volun-
tariness is not likely to produce any appreciable change in the prevail-
ing judicial approach to the question of validity of guilty pleas. If the
holding is given broad interpretation, it may be that the inherent coer-
civeness of threats or promises by judges45 will no longer be recognized,
making it necessary to look to the impact of such inducements on the
defendant's will to determine whether his ability to make a rational
choice was actually overborne. On the other hand, because of the un-
equal bargaining power of the judge and defendant and because of
the need to ensure impartiality, it may be that this apparent exception
to the holding in the instant cases will be preserved.
As to unkept promises or threats by prosecutors, the requirement
that the defendant be aware of all relevant circumstances, including
the range of possible penalties, will serve to ensure that a guilty plea
induced by deceit, whether intentional or unintentional, will not be
sustained.
4"
44"The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all of the
relevant circumstances surrounding it." 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).
45 See cases cited note 26 supra.
46 Courts often hold that such promises or threats are coercive per se, but in fact the decep-
tion problem speaks to the knowledge requirement and not to the voluntariness require-
ment. Thus while deception will still have the effect of vitiating a guilty plea made in




In striking down the death penalty provision of the Federal Kid-
napping Act in United States v. Jackson, the Supreme Court clearly
manifested its disapproval of statutory schemes - and, by implication,
of all official acts- which needlessly encourage the waiver of consti-
tutional rights. What was not directly before the Court in Jackson,
however, was the question of the validity of guilty pleas induced by
such schemes. While it may have been logical to assume prior to Brady
and Parker that had the Jackson Court been confronted with this ques-
tion it would have opted for invalidity, the decisions in those cases
expressly reject such a conclusion. Indeed, the decisions in Brady and
Parker do not in any way affect the continued viability of Jackson. In
Brady and Parker the Court merely answers the question left open in
Jackson regarding the validity of guilty pleas tendered within the con-
text of a constitutionally infirm statutory scheme.
By deciding the validity issue in Brady and Parker in terms of the
"totality of factors" test, the Court has to a considerable extent clarified
the concept of voluntariness: Only when an extraneous inducement,
whether proper or improper, has the effect of rendering a defendant
incapable of exercising rational choice will a guilty plea fail for in-
voluntariness. This differs considerably from the "primary factor" test
expounded by the Fourth Circuit in Alford v. North Carolina47 and
endorsed by the concurring and dissenting justices in the instant cases. 4 1
The primary difference between the two positions is one of emphasis.
While both pay homage to some sort of "factors" test, the tack taken
in Alford was to give conclusive weight to illicit inducements. Thus
the emphasis there was on the nature of the inducement while the
emphasis in the instant cases is on the impact of the inducement.
The Supreme Court recently had occasion to review the decision
in Alford, and in so doing it expressly rejected the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 49 Relying on its decision in
Brady, the Court held that the standard for determining the validity
of guilty pleas "remains, [sic] whether the plea represents a voluntary
and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant.... That he would not have pleaded except for the oppor-
tunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate
that the plea of guilty was not the product of a free and rational choice
47405 F.2d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1970).
48 397 U.S. 790, 808 (1970) wherein Mr. Justice Brennan stated: "If a particular defendant
can demonstrate that the death penalty scheme exercised a significant influence upon his
decision to plead guilty, then, under Jackson, he is entitled to reversal of the conviction
based upon his illicitly produced plea."
4North Carolina v. Alford, 39 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4002 (1970).
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.... -50 Thus, the Supreme Court in Alford clearly reaffirmed the prin-
ciples announced in Brady and Parker and left little doubt as to what
constitutes the proper test for determining the validity of guilty pleas.
Despite its clarity of statement, the test endorsed by the Court in
Brady and Parker is limited by the obvious difficulty of quantifying
the impact of the various inducements so as to be able to ascertain
whether or not a particular defendant was rendered incapable of ra-
tional choice. Perhaps as the lower courts begin to apply the test, the
mechanics of application will come into more precise focus.5 '
3MId. at 4002. It should be noted that a factual variation in Alford raised an additional
issue apart from the question of the voluntariness of Alford's plea. It seems that after
his guilty plea had been tendered but before it had been accepted, Alford denied he
had committed the murder for which he had been charged. Nevertheless he reaffirmed
his desire to plead guilty in order to avoid a possible death sentence. In spite of Alford's
protestations of innocence, the trial court, after considering the strength of the State's
case, accepted his plea and sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment. Thus, on review the
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a guilty plea can be accepted when
it is accompanied by protestations of innocence and hence contains only a waiver of trial
but no admission of guilt. In deciding this issue, the Court referred to language in Brady
which in that context unequivocally stated that admission of guilt by the defendant is
"[clentral to the plea and is the foundation for entering judgment .... " 397 U.S. 742,
748. In an obvious attempt to get around what would otherwise be troublesome language,
the Court in Alford qualifies the statement in Brady by stating that admission of guilt
is normall central to the plea. 39 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4003 (1970). Having surmounted
this obstacle, the Court then proceeds to hold that "while most pleas of guilty consist of
both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a
constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty." Id. at 4004. Furthermoxe,
a trial judge who accepts a plea which is accompanied by protestations of innocence does
not commit constitutional error so long as he has reason to believe that there is a factual
basis for the plea. Id.
' It should be noted that two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court ameliorate to some
extent the magnitude of this problem. In AMcCarth) v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969), the Court held that the trial court, before acepting a guilty plea, must comply
with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and satisfy itself
as to the voluntariness, intelligence, and factual basis of the plea. Id. at 467. Where
this requirement is met the appellate courts will not disturb the judgment of the trial
court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 470. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969), this requirement was extended to state courts. Id. at 243. Thus at
least as to guilty pleas made after McCarthy and Boykin the appellate courts will seldom
have to undertake the task of ascertaining from the record the impact of any particular
inducement on the defendant's freedom of choice.
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